

**AMERICAN ZIONISM
and
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
1942 — 1947**

by
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THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

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NOTE TO SECOND IMPRESSION

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To My Parents

PREFACE

The birth of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, marked the climax of a vigorous campaign launched some six years earlier by world Zionism in the Biltmore Program. At the Biltmore Conference the Zionists had reason to proclaim openly their political intentions before the American public. Although political Zionism had long pursued the goal of a Jewish state, only the circumstances of modern history compelled the complete unveiling of Zionist intentions. Having once enunciated their program before the country whose favor was considered essential, the Zionist Organization proceeded to organize American Jewry behind the Biltmore Program. After some initial difficulty the Zionists could claim that they spoke for the majority of American Jews on the question of Palestine. It could now be argued that American Jewry demanded appropriate action by their Government. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the realities of American politics and capitalizing on a multitude of fortunate circumstances, the Zionists were able to organize a large segment of public opinion in support of their program. Eventually, not only was Congress led to endorse the essence of the Biltmore Program but even the President was somewhat reluctantly induced to follow suit.

But while the Administration was led to espouse the Zionist platform, numerous diplomatic, strategic and eco-

nomic factors tended to check and restrain this endorsement. Indeed, so far had these counter factors progressed before the death of President Roosevelt that there seemed every indication to believe that the Zionists were still far from achieving their goal.

The unexpected death of Roosevelt and his replacement by Harry S. Truman again allowed the Zionists to advance their efforts to secure stronger Congressional and Presidential endorsement. Truman's unfamiliarity with the wider implications of the Palestine situation, together with his strong humanitarian inclinations, led him at first to give his unqualified support to the Zionist program. Very shortly, however, as the consequences of this endorsement became more evident, Truman sought to employ the same techniques as his predecessor in order to straddle the issue.

Meanwhile, the full force of political Zionism had come to be concentrated in the United States. Since Britain had proved intractable, it was evident that only the militant leadership of American Zionism could weight the scales in favor of the Zionists once more. The shift in Zionist leadership occurred at the very time when the United States, acting through the United Nations, could be utilized as a ready tool. Eventually, in November 1947, a resolution calling for the partition of Palestine was secured from the United Nations with strong support both from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Afterthoughts on the possible international consequences of the partition resolution again led the Administration to seek a delay in resolving the issue. Nevertheless, despite the vigorous efforts of opposed interest groups, the Administration supported and then recognized the Zionist accomplishment. Thus, during the course of six years the Zionist Organization had succeeded in translating the Biltmore Program into American foreign policy.

The object of this book is to trace the development of the Zionist strategy and to set forth wherever possible the immediate links between Zionist activity and the development of American diplomacy. An attempt will be made to unfold the plan by which the Zionists succeeded in building up a strong and vociferous interest group which could utilize the American political system so as to have its program adopted as American foreign policy. Like many other interest groups which seek, with varying degrees of success, to have their programs embodied in American foreign policy, the Zionists have employed the means open to all groups in the American system. Although particular tactics might be deplored by opponents of this policy, the general procedures employed by the Zionists seem to be within the framework of democratic techniques. The author has no desire to make a general judgment on the policies pursued by the Zionist Organization. While the compass of this book embraces the techniques employed by the Zionist Organization, it does not at all negate the fact that Arab interest groups were simultaneously exerting strong but not nearly so effective pressures in the opposite direction. Moreover, the author does not intend to conclude that the creation of the State of Israel was entirely due to the direction taken by American foreign policy. Indeed, some would maintain that Israel owes its birth essentially to the activities of Haganah, the Irgun and even the Stern Gang, all of which would explain the British withdrawal from Palestine. If this latter thesis is maintained, then the influence of American foreign policy is reduced to a minimum. Since the proportionate weight of these various influences cannot now be assessed, the author seeks to demonstrate only that the Zionist Organization substantially affected American foreign policy through a given set of techniques.

The author is deeply indebted to the custodians of

various manuscript collections who have been very gracious in lending all possible assistance. Mr. Robert Hill, Manuscripts Librarian of the New York Public Library, Mr. Howard Gotlieb, Librarian of Historical Manuscripts of the Yale University Library, Dr. J. Joseph Huthmacher of Georgetown University, and Mr. Herman Kahn, Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, have enabled the author to use the Bloom, Stimson, Wagner and Roosevelt collections which are respectively in their care. The Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, the Middle East Institute Library, the United Nations Information Office in Washington, D.C., have all assisted the author in his efforts. Dr. H. Schuyler Foster, Director of the Public Opinion Studies Staff of the Department of State, gave much appreciated assistance on matters of public opinion. The author is particularly indebted to Mr. Irwin M. Herrman and Dr. Elmer Berger of the American Council of Judaism who gave the author many important insights. Mr. Alfred Lilienthal, Mr. Kermit Roosevelt and Mr. Edwin H. Wright have also made many valuable suggestions. The initial work done in this field by Dr. Alan Taylor has been of great benefit and his suggestions as the author began work on the topic were most helpful. Through the kind services of the Honorable Frances P. Bolton, Rev. A. J. Peverada, C.S.C., and the Honorable Daniel J. Flood the author has been assisted in securing needed materials. The services of the King's College Library were always available to the author. Dr. Hisham B. Sharabi, Dr. Jules Davids and Dr. J. Joseph Huthmacher of the Georgetown Graduate School have offered valuable criticism in the reading of the manuscript.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	xv
I. THE BILTMORE PROGRAM AND AMERICAN JEWRY	1
<i>The White Paper and a New Zionist Policy— The Biltmore Program—The Biltmore Pro- gram and the Pittsburgh Conference—Prepa- rations for the American Jewish Assembly or Conference—The American Jewish Conference and the Biltmore Program</i>	
II. ZIONIST APPEALS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC	17
<i>Analysis of Zionist Techniques and Themes— Press and Publications—Mass Meetings and Protest Rallies—The Jewish School and Rab- binate—The Emergency Council—Winning Christian Support—Early Weaknesses in the Zionist Campaign—A Militant Leadership and Program—A Test Issue: the Anti-White Paper Campaign</i>	
III. THE POLITICAL FRONT—1944	37
<i>Palestine Resolution Proposed—Presidential Statement on Palestine—The Palestine Issue at the Political Conventions—Renewed Pres- sure for a Palestine Resolution</i>	
IV. ZIONISM AND THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION	62
<i>Roosevelt and Traditional Executive Policy— War-time Policy Toward Palestine—The Refu- gee Problem and Zionism—The Administra-</i>	

<i>tion and the Arab Nations—Zionist Reaction to Arab Contacts—Renewed Assurances to Zionists and Arabs—Palestine and the Election of 1944—Post-election Policy—Roosevelt and Ibn Saud—Aftermath of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud Conversations</i>	
V. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL FRONT, 1945-1946	95
<i>The San Francisco Conference—Efforts to Secure National Support—Fund Raising Activities—Renewed Pressure for a Palestine Resolution—The British Loan and Anti-British Demonstrations—The November, 1946, Congressional Elections—Division in Zionist Ranks—The Basle Conference and Zionist Strategy</i>	
VI. ZIONISM AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, 1945-1947	125
<i>Truman Receives the Palestine Question—A Program of Action: the Harrison Report and Its Aftermath—The State Department Suggests Caution—The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry—The Morrison-Grady Committee and the End of Anglo-American Efforts</i>	
VII. BACKGROUND TO PARTITION	161
<i>Zionist Strategy at the United Nations—The United States and UNSCOP Activities—The Vote for Partition</i>	
VIII. AFTERMATH OF PARTITION	186
<i>Background to American Reversal—Zionist Reaction to American Retreat—Reversal at the United Nations—Creation and Recognition of the State of Israel</i>	
APPENDIX	211
<i>Extract from Henry Stimson's Diary, March 8, 1944—Letter of Louis Lipsky to Sol Bloom, May 8, 1944—Letter of Arthur Lourie to Senator Wagner, November 3, 1945—Confidential Memorandum from Emanuel Neumann to Senator Wagner, March 14, 1947</i>	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	220
INDEX	229

INTRODUCTION

Although the idea of Zionism had for centuries constituted an element of Jewish and Christian thinking, it was not until the twentieth century that it became a political movement. As a reaction to the assimilation of Jewry within Gentile society, certain Jews began to fear the loss of their identity as a people and organized to prevent such an occurrence. Like many other nationalist movements of the time, the Zionists felt that the Jews were also a people who could maintain their existence only through a political state. This nationalist sentiment on the part of certain Jews was stimulated by the growth of racist nationalism within Christendom which objected to Jewish assimilation. Another important element destined to play a leading role in the Zionist movement was the religious sentiment of Orthodox Jewish groups which now saw in Jewish nationalism the only bulwark for the preservation of the Jewish faith.¹ Almost from the start, however, opposition to political Zionism arose both within and without Jewish circles.

As a result of anti-Semitism aroused in France during the Dreyfus Affair, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), an Austrian journalist, wrote his famous *Der Judenstaat* (1896) in

1. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism Its Meaning and History* (New York: Van Nostrand Company, 1955), p. 75.

which he demanded a land for the homeless Jewish people. Herzl suggested that either a part of Argentina or Palestine might provide a possible location for a Jewish state.² That Herzl considered Argentina as a possibility reveals that he was primarily interested in meeting the problem of anti-Semitism. The idea of a Jewish state as a fulfillment of prophecy came later and to some extent was designed as an emotional appeal.

In response to Herzl's pleas the First Zionist Congress met at Basle in August, 1897, and drew up a program destined to remain the essential foundation of Zionist policy for sixty years. The program proposed included, (1) the acquisition of an internationally recognized right for the Jewish people to colonize Palestine, (2) the promotion of large-scale Jewish colonization of Palestine, and (3) the creation of an organization to unite all Jews in support of Zionism. Although this program was in accord with the suggestions made by Herzl, the Basle Congress failed to declare that the purpose of Zionism was to create a Jewish state in Palestine. Rather, in view of the fact that many Jews, as well as the Turkish Government, would not favor the creation of a Jewish state, the Basle Congress declared the purpose of Zionism was "to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."³ However, this does not mean that the Basle Congress rejected Herzl's views. It merely hoped to lessen antagonism while at the same time the ultimate goal

2. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State, an Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Problem*, trans. by Sylvie D'Avigdor (New York: Scopus Publishing Company, 1943).

3. Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), I, 209.

of statehood was not ruled out. Before adjourning, the Basle Congress also set up the apparatus of the World Zionist Organization headed by a permanent Executive.

As first elected President of the Zionist Organization, Herzl sought to secure support from the Kaiser and then from the Sultan of Turkey for the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine. Meeting with no success in these quarters, Herzl turned his attention to Great Britain. That Government rejected an appeal from the Zionist Executive for portions of the Sinai Peninsula, but offered instead the territory of Uganda for colonization in 1903.⁴ While Herzl favored the Uganda proposal as a temporary measure, the Sixth Zionist Congress did nothing more than send a commission to investigate. A year after Herzl's death in 1904, the Seventh Zionist Congress declared that Zionism was concerned solely with Palestine.⁵

Chaim Weizmann, an immigrant chemist from Russia, helped to intensify Zionist interest in Britain. Soon to become the recognized leader of the Zionist movement, Weizmann was earnestly seeking support from British political leaders by 1906. Arthur Balfour, although not then a member of the British Government, was profoundly affected by Weizmann, as was David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel. Numerous Christians, perhaps from reasons best set forth by Arnold Toynbee, found much to support in the Zionist cause. But it was especially by associating Zionist goals with the needs of British foreign

4. Nahum Sokolow, *History of Zionism, 1600-1918* (London: Longman's, Green and Company, 1919), I, 295f.

5. Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Holy Land Under the Mandate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), I, 303.

6. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), VIII, 308.

tion, the first half of the Zionist policy was ended. Since various governments lent their support to the Balfour Declaration, it was now taken for granted that the "legal" right of the Jews to build a National Home in Palestine had been established. Indeed, this use of the word "legal," without reference to the inhabitants of Palestine, was to prove extremely useful in the effort to win over world public opinion to the Zionist cause.

As a result of the Allied victory and the establishment of the mandates system, Palestine, under British administration, was opened to Jewish immigration. At the same time the Jews were enabled to develop their own self-governing institutions by means of the Jewish Agency, an organ provided for in the text of the mandate.

In order to create machinery capable of handling the expanded operations of the Zionist Organization in its efforts to build up Palestine, a conference was called in February, 1919, by Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, a leading Zionist from the continent. This meeting, known as the London Conference, established a Central Office with headquarters in the British capital. A second conference which met in 1920 elected Chaim Weizmann as President of the Zionist Organization and then proceeded to concentrate on the second requirement of the Herzlian program—the colonization of Palestine. Elaborate plans were accordingly devised to create special funds which would facilitate a program of planned land acquisition.

The third requirement of the Herzlian program—that of winning the support of world Jewry for the cause of political Zionism—now occupied Weizmann's attention. In addition to winning support from non-Zionists, it was also necessary to unite those Zionist groups already exist-

ing throughout the world. The tool selected by Weizmann to accomplish both these purposes was the Jewish Agency. That organ had been provided for in the mandate and it was recognized by the British Government that the Zionist Organization was to serve as such an agency. The Zionist Organization had formally accepted the rights and duties of the Jewish Agency in 1922 and expressed the hope that the Agency would represent the whole Jewish people.¹³ However, as an instrument of the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency was far from being representative of world Jewry. Yet there were forces both within and without Zionist circles which viewed with alarm any extension of the Agency. A strong group of American Zionists led by Judge Brandeis believed such an extension unnecessary. However, by 1923 the control of American Zionism had passed from Brandeis, and Weizmann's path was made easier. Weizmann also worked to overcome opposition against the inclusion of non-Zionists in the Agency at the Zionist Congress of 1925. Eventually that body supported Weizmann's plan for the establishment of a Council for the Jewish Agency composed equally of Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. Of the non-Zionist participants, the Congress stated that 40% should be from the United States. Since that country had many non-Zionist Jews it was considered to be a primary goal in the quest for enlisting universal Jewish support.¹⁴

Even before Weizmann had secured official sanction for his plans to recruit non-Zionist American Jews, he had taken preliminary steps in that direction. Louis

13. Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement* (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1945), pp. 123-25.

14. Israel Cohen, *A Short History of Zionism* (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1951), p. 125f.

Marshall, a recognized leader of American Jewry, had been contacted in 1923 and was completely won over.¹⁵ Felix Warburg, another Jewish leader, fell in line after a visit to Palestine. It was especially through these men that American Jewry began assisting the Zionist movement both through fund-raising campaigns and through attempts to secure Congressional support for Jewish endeavors in Palestine. Consequently, various resolutions in the vein of the Balfour Declaration were secured from Congress although none of these went beyond the generalities contained in that document. Messages of endorsement from various presidents would be no more specific. At last, in 1927, Marshall formally agreed to the extension of the Agency and both he and Warburg assured Weizmann of the continued financial and moral support of American Jewry.¹⁶

During the 1930's Zionist efforts in Palestine ran into increasing hostility from the Arabs. Numerous riots and a continued refusal on the part of the Arabs to participate in any Palestinian government led to a greater caution in London. Although various commissions of inquiry were sent to look into the situation, their recommendations were invariably side-tracked by Zionist influence in London. However, by 1939 the threat of war demanded immediate action and the MacDonald White Paper was enacted despite Zionist protests. Jewish immigration into Palestine was thereby severely limited.

The prospect of war also led the World Zionist Congress, which met in Geneva in August, 1939, to establish an Emergency Council for Zionist Affairs in the United

15. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 308.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

States. In the event that the Jerusalem headquarters might be cut off from the rest of the movement, that body could assume international leadership. At the same time it could capitalize on the expected American primacy in the post-war world. This Emergency Council did not immediately prefix the word "American" to its title or seek to direct all American Zionist parties. An important element of control was still maintained over this body by Dr. Weizmann and the Jewish Agency but they became increasingly eager to make the American Zionists appear as the center of the movement. This was necessary in order to obtain the support of the American people and government should Britain persist in her support of the White Paper. A move in that direction was initiated in 1941 when a committee sought American Zionist approval of the aims of the Jewish Agency prior to submitting them to the Inner General Council in Jerusalem. Finally, in 1942, American Zionism was induced to lend its full support to a new and vigorous course of action. It is this reorientation of political Zionism as it affected the American political scene that the author sets out to explore.

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I THE BILTMORE PROGRAM AND AMERICAN JEWRY

The White Paper and a new Zionist policy.—Ever since the release of the MacDonald White Paper on May 17, 1939, the leaders of world Zionism had sought new avenues which might lead more directly to the Zionist goal—the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine as preparatory to the creation of a Jewish state. Having successfully acquired immigration rights by means of the British mandate over Palestine, the Zionists had previously seen their ambitions advanced through astute diplomacy with the British Government. Had the process of gradual immigration inaugurated by the establishment of the mandate been permitted to continue, Palestine would have eventually seen a Jewish majority. But this possibility was precluded by the White Paper which limited and promised final discontinuance of Jewish immigration after five years.¹

With war on the horizon in 1939, Britain saw it in her best interests to seek the solid friendship of the Arab Near East, even if this should mean sacrificing her sup-

1. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People* (New York: Jewish Agency, 1947), p. 100.

port of Zionism. Since not only the Jews of Palestine but Jews everywhere were menaced by the rise of Hitler, their support of the British war effort was assured. Such was not the case, however, with the Arabs, many of whom believed that they had been treacherously deceived by the British Government. Some of the restless Arab nationalists were indeed open to Nazi help should it prove the only means for realizing Arab aspirations. Given the situation, the limitation of Jewish immigration into Palestine seemed essential for the purposes of the British war effort.²

The effect of the White Paper was therefore to undermine Chaim Weizmann's policy of "gradualism" which sought to achieve the Zionist goal through cooperation with Britain. Instead, the mandate now appeared as an obstacle to the building up of a Jewish majority in Palestine, and the Zionist leadership therefore demanded the termination of the mandate. Palestinian Zionists, led by David Ben-Gurion, denounced the White Paper and by the end of 1939 even Weizmann voiced the necessity for a new policy. This policy, dictated by a change in circumstances, called for the creation of a Jewish state even though this meant unconcealed hostility towards the British Government.³

Concurrent with Zionist non-cooperation in Palestine, Zionist leaders in the United States began to speak in terms of a Jewish commonwealth to be set up after the war. Since Britain appeared as an obstacle to the attainment of this goal, political and diplomatic activity had to be shifted to the United States. That nation, it could be assumed, would emerge as a dominant and deciding

2. Alan Taylor, *Prelude to Israel* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 56.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

power in the post-war era. However, American Zionist leaders spoke out against any form of partition and demanded the creation of a Jewish commonwealth within the "historic boundaries of Palestine."⁴ Anything else was regarded as compromise or betrayal.

The implementation of this new program demanded the convening of a representative body which might boldly proclaim the post-war ambitions of world Zionism. At the same time, the Zionists of the United States had to appear in a key role if they were to be called upon to win over the American nation. Under the sponsorship of the Emergency Council of the Zionist Organization of America, a conference was called at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May of 1942 in order to secure both these ends.

The Biltmore Program.—The Biltmore Conference was addressed by such outstanding Zionists as Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, and Nahum Goldman. The remarks of Ben-Gurion, political leader of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency, were of extreme importance. He demanded that the concept of bi-nationalism be discarded if it meant offering the Palestinian Arabs equal representation in the government. Should his policy be carried through it could only mean that a Jewish state would emerge. Ben-Gurion's words were not lost on his audience and the Conference resolved to implement fully the Basle program of 1897.⁵ The basic clarity of purpose always present in political Zionism now lay revealed at the Biltmore Conference. The last three of the eight resolutions comprising the Biltmore Declaration spell out the new program:

4. *New Palestine*, May 15, 1942, p. 4.

5. *Ibid.*

6. The Conference calls for the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which "recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" was to afford them the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine. . . .

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defense of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be estab-

lished as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

Then and only then will the age-old wrong to the Jewish people be righted.

With this declaration the American Zionists, who had hitherto hesitated to formulate the ultimate aim of the movement, preferring instead to concentrate on the practical task of building the Jewish National Home, now promulgated the political program which henceforth guided their efforts in the Jewish community.⁷

The Biltmore Program, and the enthusiasm engendered in the process of its formulation, served to heighten the prestige of the Zionist leadership and to unite the majority of world-Zionism behind the platform of statehood. This policy, which the British Government felt went very much beyond either the Balfour Declaration or the declaration of policy contained in Command Paper 1700 of June 3, 1922, was endorsed by the General Council of the Zionist Organization in Jerusalem.⁸ The effect of the Biltmore Program, in the words of *New Palestine*, was to indicate that "the day of appeasement is past . . . Zionism must now recover the missionary zeal of its early years. To convert non-Zionists and even anti-Zionists to our cause must be the task to which every one of us addresses himself."⁹

The Biltmore Program and the Pittsburgh Confer-

6. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 227.

7. Isaac Levitats, "Pro-Palestine and Zionist Activities," *American Jewish Yearbook*, XLV, 207.

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 133.

9. *New Palestine*, May 15, 1942, p. 4.

ence.—By January, 1943, the Zionist attempt to enlist the American Jewish community behind the Biltmore Program had been launched. But the first attempt did not emanate from the Zionist Organization of America or from the American Emergency Council for Zionist Affairs, rather, it came from the Zionist-minded president of B'nai B'rith, Henry Monsky. Like many other Zionist leaders, Monsky was a Jewish nationalist from Eastern Europe who sought to link Zionism with the day-to-day Jewish interest.¹⁰ Through letters dated January 6, 1943, he invited thirty-four national Jewish organizations to select delegates to a preliminary conference in Pittsburgh. The purpose of this meeting said Monsky, was to bring together the representatives of the American Jewish community in order that they might devise a common program "with respect to the post-war status of Jews and the up-building of a Jewish Palestine."¹¹

Although the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee declined to participate in the conference, delegates from all other invited organizations assembled in Pittsburgh on January 23-24, 1943. Representing approximately one million members, these delegates decided to convene an American Jewish Assembly to

10. *New Judea*, XXIII (June, 1947), 188.

11. *American Jewish Conference, Its Organization and Proceedings* (New York: American Jewish Conference, 1944), p. 319. Hereafter cited as *AJCOP*. According to Morris Waldman, Executive Secretary of the American Jewish Committee, this move was made because the Zionists had despaired of reaching an agreement with the American Jewish Committee, and had therefore "decided to corral as many Zionist complexioned organizations as possible in order to secure mass support for the maximum Zionist program." Only an appeal by the AJC to Weizmann was said to have prevented the Pittsburgh meeting from adopting the Biltmore Program, a course which the Committee held would only widen the gap between Zionists and non-Zionists. *Nor By Power* (New York: Independent Universities Press, 1953), p. 252.

promote a common program on Palestine.¹² While the Pittsburgh meeting took no definite action on the Palestine question, that issue clearly underlay the discussion that followed. Monsky called attention to the "state of confusion" existing in the American Jewish Committee concerning the political aspirations of Zionism. He also rebuked the American Council for Judaism for holding up Jewish quarrels for public gaze and criticism.¹³

Judge Morris Rothenberg, representing the Zionist Organization of America, expressed his belief that the proposed Assembly was necessary in order to obtain "a recording of the majority of Jews . . . as expressed through the democratic forum." This was necessary, said Rothenberg, to correct the faulty impression conveyed by certain Jewish groups and rabbis that the vast majority of American Jews were opposed to Zionism.¹⁴ The Zionists apparently believed, and later events proved them correct, that closer organization of American Jewry would primarily benefit the Zionist cause.

Preparations for the American Jewish Assembly or Conference.—The Pittsburgh meeting was termed an historic conference, not only by the Zionists but by virtually the entire Jewish press.¹⁵ The meeting created an Executive Committee to formulate a call for the proposed Assembly, to fix the date for elections of delegates, to raise necessary funds, and to set the date and place of the anticipated meeting. The Assembly, it was decided, would consist of five hundred delegates, of whom three

12. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 323-26.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21.

15. *New Palestine*, February 3, 1944, pp. 3-5.

hundred seventy-five would be elected through local or regional conferences by the communities on the basis of their Jewish populations, while one hundred seventy-five delegates would be named by the cooperating national membership organizations. Although national organizations were to be represented on the basis of parity, proportional representation was to be used in the local elections in order to assure minority representation.¹⁶

The American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee, both of which had previously declined to attend the Pittsburgh meeting, were ultimately involved in the proposed Assembly. The American Jewish Committee had originally objected to the name "Assembly" on the grounds that it implied a separate political enclave.¹⁷ After much correspondence between the Executive Committee for the Assembly and the American Jewish Committee, a compromise agreement was reached. The American Jewish Committee agreed that the forthcoming meeting might claim to speak for all American Jewry in order to secure a program of united action, and in return, the Executive Committee agreed to change the proposed "Assembly" into a "Conference." This was to allow any participating organization to dissent from, and so dissenting, not to be bound by the conclusions of the Conference.¹⁸ Under these conditions the American Jewish Committee subscribed to the "Call for the American Jewish Conference" released on April 30, 1943.¹⁹ Likewise, the Jewish Labor Committee decided to participate in the Conference after being granted sixteen seats. This

16. *AJCOP*, pp. 32-34.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

19. *Congress Weekly*, April 30, 1943, p. 24.

brought to a total of sixty-five the number of Jewish organizations represented in the Conference.²⁰

Shortly after the adherence of these two influential organizations had been secured, another conflict appeared in the making. The issue concerned the role to be played by the local Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in the election campaigns prior to the convening of the Conference.²¹ This dispute over representation and funds did not assume the form of an open conflict between Zionists and non-Zionists due to a studied attempt to hold the Conference without additional public controversy. In fact, it was this concern on the part of "assimilationist" groups to avoid focusing a public spotlight on the Jews as a distinct group, which played into the hands of the Zionists. However, the press revealed some inkling of controversy when the *Independent Jewish Press Services* charged that a "handful of men," composed of the American Jewish Committee's anti-Zionist officers, unable to rely upon "democratic elections" seemed to be "preparing an alibi for itself in connection with the outcome of the American Jewish Conference" by creating the diversionary cry of "unfair treatment" and "discrimination."²² These charges would prove valuable once the American Jewish Committee began dissenting from the Conference.

According to the election rules devised by the Executive Committee such philanthropical and non-Zionist organizations as the Joint Distribution Committee, the

20. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

21. Nathan Schachner, *The Price of Liberty, A History of the American Jewish Committee* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1948), p. 147.

22. *Independent Jewish News Services*, June 4, 1943, pp. 1A-2A.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and the Organ for Rehabilitation and Training, were excluded from the Conference under a strict interpretation of the meaning of "membership organizations." The American Jewish Committee therefore proposed the co-option of a number of outstanding personalities who would supplement the locally elected and nationally appointed Conference delegates in order to partially correct what it termed the inequalities of the elections. When this proposal was decisively rejected by the Executive Committee the American Jewish Committee refused to become involved in the local elections and charged that they were, in many cases, dominated by electioneering, factional log-rolling and personal bitterness.²³

The Zionist leadership, on the other hand, was keenly aware of the importance of the community-wide elections, and *New Palestine*, the Zionist organ, carried explicit instructions to its readers on the best methods to win victory at the polls. Members were warned by Rabbi Israel Goldstein against electing as delegates persons whose only qualification was social prominence. "The processes of democracy in Jewish life," said Goldstein, "call for a representation of policies rather than of prominent names."²⁴ Candidates were to be considered purely on the merit of their Zionist record.

The Conference elections consequently saw a remarkable success for Zionist efforts. Of the three hundred seventy-nine elected delegates, two hundred forty were formal members of the Zionist Organization of America or its affiliates. When the Conference convened, a Committee of Five, representing the American Jewish Con-

23. Schachner, p. 148.

24. *New Palestine*, May 21, 1943, p. 12.

gress, the American Jewish Committee, the Zionist Organization of America, Poale Zion and B'nai B'rith, was appointed to devise procedures. From this Zionist-dominated organizational apparatus there emerged a system of nine blocks which were to provide the basis for making committee appointments and for allocating speaking time. This system very definitely served Zionist purposes since "independents" were recognized only on the basis of their affiliation with a "bloc," and there remained only one non-Zionist "bloc." The formal Zionist parties and their allies among the Conservative and Orthodox religious groups, together with the Zionist-led B'nai B'rith and American Jewish Congress, thus controlled four-fifths of the voting strength. As the American Jewish Conference prepared to convene on August 29, 1943, it appeared that either as a result of accurate representation or of what some termed as rigged elections and procedures, the Zionist partisans seemed to be in a position to secure a notable victory by binding the American Jewish community to its Biltmore Program.

The American Jewish Conference and the Biltmore Program.—The Palestine question became the central issue as the Conference got under way. Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, a justice of the New York State Supreme Court, and President of the American Jewish Committee, urged that points of agreement be stressed. The American Jewish Committee, like most other Jewish groups, had lent its assistance to various projects in Palestine without, however, calling for a separate Jewish state. Proskauer therefore supported a resolution calling for continued immigration to Palestine. Abba Hillel Silver, active in Zionist affairs from early youth,²⁵ demanded that Jewish unity be

25. *Palestine Affairs*, I (December, 1946), 5.

built upon a stronger plank. Reversing the moderate compromise trend which seemed to mark the early stages of the Conference, Silver continued to expound in strong Herzlian Zionist language. He denounced those who stressed unity at the expense of the traditional goal of world Zionism and boldly called for the creation of a Jewish state. Only in this way, said Silver, could the immemorial problem of Jewish homelessness be resolved.²⁶ Caught up by Silver's eloquent oratory, the delegates responded by repeatedly singing the Zionist National Anthem.

The Conference therefore decided not to content itself with an appeal for free immigration into Palestine but instead adopted the Biltmore Program with its call for a Jewish state. This question was decided in a committee on Palestine consisting of sixty-seven members apportioned on the basis of bloc strength. Discussion in the committee revealed that the Zionists were not completely united on the wisdom of proclaiming a Jewish state or commonwealth in Palestine as the declared goal of the American Jewish community. Judge Proskauer, again speaking for the American Jewish Committee, endorsed a moderate platform and warned that "the practice of asking for everything in the hope of getting something was a very dangerous doctrine. All the people hostile to Jewry," he continued, "are just waiting for the urging of these maximum demands in order to cement the opposition to the legitimate building up of Palestine itself." He further stated that he had "spoken to Washington" and was assured, "from reliable sources which he could not disclose," that "it would be a tragedy to put forth this maximal demand."²⁷ Despite these urgings a new "maximal" resolution was introduced at the fifth and final session of the

26. *AJCOP*, p. 98.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

Palestine committee. Only Proskauer and Jacob Blaustein, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, voted in the negative. The Palestine resolution, which embodied the Biltmore approach, was finally adopted by a vote of 478 to 4 with 19 abstentions.²⁸

The American Jewish Conference marked an important victory for the Zionists in their effort to gain political predominance among American Jewry. Emerging from the Biltmore Conference of 1942 with fixity of purpose and a cohesive leadership, the Zionists were ready and able to convene the American Jewish Conference on their own terms. And this Conference, which claimed to speak for "the over-whelming majority" of American Jewry, proceeded in turn to affirm the Biltmore Program. While certainly not constituted in such a manner as would justify the Zionist claim that at least ninety per cent of American Jewry supported a Jewish state, it did seem to reflect the desire of the majority.²⁹ Dr. Julian Morgenstern, President of Hebrew Union College, believed that a majority of American Jews desired a Jewish commonwealth, but of how large a number there was no way of knowing.³⁰ Large numbers of American Jews had consistently failed to take any stand on Palestine and the Conference could obviously not speak on their behalf. The Conference spoke merely for organized Jewish groups as directed by Zionist techniques. In defense of the techniques employed, Rabbi Joshua Tractenberg declared that the Conference was never meant to be representative

28. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

29. Samuel Halperin, "American Zionism: The Building of a Political Interest Group" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1956, p. 341).

30. Julian Morgenstern, *Unity in American Judaism* (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College, 1945), p. 37.

of the American Jewish community since the delegates were responsible to no community and were bound to represent organization interests. Those delegates, said Tractenberg, elected on a community-wide basis were as lost sheep since they had no voice except through the organizational blocs.³¹ At least through its organizational apparatus, American Jewry was committed to an objective which force of circumstances necessitated. As Hitler's racial madness took its toll, the Zionists pointed to Palestine as the last refuge for the European Jew. No Jewish organization could hope to maintain its power and prestige unless it appeared as eager to save the refugees. Without the European situation the Zionists could not have surmounted the heterogeneity of the Jewish community.³²

As a result of the defeat suffered at the Conference, the American Jewish Committee withdrew and declared that it continued to support a plan calling for the conversion of the mandate into a temporary international trusteeship responsible to the United Nations. The Committee continued to advocate Jewish immigration into Palestine up to the full extent of its economic absorptive capacity.³³

After taking this unpopular stand the American Jewish Committee was forced to seek the enrollment of individuals instead of relying upon corporate membership.³⁴ But before it could hope to enlist mass support, it was necessary to remove the stigma of anti-Zionism attached to it by the Zionists. Consequently, the Com-

31. Joshua Tractenberg, *Conference or Assembly? An Analysis and a Challenge* (Harrisburg, Pa.: author, 1944), p. 5.

32. Halperin, p. 345.

33. AJCOP, p. 165.

34. J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1950), p. 209.

mittee attacked the White Paper of 1939 while making it clear that it did not at that time wish to urge the determination of the final constitutional status of Palestine. Subsequent statements from Proskauer indicated an ever greater desire to avoid conflict with the Zionists. Without regard to the intellectual merits of its position, the American Jewish Committee was to discover that "independence of action was a very unpopular policy to pursue in a community craving unity for many Zionist activities in Palestine."³⁵

Other dissidents from the Conference joined in the movement led by the American Council for Judaism which was founded on the basic proposition that Judaism is a religion of universal values and not a nationality.³⁶ The Council, unlike the Conference or the American Jewish Committee, did not reject the White Paper but opposed only the immigration and land clauses. Those Jews who placed themselves in the ranks of the anti-Zionists were, however, to find themselves faced with many difficulties.³⁷

With the enactment of the Palestine resolution of the American Jewish Conference, the primary Zionist effort to consolidate organized American Jewry behind its program was virtually attained. Within two weeks after the Conference adjourned, Rabbi Israel Goldstein, the new president of the Zionist Organization of America, announced that henceforth the task of the Zionist movement was to

... win the wholehearted approval of the American Government and people for the Zionist program

35. Halperin, p. 325.

36. American Council for Judaism, *Statement of Views*.

37. cf. remarks of Lessing J. Rosenwald in *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 418 and H. Res. 419* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 129.

with respect to Palestine, which now has become the program of the whole of American Jewry represented through the democratically elected American Jewish Conference.³⁸

In pursuance of this program seminars were organized in local communities so that the policy of the Conference might be diffused throughout the entire Jewish population as a preliminary to political action. The Zionist Organization reinstated life membership at the national level and obtained \$100.00 from 2500 persons to constitute an "Emergency Fund" to be used "only for extraordinary purposes in connection with the political struggle which . . . lies ahead."³⁹ Aided by the Interim Committee of the American Jewish Conference, whose membership was almost identical with that of the Zionist Emergency Council, the Zionist Organization was ready to fix its attention on the American public and the United States Congress.

38. *New Palestine*, September 24, 1943, p. 4.

39. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1943, p. 89.

II ZIONIST APPEALS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

Analysis of Zionist techniques and themes.—The Zionist leadership employed a variety of public relations techniques in its effort to enlist the American people behind the program for a Jewish state. These techniques included various types of propaganda organizations and a number of propaganda themes and media calculated to win over the apathetic or uncommitted sectors of the populace, particularly the American Jews.

Much of the data necessary for an adequate presentation of Zionist propaganda is presently not available. The Zionists, like other interest groups which pursue controversial objectives, have taken all possible precautions to keep their activities protected from the public eye. Few interest groups wish to admit that they engage in extensive propaganda because of the stigma associated with the term,¹ and to this rule the Zionists are no exception. A second difficulty is that even when a particular technique employed can be cited, there is almost no way in which its effectiveness can be gauged. Thus, the historical material at hand does not provide a completely reliable

1. This is analyzed by David Truman, *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York, Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1951), p. 4.

guide to the changes in public opinion due to Zionist activity.

But despite the difficulties involved, it is possible to observe certain important aspects of Zionist techniques, and these, seen concurrently with changes in public opinion, leave no doubt that the two were related. Certain elements, such as propaganda appeals, press and publication activities, rallies, education and youth activities, along with rabbinical endorsements, have been constant features of Zionist history and can be investigated to some extent.

Although there has been no adequate analysis of Zionist propaganda appeals, leading addresses and articles by Zionist spokesmen seem to reveal typical themes employed to win adherents for the Biltmore Program. The general content of these appeals has been broken down into ten themes by Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr., in his survey of Zionism:²

1. Zionism is the Jewish badge of honor and the Jew who cares for his people will help Palestine.
2. The achievements of Jewish pioneers in Palestine are a great success and provide an example for all mankind. These achievements in Palestine enhance Jewish pride and self-respect.
3. The Jews everywhere constitute one people—whatever happens to Jews in one land affects their status in another. The European refugees must be helped by their brethren in America.

2. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *National Minorities: An International Problem* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 106-9.

4. Zionism provides meaningful and pleasant activity of a social nature, as well as work for a worthy cause. Zionism means identifying with the history and destiny of the Jewish people —the Zionist cause is dramatic for it combats the enemies of the Jewish people.
5. Zionism is a constructive way to solve the Jewish problem because self-determination is preferable to continuous philanthropy. The Jews must rely upon themselves and not upon the conscience and mercy of the world. No country wants Jewish refugees except Palestine.
6. Zionism perpetuates Judaism and provides for Jewish survival as a distinctive grouping. Palestine will be a cultural center that will enrich American Jewish life. Jewish morale is bolstered by Zionism and the Jew is able to express himself in his own unique way, eventually to the benefit of world culture.
7. Zionism will help end anti-Semitism by ending the abnormality of Jewish national homelessness. When anti-Semitism does occur, it can be compensated for by the Jewish sense of belonging fostered by Zionism.
8. The Jewish State is inevitable. Biblical prophecy, a crying world need, and the achievements of Palestinian Jewry all require a statehood solution.
9. Assistance for Palestine is consonant with loyalty to the United States. Palestine is on the front line of war against Nazism. Palestine is a bulwark of democracy in the feudal Middle East.
10. The Zionist solution proposes historic justice.

A Jewish State is just compensation for innumerable massacres.

Press and publications.—The Yiddish press, which usually endeavored to espouse Orthodoxy and retain ties with “the old country,” had, from a very early period, espoused the Zionist cause.³ A survey released in 1923 had revealed that only one New York Yiddish newspaper failed to qualify as Zionist.⁴ Yiddish dailies reached 535,000 families in 1927. Despite a drop due to more rapid Americanization, 425,000 families, approximately one-third of American Jewry, subscribed to the pro-Zionist Yiddish press in 1945.⁵

As for the national periodicals, twenty of the twenty-four were characterized by one study as very “pro-Palestine,

3. An interesting appraisal of the mission of the press among Jews was given in 1912 by Israel Cohen:

“. . . But this work [economic and intellectual development of Palestine] represents only one aspect of Zionist activity; another consists in the zealous and incessant propaganda which is carried on by countless societies throughout the world. Despite the fifteen years in which the Zionist organization has been in existence, it cannot as yet count upon the active adhesion of anything but a minority of the Jewish people. The process of assimilation had been allowed too long a start: the disintegrating effects of a hundred years of social emancipation cannot be arrested in a day. But the national idea has nevertheless made conquests in the Western citadels of assimilation, and its progress is particularly significant among the Jewish students of universities. . . . The work of propaganda by meetings, by publication, and by world-wide press . . . such is the only road that will save the Jewish people from absorption.”

Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement* (Berlin : Central Zionist Office, 1912), p 31f.

4. Mordecai Soltes, *The Yiddish Press, An Americanizing Agency* (New York: Columbia University, 1923), p. 18.

5. Ben Edidin, *Jewish Community Life in America* (New York: Hebrew Publications Co., 1947), p. 84.

if not actually Zionist," and others were reportedly giving "adequate" coverage to Zionist news.⁶ The Zionist organizations themselves published twenty-seven English language publications which were supplemented by the publishing activities of organizations carrying on specific projects in Palestine. National and local publications had a circulation exceeding 300,000 families in 1940 and 600,000 in 1945.⁷ To these figures must be added the more than 250,000 subscribers to *Congress Weekly*, *Reconstructionist*, *Jewish Spectator*, *Opinion*, and *B'nai B'rith Monthly*, which usually upheld and promoted policies pursued by the Zionist movement.

The general American press was supplied with hundreds of press releases and Zionist objectives were furthered by numerous personal contacts on local newspapers. Later, in 1944, it was reported that ten per cent of the 3,300 news columns reprinting Zionist Organization press releases were found in the general American press. By 1945 this number was increased to twenty-five per cent giving a total of 4,000 columns.⁸ The only newspaper ever accused of being anti-Zionist was the *New York Times*. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Jewish publisher of the *Times*, was charged by Silver as opposing Zionism since 1917. The *Times*, it was said, "never misses an opportunity to focus attention on the anti-Zionist viewpoint."⁹

The Public Relations Department of the Zionist Organization maintained close contact with the outstanding Washington correspondents of the country's press and with the city desks of the Metropolitan newspapers in Greater

6. *New Palestine*, March 21, 1941, p. 11.

7. *Palestine Yearbook I*, 477f.

8. Zionist Organization of America, *47th Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: ZOA, 1944), p. 25 and *48th Annual Report*, p. 33.

9. *New York Times*, November 2, 1943.

New York. Large and impressive press conferences were inaugurated in New York and Washington. The color surrounding a press luncheon tendered Dr. Israel Goldstein gave the impression of a Presidential press conference. Correspondents representing every major Press Association were in attendance, as were representatives of the major radio networks.¹⁰

Zionist organizations were also extensively engaged in the distribution of pamphlets and books. The Zionist Organization of America reported the distribution in the year 1943-1944 of over one million leaflets and pamphlets to public libraries, chaplains, community centers, educators, ministers, writers and others who might further the Zionist cause. Various non-Jewish works such as Rev. Norman MacLean's *His Terrible Swift Sword* (London, 1942), Professor Carl J. Friedrich's *American Policy Towards Palestine* (Washington, 1944), and Frank Gervasi's *To Whom Palestine* (New York, 1946), along with several others, were subsidized from time to time by the Zionists and promoted jointly with commercial publishers.¹¹ Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk's *Palestine, Land of Promise* (New York, 1949), was probably the most successful of the Zionist-inspired and disseminated books.¹² Dr. Lowdermilk presented a popularized treatment of a Jordan Valley Authority proposal and this book, which

10. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 64.

11. American Zionist Emergency Council, *A Report of Activities*, 1940-1946 (New York: AZEC, 1946), pp. 10-11.

12. Dr. Lowdermilk had spent rather more than three months in Palestine and Transjordan in the spring of 1939. Mrs. Lowdermilk, to whom the book was dedicated as "My Comrade and Inspiration," afterwards told a Zionist meeting in London that "although the daughter of a Methodist minister, she was Zionist born and bred." Cited in *Jewish Palestine Appeal News*, March 5 and 12, 1948.

even made the "best seller" lists, was specifically encouraged by Emanuel Neumann, director of the American Emergency Council for Zionist Affairs' public relations program. According to Rabbi Silver, this book served "to dissipate the false propaganda which has been spread concerning Palestine's limited absorptive capacity as an argument for the retention of the White Paper and the curbing of immigration into Palestine."¹³ Zionist monthly sales of books were reported to total between 3,000 and 4,000 throughout the year 1944-1945.¹⁴

Mass meetings and protest rallies.—Another important and effectively employed technique was the mass meeting and protest rally. This device became prominent after Dr. Silver assumed Zionist leadership in August, 1943. Under Silver there was a definite break with the "quietist" tactics which had characterized the previous period. Silver's idea was to create pressure which "would produce results in the highest places both here and abroad."¹⁵ Mass meetings, protest rallies and public petitions proved effective means for creating the desired pressure. A massive open-air protest against British policy in Palestine, staged in Madison Square Park with 200,000 in attendance in August, 1945, perhaps attracted the most attention, but

13. AZEC, *Op. cit.*, p. 10. In this same report Silver includes data on other aspects of Zionist public relations programs, some of which "because of their confidential nature," were not discussed. Cf. Samuel Dinin's discussion of the work of the Zionist Commission on Palestine Surveys, which was assisted by Robert R. Nathan of the War Production Board, Oscar Gass of the Treasury Department, Louis Bean of the Bureau of the Budget, and Colonel Theodore B. Parkar, chief engineer of the TVA, in conjunction with various economic surveys of Palestine's economic capacity. *American Jewish Yearbook*, XLVI (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1947), 179-80.

14. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 15.

15. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 60.

it had its counterparts across the country.¹⁶ The Emergency Council in New York could produce duplicate rallies where and when desired and advised the local Emergency Committees to prevent public demonstrations from becoming scattered or sporadic. Rather,

They must be a united, nationwide effort, carefully planned and organized, utilized at some decisive moment in the campaign. It is not difficult to imagine the cumulative effect of a hundred or more mass meetings held simultaneously on one day throughout the United States in all major communities and extensively reported in the press. It cannot for a moment be doubted that such a demonstration would have a highly significant meaning in Washington.¹⁷

The Jewish school and rabbinate.—The institution of the Jewish school, which was especially designed to perpetuate group survival, was traditionally associated with Palestinian or Zionist themes. Nevertheless, the Zionist flavor was not entirely natural to all of these schools and it was sometimes necessary for the Zionists to turn them to their purposes. This was done by infiltrating the boards of directors or, where this was not possible, by creating pro-Zionist schools.¹⁸

Zionist propaganda in the United States was especially advanced by the American rabbinate. Conservative and Orthodox rabbis were for the most part staunch Zionist supporters. Stephen S. Wise, Abba Hillel Silver, Israel

16. AZEC, *A Report of Activities, 1940-1946*, p. 8.

17. AZEC, *An Outline of Activities for Local Emergency Committees* (New York: AZEC, 1943), p. 6.

18. Halperin, p. 407.

Goldstein, Solomon Goldstein and James G. Heller were a few noteworthy examples of Zionist spokesmen who came from the rabbinical ranks. Being recognized leaders both within Jewish and non-Jewish circles, these rabbis naturally exerted extensive influence in the community.

The Emergency Council.—The chief motivating and directing force in the mobilization of American public opinion behind the Zionist platform was the American Zionist Emergency Council. The organization and activities of this body have already been partially seen in conjunction with other Zionist propaganda techniques. The Emergency Council, from the time of its inception, had primarily aimed to act as an inter-party body for its chief constituent groups—the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, Mizrachi and Paole Zion. However, much of its time had been consumed with resolving internecine Zionist feuds. It was only late in 1940 that the body acquired a full-time secretary and offices of its own in New York. It was not until January, 1941, that Emanuel Neumann assumed the duties of Executive Officer in charge of the Department of Public Relations and Political Action.¹⁹

Winning Christian support: the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Committee on Palestine.—Under the direction of Neumann steps were taken "to educate and arouse American public opinion in behalf of the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth."²⁰ Not the least of Neumann's accomplishments was the formation of the American Palestine Committee under the chairmanship of Senator Robert F. Wagner.

19. Halperin, pp. 414, 418.

20. AZEC, *A Report of Activities*, 1940-1946, pp. 4-5.

As a New Deal liberal, the New York Senator had always shown keen concern for minority groups, especially Jews and Catholics. Indeed, Tammany Hall depended upon the support of these two groups, and Wagner, although a Protestant at the time, did not conceal his sympathy for Jews and Catholics. Wagner was particularly popular as a dinner speaker at Jewish functions and had been prominent in that capacity for many years.

Wagner's concern and interest in the Jewish question was of particular value to the Zionist cause. But unlike many politicians who came to support Zionism for political reasons, the Senator exhibited a spontaneous and natural sympathy for the Zionists. As Wagner's biographer remarked, this attitude arose in part from the Senator's German background, which gave him something of a guilt complex with regard to the Jewish people.²¹ Significantly, Wagner's administrative assistants since 1927 (Simon Rifkind, 1927-1933; Leon Keyserling, 1933-1939; and Philip Levy, 1939-1945) were all Jewish, and it could be safely assumed that they assisted the Senator in understanding the Jewish problem. Whether through his own conviction or in the light of studies supplied him, Wagner's constant claim was that the American Congress had given formal support to the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth in its resolution of 1922—a document which registered American approval of the Balfour Declaration with its restricted meaning of favoring a "national home for the Jewish people."²²

The Senator's papers reveal a constant stream of communications with Neumann concerning the enlistment of

21. From an interview with Dr. Joseph Huthmacher of Georgetown University, custodian of the Wagner Papers. November 4, 1959.

22. *American Palestine Committee, 2nd Annual Dinner*, (May 25, 1942), p. 25. Cf. Esco, I, 251-52.

senatorial support for the American Palestine Committee. Letters such as that dated February 14, 1941, which listed seventeen senators whose names were still missing from a declaration backing the "restoration of Jews in Palestine," were frequent.²³ All of those mentioned in this particular list would appear as signatories to the declaration of seventy senators sponsored by the American Palestine Committee in "its first public action to direct attention to the importance of Palestine in the solution of the problem of Jewish homelessness."²⁴ This practice of enrolling key public figures for a humanitarian cause proved most successful and was facilitated by the almost complete absence of any propaganda favoring the Arab cause. Even such a Catholic clerical figure as Monsignor John F. Ryan of Catholic University was enlisted as a Vice-Chairman. Ryan's association with the Zionists, somewhat unique in view of the marked absence of Catholic clerical figures, can probably be explained both by reason of his long association with Wagner and his traditional concern for humanitarian and liberal measures. Other important figures to be found on the Executive board of the Committee were William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, former Senator William H. King of Utah, and Senator Charles L. McNary who appeared as co-chairman with Wagner. Harold Ickes, Senators Taft and Vandenberg, Attorney-General Jackson, Paul V. McNutt and William Allen White are only a few of the notable persons listed as sponsors or adherents to the Declaration.²⁵ By

23. Palestine File, Wagner Papers (deposited at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.).

24. American Palestine Committee, *Seventy Senators Back "Restoration of Jews in Palestine"* (April 20, 1941) news release.

25. American Palestine Committee (membership list as of May 1, 1942).

the end of the war the American Palestine Committee had grown to a membership of 6,500 public figures, including senators, congressmen, cabinet members, governors, state officers, mayors, jurists, clergymen, educators, writers, publishing, civic and industrial leaders.²⁶

The declaration by the seventy senators secured by the American Palestine Committee, emphasizing as it did "the tragic plight of refugees fleeing from persecution and finding no home," again attempted to link the refugee problem with Palestine as an only solution. The reason for this was clear. For while many Americans might not support the creation of a Jewish state, traditional American humanitarianism could be exploited in favor of the Zionist cause through the refugee problem. Indeed, as later events were to show, the refugee problem had to remain unsolved in order to insure the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Wagner also constantly associated the refugee problem with Palestine as is seen in his solicited letter to the editor of the pro-Zionist *New York Daily Mirror*. Here he stated that "the most immediate urgent problem is to rescue those Jews who can still be rescued by the United Nations; and the best refuge immediately available is the Jewish National Home in Palestine, where those rescued may add their strength to Palestine's great and growing contribution to the Allied war effort."²⁷

26. Hurewitz, p. 210.

27. Wagner to editor of *New York Daily Mirror*, February 22, 1943, Wagner Papers. While Wagner fully committed himself to the Jewish cause in Palestine, he did so only in conjunction with the official and recognized Zionist leadership. In a letter to Will Rogers, Jr. and Ben Hecht, who invited the Senator to join in sponsoring the American League for a Free Palestine, Wagner gave an unqualified rejection. He objected to the organizations connection with the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, "a self-constituted organization representing no responsible elements of Jewry. . . ." Wagner to Rogers and Hecht, May 23, 1944, Wagner Papers.

Another achievement due in great part to Neumann's efforts was the establishment of the Christian Council on Palestine at the end of 1942. By April, 1945, this group numbered close to 2,400 members.²⁸ This organization especially enjoyed the backing of numerous Protestant leaders, many of whom viewed the restoration of Israel in the light of Biblical prophecy.

Early weaknesses in the Zionist campaign.—But despite the successful formation of these public opinion groups, the activities and accomplishments of the Emergency Council in 1942 and 1943 were apparently far from satisfactory. In the official report for 1944 the situation prevailing before August, 1943, was painted in somber colors. According to this report, Zionist prestige in American political and diplomatic circles had reached a new low during 1942 and the first half of 1943. It was pointed out that while prominent officials still continued to address Zionist gatherings, their words "had become models of fence-straddling and vagueness."²⁹ The charge was made that certain "official quarters went so far as to advocate the issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement demanding a cessation of all discussion of the Palestine question," and this plan was reportedly abandoned only because of "the most strenuous efforts on the part of Dr. Wise and his associates."³⁰ The report lamented that the Washington front had been neglected and that up to 1943 there had been no Washington bureau of the Emergency Council. This had forced the Jewish Agency to establish its own offices in Washington even though it had presumed that the Emergency Council would conduct all political work in the United States.³¹ *New Palestine* complained

28. Hurewitz, p. 210.

29. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 59.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

that no Zionist leader existed in that critical period who could command the respect of a Louis Brandeis as in the critical days of World War I.³²

Zionist party factionalism also acted to prevent the full activities deemed necessary to win over the American public. Neumann reportedly spoke of the Emergency Council itself as a conference of ambassadors which committed itself to nothing without endless consultations.³³ Added to this inter-Zionist confusion was the appearance of representatives of the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, a Palestinian terrorist group or at least having terrorist associations, which sought to take over the leadership of American Jewry. This group won over thousands of well-intentioned Jews and non-Jews by means of an extensive newspaper ad campaign.³⁴ This state of discord was made even more acute by Neumann's resignation from the Council in December, 1942. He criticized the Emergency Council, saying that Zionist propaganda would never reach its goal as long as the Council remained unaltered and characterized by "recurrent factionalism and personal differences . . . vacillation in policy and in action; absence of centralized administrative direction; failure to adopt a definite program of activities and budgets wholly inadequate to the immensity of the task."³⁵

A militant leadership and program.—It was therefore only after the Zionist victory at the American Jewish Conference in August, 1943, that full attention could be given to the mobilization of American public opinion. At the direct request of Chaim Weizmann, President of the

32. *New Palestine*, May 15, 1942, p. 4.

33. Halperin, p. 418.

34. ZOA, 47th Annual Report, p. 59. cf. Hurewitz, p. 210 for a sketch of the Hebrew Committee's activities.

35. *International Jewish Press Services*, February 12, 1943, pp. 1-3.

World Zionist Organization, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise assumed the Co-Chairmanship of a reorganized American Zionist Emergency Council (now officially changed from American Emergency Council for Zionist Affairs) and the Chairmanship of its Executive Committee.

Silver's approach to public relations was markedly different from that of earlier Zionist leaders. As the 1944 report indicated, Dr. Silver rejected "backstair diplomacy as the sole technique for achieving our goal" and insisted on a program of public relations designed to create national agitation for a Jewish Palestine; hence, his concern for public demonstrations.³⁶ His militant and audible formula which began to shape Zionist policy declared that:

We must build upon the broad base of public sentiment, the approval of public opinion which in the final analysis determines the attitude and action of governments in democratic society.

With all my supreme admiration for the great personalities who are our friends, and for the significance of great personalities in the world crisis today, with my full admiration and full realization of these two facts, I still say, unto you, what the Psalmist said long ago: . . . "Put not your trust in princes . . ."

Put not the future of our movement in the sole keeping of individuals, however friendly, however great; appeal to the masses of the people of the world; talk to the whole of America; make friends everywhere; carry on an active educational propaganda in your circle, within the sphere of your

^{36.} ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 60.

influence, among your own friends. That will sustain them when they come to make important decisions which may involve America's participation in the ultimate solution of the Palestine problem.³⁷

A new and larger budget together with a vigorous leadership enabled "a program of Zionist public relations and political activity on a scale undreamed of heretofore."³⁸ The annual budget, exceeding half a million dollars, was derived from the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Foundation Fund, and thus indirectly from the United Jewish Appeal.³⁹ With this larger budget a "program was designed to reach out into every state of the Union."⁴⁰ The central office was quickly set up in New York and fourteen special departments, each under experts in their respective fields, were immediately established. These included Community Contacts, Information, Publications, Speakers, Research, Intellectual Mobilization, Christian Opinion, American-Jewish Religious Forces, Special Events, Labor Relations, Post-War Political Planning, American Palestine Committee, Economic Resources and Contact with Allied Post-War Groups. At the same time, a permanent bureau was set up in Washington, an office defunct since 1930, and "within a few days official circles began to recognize that a new, vital, dynamic

37. Abba H. Silver, *A Year's Advance: A Political Report Submitted to the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, October 15, 1944* (New York, AZEC, 1944), p. 18.

38. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 60.

39. Little data is available on the financing of the Council. cf. Samuel Dinin, *Zionist Education in the United States* (New York: ZOA, 1944), p. 41.

40. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 60.

force was on the scene.”⁴¹ All of this vigorous activity depended upon over four hundred local Zionist Emergency Committees established by the national headquarters. These committees, located in every major community, were purposely limited to approximately eight or twelve select members and effectively pursued their object of involving all locally functioning Jewish groups in the Zionist cause.

A test issue: the anti-White Paper campaign.—The first major project of the Emergency Council after the reorganization of August, 1943, was the mobilization of American public opinion, both Jewish and non-Jewish, in support of a massive protest against the British White Paper which was to choke off all further immigration into Palestine in April, 1944. This campaign was viewed as “educational” in the sense of developing and testing the political skills of the American Zionists preparatory to the ultimate campaign for a Jewish state.⁴² The wide range of propaganda techniques employed by the Zionist Organization on the eve of the struggle for Jewish statehood is revealed through the letters and instructions sent out during the campaign by the Emergency Council in New York.

The local Emergency Committees were first directed to establish contacts with their congressmen either through delegations or by means of small social functions to which the representatives were invited. The purpose of these contacts was “to produce in this country what already exists in the British House of Commons, a group of national legislators who are familiar with the details of

41. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 60.

42. *New Palestine*, October 8, 1943, p. 2.

the Palestine situation and can discuss it intelligently.”⁴³ The local groups were directed to contact the non-official political leaders as well as the office holders and to cultivate both political parties. Nor were the local groups to ignore their community and state governments. Congress, said the Emergency Council, would be impelled to act only if there was a “very substantial public opinion on this subject throughout the country. National political leaders follow the lead of their local constituencies.”⁴⁴ A later petition to the President by the governors of forty states on behalf of a Jewish state testified to the effectiveness of this approach.⁴⁵

Specific instructions issued in conjunction with the anti-White Paper campaign stressed a concerted, sustained action through demonstrations, editorials and other techniques designed to impress the Government at the appropriate time:

. . . On certain occasions it will become necessary to produce a dramatic demonstration of . . . American public opinion. That means deluging public officials, Congressmen and Senators, with letters and telegrams. You *must* be prepared at quick notice . . . to go into action to organize *letter-writing campaigns and telegrams*. That is why it is so important to keep in close contact with your local Jewish organizations, working through them to produce the results. . . . Those who have the responsibility for formulating American foreign policy

43. AZEC, *An Outline of Activities for Local American Emergency Committees*, p. 3.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 237.

must be made to feel that the Jews of America are around on the question of the White Paper; that they want it abrogated; and that this is the sentiment of millions of Jews throughout the United States.⁴⁶

Assisted by over 2,000 Zionist leaders across the nation, the Emergency Council was thus able to secure anti-White Paper resolutions from all major Jewish organizations as well as from such important associations as Lions, Elks, Rotary, Business and Professional Women's Club, etc. Labor unions and church groups swelled the number of those going on record against the White Paper.⁴⁷ Those groups which refused to cooperate were listed by the Emergency Council on its list of antagonists.⁴⁸

Rabbi Leo I. Feuer, Chairman of the Community Contacts Committee, reported to the Executive Committee that hundreds of thousands of individual letters, postal cards, petitions and telegrams had been sent to Washington during the course of the anti-White Paper campaign. The files of Congressmen in office at that period bear ample evidence of that assertion. Feuer also noted that the Emergency Council, in conjunction with the Zionist Organization of America, had purchased radio time on 182 American and 50 Canadian stations. During a thirty-nine week series of fifteen minute programs, Americans in forty-six states heard such stars as Victor Jory, Judith Evelyn, Joseph Schildkraut, Gene Kelly, Joseph Cotton, Eddie Cantor, Walter Abel, and Edward G. Robinson in professionally-produced dramatizations on "Palestine

46. AZEC, *An Outline of Activities*, pp. 4-5.

47. Press Releases of the AZEC (December 13, 16, 20, 1943).

48. AZEC, *Confidential Bulletins* (January 1944).

Speaks.”⁴⁹ Other aspects of the Emergency Committees’ work included “Vigilance Committees” which reported to the National Office on all anti-Zionist activities in the community. Veterans’ Committees sought to influence returning Jewish servicemen, and “high level talks” were initiated with representatives of non-Moslem minorities of the Middle East which had members in the United States.⁵⁰

While the complete effectiveness of Zionist techniques in converting Americans to some one or other aspect of the Organization’s program cannot be completely measured, it is obvious that no means of communication was ignored. The success experienced in this exercise of organizational “muscle-building” now led to a more direct approach on the political front.

49. ZOA, *47th and 48th Annual Reports*, pp. 50-51, and 18 respectively.

50. *Ibid.*

III THE POLITICAL FRONT—1944

Palestine resolution proposed.—The existence of a revitalized Emergency Council quickly produced political repercussions in Washington. The most important step on the political front was the introduction of the Palestine resolutions in both Houses of Congress. “The technical or strategic purpose of this move was to set up a specific target upon which the Council could effectively concentrate the fire of its propaganda.”¹ The Council realized that such a move involved risks, but it “had become convinced that the risk of inaction was even greater.”² Since members of Congress tend to be responsive to pressure groups, it was not surprising that such a program was launched. Besides, a long history of political declarations expressing sympathy towards Jewish development of Palestine had brought little organized opposition. It could therefore be assumed by most legislators that a pro-Palestine stand would only strengthen their positions. Two identical measures concerning Palestine were therefore introduced on January 27, 1944, in the House of Representatives and read as follows:

1. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 61.
2. *Ibid.*

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution:

Therefore be it

Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures, to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.³

The resolution as presented was almost identical with the Biltmore Program which had called for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth. An interesting nuance to be found in the Congressional resolution was the substitution of the word "reconstitute" in place of "be established"; the obvious intent being to create the

3. United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings Before the . . . , Jewish National Home in Palestine*, hereafter cited as *Hearings* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 1.

impression that a Jewish commonwealth had once existed and that its restoration was only proper. This phraseology enabled those so disposed to view a modern Jewish state as a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy. The influence of the Biltmore Program upon the Congressional resolution of 1944 is even more pronounced when that resolution is compared with the Congressional resolution of 1922. The latter resolution, signed by President Harding, had recognized that as a result of the war "the House of Israel [was given] its long-denied opportunity to re-establish a fruitful Jewish life and culture in the ancient Jewish land" and that the United States Congress favored "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."⁴ Such a statement fell far short of the "maximal" demands registered in the Biltmore Program and echoed in House Resolutions 418 and 419 of 1944.

One of these resolutions was introduced by Representative Compton of Connecticut, a Republican, and the other by Representative Wright of Pennsylvania, a Democrat. Senator Wagner of New York, a Democrat, and Senator Taft of Ohio, a Republican, jointly introduced a similar resolution in the Senate. The House Resolutions were then referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, whose chairman, Sol Bloom of New York, according to *The Voice* of San Francisco, hoped to have them approved without the formality of a hearing. The Congressman had stated to that paper,

. . . that if it were not for the Council for Judaism the resolution for Palestine would have been recommended to the House without any discussion.

He further stated with pride: "I want you to

4. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 227.

know that I am not a reform Jew; I am an orthodox Jew; I have never prayed without a hat; I follow Judaism in the footsteps of my father and mother, and they were orthodox Jews." During the interview he took out an Agada and he said; "For the last 40 years I repeated with my parents the age-old saying "L'shono havo b'yerusholayim" i.e., "Next year in Jerusalem," that means that Jerusalem was always our hope and why not now?"⁵

Prior to the consideration of these resolutions in committee, the Chairman had undertaken to compile a book containing original documents and other materials which were to supply the members with "full information regarding the issues involved."⁶ That Bloom's compilation of background materials actually provided "full information" is doubtful. There does appear in the study a text of the mandate, the joint resolution signed by President Harding in 1922, the Convention of 1924 between the United States and Britain relative to Palestine,⁷ and the White Paper of 1939. Bloom's book of 104 pages devoted 29 pages to the documents cited while the remaining 74 were the reproduction of remarks by British statesmen who had spoken out against the White Paper.⁸ It was with this slanted information that the House Committee on

5. *Hearings*, p. 498.

6. *Ibid.*, iii.

7. Anti-Zionists had always maintained, as did the State Department, that this Convention merely dealt with the rights of American nationals in Palestine and did not make the United States a party to the mandate. This contention was advanced with force before the Committee by Faris S. Malouf, President of the Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of the Eastern States. *Hearings*, p. 302.

8. United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Jewish National Home in Palestine* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 30-104.

Foreign Affairs began its hearings on the Palestine resolutions. When a member of the Committee asked if the booklet contained a report from the State Department, Bloom replied that the proposed legislation was merely a House resolution.⁹ Yet the resolution required the government "to take appropriate measures" to open the doors of Palestine to the Jews, so that they might ultimately transform it into a Jewish state. Bloom's background study was later bound as an appendix to the *Hearings* and ironically closed with a tribute from Representative Eaton who expressed the belief that "it is filled with information which we will need in order to intelligently discuss these resolutions."¹⁰

A reading of the *Hearings* reveals the Chairman assuming a cordial and apparently equitable manner towards all witnesses. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt as to the cause Bloom supported, and, indeed, eagerly wished to appear as supporting. Whether or not there was any pre-determined plan to restrict the anti-resolution testimony cannot be ascertained, but the fact remains that the total testimony—including questioning and supporting documents—of the anti-Zionists was 108 pages. The remaining 280 pages of testimony, questioning and documents supported the Zionist cause. Despite Bloom's gentle handling of the opposing witnesses, he always hastened to cite "historical" evidence in support of the contention that the United States had consistently endorsed a Jewish commonwealth. Thus he quoted the alleged declaration of Wilson that the United States gave its full concurrence to the idea that the foundations of a Jewish commonwealth were to be laid in Palestine—a statement proven to

9. *Hearings*, p. 1.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

be inaccurate.¹¹ As the *National Jewish Ledger* remarked, Mr. Bloom not

. . . only supported the resolutions, but on numerous occasions he was able to use his prerogative as chairman in ironing out an embarrassing situation, or in reminding a procommonwealth witness of a particularly helpful document, or in directing the discussion or cross-examination into the proper channels dealing directly with the resolution.¹²

Throughout the course of the testimony the Committee seemed little impressed with the arguments brought forth by those witnesses who spoke against the resolution. The only notable exception in this regard was Representative Frances Bolton of Ohio. Mrs. Bolton was moved by the remarks of Lessing Rosenwald, representing the American Council for Judaism, who brought out the implications of Jewish nationalism. Mrs. Bolton thereupon suggested that the matter be discussed more fully lest the Committee lend its support to a proposition which might have the effect of denying a fundamental tenet of democracy.¹³ But when Mrs. Bolton had concluded her observation, Chairman Bloom asked permission for Rabbi Silver to respond. The Rabbi's remarks on Jewish history apparently had good effect since no member of the Committee further ventured to raise the possibility of a theocratic state in Palestine.

Before and during the course of the Hearings the vigorous policy formulated by Dr. Silver was clearly

11. For a discussion of this point see Alfred M. Lilienthal, *What Price Israel* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 89.

12. *National Jewish Ledger*, March 10, 1944, cited in *Hearings*, p. 499.

13. *Hearings*, p. 167.

manifest. The official report for 1944 described the procedures employed:

The local committees performed magnificently. From large cities and hamlets, thousands of letters, postcards and telegrams poured in upon the members of the Senate and the House. Every member of the Foreign Affairs Committee was contacted several times by his constituency. Congressmen were unanimous in exclaiming that they had seldom seen such amazing public interest in a piece of legislation.

One great objective was realized instantly. The "conspiracy of silence" was broken and the Palestine question was placed on the agenda of public opinion as one of the vital issues of the hour. What is more, the American people became aware of the justice of the case for a Jewish Palestine as never before, and large numbers of influential non-Jews became champions of the Jewish National Home.¹⁴

Numerous petitions and resolutions urging enactment of the resolutions are to be found scattered throughout the proceedings. From San Francisco alone, there came communications from such groups as Beth Israel Sisterhood, Temple Sherith Israel Men's Club, San Francisco Chapter of the National Home for Jewish Children, Jewish Educa-

14. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 61. In view of the official statement contained in the report that all members of the Foreign Affairs committees of both Houses had been contacted, it is interesting to note that a thorough search of the papers of Senator Connally, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1941 to 1946 and from 1949 to 1953, reveals not a single reference to the Palestine question. For some reason this file had not been transferred to the Library of Congress with the rest of the collection. When phoned concerning the absence of this file on October 23, 1959, the Senator replied that, "I don't know about that. Its been so long I can't remember."

tional Society, Pacific Hebrew Orphan Asylum and Home Society, and two B'nai B'rith lodges.¹⁵ Zionist spokesmen, including Louis Lipsky, Israel Goldstein, James Heller and Herman Shulman were personally on hand in order to assure the Committee that their views were representative of American Jewry. Lipsky dismissed the anti-Zionist testimony of the American Council for Judaism as the efforts of a mere 2,000 Jews as opposed to the 2,500,000 who had spoken through the American Jewish Conference in favor of a Jewish Palestine.¹⁶

As the recognized Zionist spokesman in the House of Representatives and a key Democratic leader, Sol Bloom was placed in something of an anomalous position. Although there is not as yet sufficient material available to warrant the drawing of extensive conclusions, nevertheless, certain deductions seem justified. As a Jew representing a heavily populated Jewish area, Bloom naturally was eager to retain the favor and sympathy of that group. Bloom's labors in the securing of entrance visas for hapless European Jews were extensively recognized. Similarly, he was always at the disposal of various Jewish organizations and merited their expressions of thanks. It was through the efforts of Bloom, for example, that Rabbi Meyer Berlin, Honorary President of the Mizrachi Organization of America, was enabled to return to Palestine in order to continue his work.¹⁷

But while Jewish and pro-Zionist, Bloom remained an outstanding Congressional Democrat and, it could be assumed, endeavored to back the Administration even

15. *Hearings*, p. 8.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

17. Berlin to Bloom, December 8, 1943, in Bloom Papers (New York Public Library, New York, N. Y.) Biographical File. Hereafter cited as Bloom Papers.

though this might sometimes be painful to his Zionist sensibilities. It was at the Bermuda Conference on the Refugee Problem held in April, 1943, that the difficulty of Bloom's position was revealed. The Bermuda Conference had been sponsored by Roosevelt and Churchill in an attempt to deal with that vexing world problem. Since Jews constituted a considerable proportion of that group, it was natural that Bloom should be named as an American delegate to the Conference. One of Roosevelt's greatest hopes was that immigration barriers against Jews might be lifted by all nations, including the United States. To Roosevelt it seemed dishonest to demand immigration concessions from the Arabs while the United States retained its tight and selective quota laws.¹⁸ Bloom had evidently supported the President's approach to the refugee problem despite a current of opposition from his own co-religionists. The Zionist policy, it must be remembered, was to contend that there was only one solution to the refugee problem and that lay in the creation of a Jewish state. Seen in this light the letter of thanks written to Bloom after the Conference by its chairman, President Howard Davis of Princeton, gives an insight to the matter. Davis thanked him for

. . . the valuable and patriotic service you rendered as a member of the delegation. You were in a more difficult position than any other member of the Conference. Knowing as I do how keenly you feel for the persecuted peoples of Europe, it is with great satisfaction that I express to you my admiration for the reasonable and straightforward course

18. Morris L. Ernst, *So Far So Good* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 170.

you pursued throughout the deliberations of the conference. I know that your position will be attacked by many whose emotions are now controlling their intellects, but I want to say to you how thoroughly I respected the position you sustained throughout.¹⁹

Bloom's position on this matter is again revealed by a letter from Alfred M. Cohen who expressed his concurrence with the Congressman's belief that "the Jewish problem could be solved by securing equality of races before the law and not by segregating the Jews in any one part of the world."²⁰

Having taken this stand at the Bermuda Conference, Bloom's stock in Zionist quarters was not especially high. It was becoming increasingly necessary for his political life that he once again appear as a leader of Jewish opinion. By playing a prominent role in the Palestine resolution hearings, Bloom perhaps hoped to attain that goal. At any rate, the obvious earnestness of the Emergency Council concerning the introduction of the resolution—a step taken only "after long and critical deliberation, after the exploration of every possible means of ascertaining official views, after a systematic canvass of Congressional opinion, both through the local Emergency Committees and through the Washington Bureau . . ."²¹—tempered whatever "international" approach the Congressman might have harbored and impressed him with the necessity of playing a prominent role in the hearings. In fact, the extract from the *National Jewish Ledger* which stated that

19. Davis to Bloom, May 3, 1943, Bloom Papers.

20. Cohen to Bloom, May 25, 1943, Bloom Papers.

21. 47th Annual Report, p. 61.

"Congressman Bloom was a very pleasant surprise to us of the Jewish press, who had heard rumors prior to the hearings that he was opposed to the resolutions," was possibly included in the appendix of the *Hearings* purposely to offset what criticism of his position had existed. This same statement went on to add that "the rumors, we are happy to say were utterly unfounded and untrue." ²²

Assuming that Bloom wished to retain the loyal backing of the Zionists, it appears that this goal was at least initially accomplished during the course of the Committee hearings. He was personally congratulated by the American secretary of His Eminence, Dr. Isaac Halevi Herzog, Chief Rabbi of the Holy Land, for his statesmanship "during the hearings of last week on the resolutions in behalf of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine." ²³

However, evidence from other sources seems to indicate that Bloom's support for the resolution only extended to the public forum. An unpublished letter from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to Bloom reads as follows:

Concerning our conversation of February 7th with respect to House Resolutions 418 and 419, it is the judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these resolutions, no further action on them would be advisable at this time.²⁴

Bloom's conversations with the Secretary of War were held the day before the hearings commenced. Moreover, the Congressman was a close friend of Stimson's and must

22. *National Jewish Ledger*, March 10, 1944, cited in *Hearings*, p. 499.

23. Herzog to Bloom, February 17, 1944, Bloom Papers.

24. Stimson to Bloom, March 2, 1944, Bloom Papers.

have been informed of his attitude. At the same time, the State Department was clearly against the resolution, for as Hull later related:

At the State Department, we felt that the passage of these resolutions, although not binding on the Executive, might precipitate conflict in Palestine and other parts of the Arab world, endangering American troops and requiring the diversion of forces from European and other combat areas. It might prejudice or shatter pending negotiations with Ibn Saud for the construction of a pipeline across Saudi Arabia, which our military leaders felt was of utmost importance to our security. And it would stimulate other special interests to press for the introduction of similar resolutions regarding controversial territorial issues relating to areas such as Poland and Italy.²⁵

It must be assumed then that Bloom, being in close contact with Stimson and Hull, knew of the Administration's fears concerning the Middle East situation. Nevertheless, the hearings had to proceed lest the Administration, and particularly Sol Bloom, incur the wrath of the Zionists. Moreover, by apparently supporting the resolution, Bloom could continue to control the situation in behalf of the Administration.

That some such strategy was employed seems implicit from an entry in Stimson's diary for March 8, 1944.²⁶ Here he recorded the President's fears on the subject as con-

25. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), II, 1534-35.

26. Diary of Henry L. Stimson, March 8, 1944 (Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.). (cf. Appendix I for letter.)

veyed to him by John Jay McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, as well as his own reaction. Having been warned by the State Department of the adverse effect which a Palestine resolution might be expected to produce on the Middle East situation, the President was anxious that Stimson should make public a letter addressed to Senator Connally advising discontinuance of the hearings. This communication was most probably a duplicate of that sent to Bloom on March 2. Although McCloy was on the verge of making the note public in order to forestall further action in Congress, Bloom strongly advised against it. The Congressman felt that the situation could be handled to the Administration's satisfaction without any intervention on the part of the War Department—a move which could be interpreted as anti-Zionist. Bloom was especially opposed to the publishing of the letter at that time since it could be taken "as an attempt to backfire" the meeting of the National Conference on Palestine²⁷ which was then convening in Washington. Stimson fell in with Bloom's reasoning on this point, as did Edward R. Stettinius of the State Department, and it was decided that release of the letter should be delayed. However, Bloom now advised against any release of the letter since it would play into the hands of the Republicans. Fearing that this would anger the President, Stimson suggested that Bloom personally go to the Chief Executive and lay the matter before him.

27. The National Conference on Palestine was sponsored by the American Palestine Committee in cooperation with seven other organizations. Apparently aware of the Administration's feelings towards the Palestine resolution, the Conference resolved on March 9, 1944 that: "While we are completely aware of the problems and responsibilities of our military and diplomatic leaders, we are firmly convinced that the technique of appeasement . . . cannot provide the basis of an enduring . . . solution of the Palestine problem." Cited in National Conference on Palestine, *The Voice of Christian America* (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 45.

The Secretary went on to record that the whole matter had been stirred up by Drew Pearson who hoped to make it appear that the Administration was preparing to take an anti-Jewish line—a deduction made on the basis of “secret” testimony given by General George Marshall, the Chief of Staff, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It had been decided by Stimson, acting on advice from Bloom, that no major figure was to appear before Congress lest too much be said on the matter. But in the absence of Stimson, Marshall had been called upon by Senator Connally supposedly to testify before a secret session of the Committee.²⁸ Word of this testimony had been leaked to Pearson who saw in it a cover on the part of the Administration for an impending anti-Zionis move. It was for this reason that Stimson, like Bloom, thought that any publicity would only play into the hands of the opposition.

But if the Administration had trusted that Bloom and Connally could control the resolutions, that belief was evidently abandoned. Contrary to the advice of Bloom and Stimson, the President desired a letter from the War Department which would end the matter. The letter made public by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 17, 1944, bearing the same date read:

28. cf. Kermit Roosevelt, “The Partition of Palestine; A Lesson in Pressure Politics,” *Middle East Journal*, II (January, 1948), p. 4. Roosevelt states that “the Chief of Staff had inquired of our military attaches in the Middle East whether they thought its [Palestine resolution] passage would damage the war effort. On the basis of their replies he concluded that reaction to the resolution would limit the military contribution which could be made from the Middle East to the invasion of France . . .” Also, cf. George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 316. Kirk’s assertion that “General Marshall, with the approval of the Secretary of War and State gave evidence before a secret session of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee” is contradicted by Stimson’s remarks on the subject.

Dear Mr. Bloom:

Concerning our conversations with respect to House Resolutions 418 and 419, it is the considered judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war.²⁹

Although this letter was released against the better judgment of both Bloom and Stimson, it is interesting to note that the Congressman evidently caused certain revisions to be made in its wording. These revisions, found appended to a duplicate of the letter of March 2, 1944, had the effect of pointing out more explicitly that the resolutions would hamper the war effort. Bloom's penciled amendments read:

(after the phrase "on them" insert) "at this time"
omit "no"

(after "advisable at this time" insert) "prejudicial to
the successful prosecution of the war"³⁰

Having taken these precautions, Bloom possibly felt that both his position as well as that of the Administration had been saved vis-a-vis the Zionists. Statements from the Zionist press seemed to bear this out since they revealed no signs of anger against Bloom. Rather, he was praised for his work in compiling the background booklet and all blame for the shelving of the Palestine resolution was attributed to the military situation.

29. Stimson to Bloom, March 17, 1944, Bloom Papers.

30. Stimson to Bloom, March 2, 1944, Bloom Papers. Stimson's letter at the very least was not an unexpected bombshell as authors have traditionally maintained. Cf. Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 311.

But while the Zionist press did not attack Bloom, Zionist headquarters reacted differently. Here indeed there seemed to be suspicions that Bloom had not been completely candid on the question of the resolution. A letter from Louis Lipsky of the Jewish Agency revealed this undercurrent of dissatisfaction. In a confidential letter dated May 8, 1944, Lipsky ventured to set Bloom straight on his standing with the Zionists and Jews generally.³¹ He pointed out that although Bloom's stand during the hearings had evoked admiration, since the shelving of the resolution his position had deteriorated. The reason for this state of affairs, said Lipsky, was that rumors were being circulated to the effect that while Bloom had appeared to favor the resolution, he was "in fact working all the while for its defeat." After repeating rumored details of Bloom's "crafty manoeuvres . . . to kill the resolution," Lipsky warned that only Dr. Silver's restraining hand had checked a proposed denunciation. But Dr. Silver was running out of patience with the Administration, said Lipsky, especially since Bloom's precipitant action in Committee on the resolution had virtually nullified any advantage gained from a recent Presidential statement. In view of this situation, Lipsky intimated in no uncertain terms that the Republicans might receive Silver's support. In order to save not only his own position with respect to American Jewry, but that of the Administration also, Lipsky urged Bloom to secure immediately a strong statement from the President backing "the rights of the Jewish people." This step, he said, must be taken at once since the Zionists were having a national meeting of Emergency Committees on May 23-24. To delay such action until June, warned Lip-

31. Lipsky to Bloom, May 8, 1944, Bloom Papers. (cf. Appendix II for letter.)

sky, "would be fatal to all good relations between American Jews and the present Administration of Government."

Criticism in a like vein had reached Bloom from other Zionist circles and the Congressman was led to protest; in what terms is not known. Whatever Lipsky's implications were politically, the Zionist Organization could scarcely allow such an important figure as Bloom to be alienated. Nahum Goldman most apologetically informed Bloom that remarks of one Harry Steinberg, a minor employee at Emergency Council headquarters, in no way reflected the Zionist position. Steinberg had apparently voiced the rumor that there was dissatisfaction with Bloom in Zionist circles and that this would affect his chances of re-nomination. Goldman hastened to add that the Zionist Organization, far from being displeased with Bloom, was sending its president, Rabbi Israel Goldstein, to thank him for his help during the hearings.³²

Presidential statement on Palestine.—If, as Lipsky had indicated, the Zionist Organization now felt uncertain as to the worth of the President's statement of March 9, 1944,³³ the official leadership gave no hint of it. The statement referred to had been given out by the President in a personal interview with Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver. Intending to soothe the Zionists prior to the Administration's intervention against the Palestine resolution, Roosevelt had authorized those leaders to make the following statement in his name:

The President authorized us to say that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939.

32. Goldman to Bloom, May 26, 1944, Bloom Papers.

33. *Supra*, p. 52.

The President is happy the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our Government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees.³⁴

The President's statement, according to the Zionist report, was directly attributable to the public agitation aroused by the introduction of the Palestine resolution.³⁵ It was also singled out as "the first clear-cut expression of sympathy with Zionist aims to come from a leader of any of the Great Powers since the war began."

The Palestine issue at the political conventions.—The temporary frustration experienced as a result of the shelving of the Palestine resolutions did not deter the Zionist leadership from another major goal of 1944—the insertion by both parties of Palestine planks in their political platforms. The "intense, feverish activity spent by Dr. Silver at the Republican Convention and by Dr. Wise at the Democratic"³⁶ was of no minor significance in the attainment of that goal. The Republicans would generously comply with Silver's wishes and by resolution of June 27, 1944, declared:

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their

34. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 224.

35. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 62.

36. *Ibid.*

homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and of the mandate while he pretends to support them.³⁷

Having achieved their purposes at the Republican Convention, Zionist spokesmen now concentrated their efforts on the Democratic Convention scheduled to meet in July. This program, directed by Dr. Wise, was aided by "the magnificent efforts of Dr. Israel Goldstein, Herman Shulman, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Judge Harry Fisher, Elihu D. Stone and other Zionist leaders."³⁸ Wise informed Congressman Bloom on July 12, 1944, that he was

. . . going to Chicago tomorrow to meet with the Steering Committee of the Resolutions Committee. Much must be done,—unless the Republican candidate is to enjoy an absolutely unfair advantage over the Democratic candidate, who happens to be the responsible President and Commander-in-Chief.³⁹

37. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 232.

38. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 62.

39. Wise to Bloom, July 12, 1944, Bloom Papers. Wise wrote in the word "responsible," allowing Bloom to interpret it as he would.

While Wise worked through Bloom to inform the Democrats of the “vital” necessity of a Palestine plank, Will Rosenblatt wrote to Senator Wagner on July 18, 1944, in a similar tone:

We all feel that it is terribly important that a Palestine plank be put into the Democratic platform. . . . The failure to have such a plank in the Democratic platform may seriously hurt the President in New York State, and might even do you some harm even though I feel that you are pretty safe in the State. The President’s chances in New York are not nearly as good as yours.

Just to confirm our point of view, I might tell you that I spoke to my brother-in-law, Ambassador Steinhardt, on Friday about this and he told me that he considers it of the greatest importance that such a statement be included. My brother, Bernard Rosenblatt, feels exactly the same way.

I am afraid that those who are advocating a short platform might use that argument as the grounds for excluding a plank on Palestine. This dare not be done. Incidentally, the Republicans, in their plank, claim the credit that the Republican Congress in 1922 ratified the mandate. A Democratic plank could equitably claim that it was a Democratic President, Woodrow Wilson, who made the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate to Palestine a possibility and a reality.⁴⁰

40. Rosenblatt to Wagner, July 18, 1944, Wagner Papers.

Whether the inclusion or exclusion of a Palestine plank would have had any decisive effect on the mind of the American voter, Jewish or non-Jewish, remains unknown. But it was to the advantage of the Zionist Organization that both parties be impressed with the importance of the Jewish vote, which, as that group could now contend, almost solidly backed the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. At any rate, the Democratic National Convention took no chances and determined not to be outdone by the Republicans. Although the Democratic resolution was shorter than the Republican plank, its wording was more satisfactory to Zionist tastes since it virtually repeated the Biltmore Program:

We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic commonwealth.⁴¹

While this vigorous policy was being pursued on the national political front, other areas were not neglected. Legislatures of twenty states had been brought to adopt resolutions condemning the White Paper and urging support for Jewish aspirations in Palestine. On March 17, 1944, the very day that Stimson's letter had been released, a strongly-worded petition sponsored by the Zionists had been submitted to the White House. Attached to the petition were the names of 1,700 American university professors from 250 different institutions of learning. "This petition," said the Zionist report, "made a tremendous impres-

41. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, p. 232.

sion on the general public, and attracted widespread newspaper coverage." ⁴²

Renewed pressure for a Palestine resolution.—By September the Zionists were pleading their cause at Washington once more. On the 14th, Wise wrote to Roosevelt urging a decision on the basis of an undivided Palestine.⁴³ There had been some discussion of partition as a possible solution the previous June, and Stettinius informed the President that he had mentioned it to Wise and Silver.⁴⁴ Now Wise firmly rejected this view. He enclosed a copy of a memorandum setting forth the view of the Emergency Council which had been submitted to the State Department in July. Partition, said the memorandum, would be economically unwise for both Jews and Arabs. It would lead to political friction, and would leave each state militarily indefensible. Besides, the memorandum added, all Jews were against it. In this new effort the Zionists engaged the services of Senator Wagner, who, in the course of asking Roosevelt to see Wise and Silver, recommended that an early decision be taken on the future of the Jews then being liberated in Europe by advancing Allied armies. Wagner strongly advised against returning the Jews to their former homes since they really wanted to emigrate to Palestine.⁴⁵

After the Democratic victory in the November elections, the Zionists pressed more earnestly for fulfillment of campaign pledges. Congressman Bloom quickly prepared another pamphlet which was printed by the Government

42. ZOA, *47th Annual Report*, p. 63.

43. Wise to FDR, September 14, 1944, Roosevelt Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.).

44. Stettinius to FDR, June 14, 1944, Roosevelt Papers.

45. Wagner to FDR, September 29, 1944, Roosevelt Papers.

Printing Office. The pamphlet was designed to set the stage once again for consideration of the Palestine resolution. As was indicated in the foreword of the book, Stimson had lifted his objection to consideration of the resolution on October 10, 1944. The Secretary had stated that while there was still some opposition to the resolution within the Department, he felt

. . . that the military considerations which led to my previous action in opposing the passage of this resolution are not as strong a factor now as they were then.

In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis.⁴⁶

Bloom further stated that since the introduction of the resolutions in February, a total of 395 Congressmen had "expressed themselves on the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine."⁴⁷ Their views, almost all of which favored the Zionist cause, had been assembled by the Emergency Council and turned over to Bloom for publication.

But despite the Democratic espousal of a Jewish commonwealth, and Roosevelt's reiteration of the platform on October 13,⁴⁸ the President was still reluctant to act. On November 15, he and Stettinius agreed to inform Wise that it would be "unwise" to push reconsideration of the

46. United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Supplemental Statements to Hearings on H. Res. 418 and H. Res. 419* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 3.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Roosevelt to Wagner, October 15, 1944, Wagner Papers.

Congressional resolutions on Palestine at that time. Wise was so informed by Stettinius two days later.⁴⁹ As if to stress the cogency of the Administration's position, the President sent both Wise and Silver a series of protests against American policy which had been transmitted by the Cairo Legation.

Dr. Silver continued to insist, however, that the resolution must be pushed immediately. He wrote to Bloom on November 27, noting with satisfaction that the Congressman was prepared to bring the Palestine resolution before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He urged that it be acted upon promptly.⁵⁰ But this persistent pushing of the resolution on Silver's part must have antagonized Dr. Wise who felt that his own close relations with the President were being needlessly endangered.⁵¹ The House Committee gave approval to the resolution in amended form on November 28, 1944. In its revised form the resolution eliminated the word "Jewish" preceding "democratic commonwealth" and the phrase "will take appropriate action." In effect, the amended form of the resolution made it almost as innocuous as the official declarations of pre-Biltmore days. It seems safe to assume that Bloom had lent his assistance to toning down the resolution since it could hardly have been altered without his concurrence.

It was assumed that approval of a Palestine resolution by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would quickly follow.⁵² But since the Administration had no such reliable

49. Stettinius to FDR, November 17, 1944, Roosevelt Papers.

50. Silver to Bloom, November 27, 1944, Bloom Papers.

51. Wise to FDR, December 12, 1944 and FDR's reply of December 21, 1944, Roosevelt Papers. In his reply the President expressed appreciation for the Rabbi's "considerate attitude."

52. Cyrus Adler, *American Diplomatic Action Affecting Jews, 1840-1945* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1946), p. 401.

friend as Sol Bloom in the Senate committee, or at least not one who was also Jewish, it seemed necessary for the Administration to intervene once more. Having already withdrawn the military objection—undoubtedly a political move coming as it did before the election—the Administration advanced diplomatic reasons against passage of the resolution. The State Department thereupon informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that “passage of the resolution at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation.”⁵³ In the face of this warning the Taft-Wagner resolution was shelved.

Thus, with the closing of the 78th Congress, the Zionist leadership could not point to any notable political victory. While they had definitely built up their following both with the American public and in Congress, the Zionists were not yet able to overcome the objections of the Administration. And since the Administration could still rely upon the political allegiance of Sol Bloom over his Zionist inclinations, it was able to avoid the commitment so ardently desired by the Zionists. Indeed, Bloom perhaps felt that this was the best way ultimately to secure the Zionist goal, namely, by retaining the confidence of the President. This was obviously the thinking of Dr. Wise and since this was not in harmony with the views of Dr. Silver, the latter resigned from the Emergency Council in view of the Zionist decision not to press the resolution.

53. *Ibid.*

IV

ZIONISM AND THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

Roosevelt and traditional Executive policy.—Roosevelt's record towards Zionism long reflected the basic approach of previous administrations to the Palestine question. While Congress might be more immediately susceptible to Zionist pressure groups since it did not have to face the realities of the situation, the Executive, acting with the advice of the State Department, had always trod a different path. It was for that reason that Rabbi Silver had indicated after the Zionist organizational shake-up of August, 1943, that too much confidence must not be placed in any one man, no matter how important his position. Rather, Silver emphasized a policy which, through constant molding of American public opinion and pressure upon Congress, might eventually force the Executive into an active role in favor of the Biltmore Program.¹

The Zionist historian, Frank Manuel, states that the official attitude towards Zionism had not only cooled during the last year of Wilson's administration, but changed abruptly with the coming of the Republicans. And this

1. *Supra*, p. 31.

change, he notes, coincided with the "favorable" Palestine resolution passed by Congress in 1922. Thus, when Dr. Sokolow sought an expression of favor for the Zionist cause on November 22, 1921, he was given a cool reception by Secretary Hughes. Zionist delegations were considered a nuisance and an interview was refused Herman Bernstein in March, 1922. This attitude on the part of the Executive was quite consistent according to Manuel, for "the Department of State and the Congress, of course, never thought alike on Palestine affairs under any administration, because they moved in different orbits."² Declarations made by Wilson, Harding, Coolidge and Hoover had all spoken sympathetically of Jewish efforts in Palestine while not specifically espousing the aim of political Zionism.³ More, however, could hardly have been expected before May, 1942. Only then, when hopes of securing assistance from Britain grew dim, did the Zionists fully proclaim their political goal in the United States and concentrate their efforts on this country. Up until that time it was enough to enlist American aid for Jewish immigration, agricultural and financial projects. That Roosevelt's Administration should be led away from the traditional approach of the Executive, or at least appear to give that impression, was due especially to the energetic resourcefulness of Dr. Silver. That this should have been done at a time when American interests were vitally concerned with maintaining Arab friendship for economic and strategic reasons, only underlines the extent of the Zionist victory.

Roosevelt, like his predecessors, adhered strictly during his first three terms to the basic position of the Hughes

2. Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 275.

3. Jewish Agency, *Book of Documents*, pp. 218-20.

period; namely, that the Jewish National Home provisions of the mandate were not an American interest. When several Jewish organizations presented a paper to the State Department in 1936 calling upon the United States to protest a rumored change in the immigration policy on the basis of the 1924 Anglo-American Convention, neither the President nor the State Department gave weight to these assertions. Secretary Hull merely asked the American ambassador in London to repeat Jewish concern in an unofficial manner to the Foreign Secretary.⁴ Permanent officials were, in fact, resentful of what they considered the unwarranted intervention of American Zionists in the conduct of foreign policy.⁵ In response to a telegram from Mayor Spellacy of Hartford in 1938, Roosevelt replied to the Mayor's appeal for presidential action on Palestine by stating:

I understand, however, that under the terms of our convention with Great Britain regarding the Palestine mandate, we are unable to prevent modifications in the mandate. The most we can do is to decline to accept as applicable to American interests any modifications affecting such interests unless we have given our assent to them.⁶

After the release of the White Paper on May 17, 1939, Roosevelt continued to recognize that Palestine was a British matter. Nevertheless, he privately expressed the belief that "the British are not wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine Mandate could not have

4. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1528.

5. Manuel, p. 305.

6. Cited in *Hearings*, p. 303.

intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country.’’⁷ Roosevelt recognized that ‘‘while the Palestine Mandate undoubtedly did not intend to take away the right of citizenship and of taking part in the Government on the part of the Arab population, it . . . did intend to convert Palestine into a Jewish Home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively short time.’’⁸ For these reasons the President felt that ‘‘it is something that we cannot give approval to by the United States’’ even though ‘‘there are some good ideas in regard to actual administration of government.’’⁹ Roosevelt’s essentially pragmatic approach to the problem is revealed in this same memorandum, for he advocated that the administration of Palestine be continued on a five-year basis which would allow Jewish immigration to continue. Then there could be a re-evaluation and, if necessary, the Palestinian government would continue on a temporary basis for another five years. He felt that the Arabs could be brought to accept this because Arab immigration into Palestine had far surpassed the Jewish total since 1921. This habit of viewing the Palestine situation in a way which did not depend upon a definite solution was thus ingrained in the President’s attitude. But whatever might have been the President’s personal views, there was no official reaction to the White Paper. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy was simply instructed to inform the British Foreign Office, informally and orally, that there was much

7. Hull, II, 1530. Only four months earlier Roosevelt had assured Ibn-Saud ‘‘that the Government has never taken any position different from that which it has maintained from the beginning toward this question.’’ Personal Papers File 3500, January 9, 1939 (FDRL) Ibn Saud obviously had to interpret for himself what American policy had been.

8. Hull, II, 1530.

9. *Ibid.*

disappointment in America over the White Paper, "especially in Zionist circles."¹⁰ Thus, on the eve of the war, Roosevelt declined to take a stand on Palestine in terms of the ultimate question. Indeed, his administration lacked any basic policy towards the Middle East as a whole.¹¹

War-time policy toward Palestine.—After the outbreak of the war, Roosevelt continued to indicate that Palestine, like all the Middle East areas, was primarily a British responsibility. Hence, when he was sounded out by Chaim Weizmann, the visiting World Zionist leader in February, 1940, on the likelihood of American interest in a new departure in Palestine, away from the White Paper once the war was over, the President "merely showed himself friendly, but the discussion remained theoretical."¹² Weizmann thus remarked of his first American trip, which lasted three months, that it "was not a satisfactory one."¹³ Roosevelt's attitude is similarly brought out in answer to Rabbi Wise who sought an American note to the British Government urging the full-scale arming of Palestinian Jews.¹⁴ Roosevelt made it clear that the British had to exercise concern for the whole area and he went on to explain why the British felt they could not devote more material to the arming of the Jews. This information, he said, had previously been communicated to Weizmann and Neumann and added that

The British are therefore obliged to handle their resources so as to maintain a maximum number of

10. *Ibid.*

11. C. L. Sulzberger, *What's Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 162.

12. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 420.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Wise to Roosevelt in Wise, pp. 225-26.

fighting men in the Near East and to enlist the support of all the peoples who live in that area. In this particular matter, therefore, I can merely call to the attention of the British our deep concern for the defense of Palestine and our concern for the defense of the Jewish population there; and, as best I can, supply the British forces with the material means by which the maximum protection to Palestine will be afforded.¹⁵

To the extent that Roosevelt and the State Department were vitally concerned lest the Axis overrun all the Near East, it can be said that the Administration had a policy with respect to that area. The State Department recognized the seriousness of the situation and strove to keep the Arab world pacified. It was necessary that the delicate balance in the Near East not be disturbed by pro-Zionist declarations which could be utilized by the Germans who were moving across North Africa in early 1942; a situation made more difficult by the publication of the Biltmore Program in May, 1942. When, for instance, John G. Winant, American ambassador in London, asked Mr. Weizmann early in 1942 to return to the United States in order to work there on the problem of synthetic rubber, he cautioned the Zionist leader "to devote [himself] as completely as possible to chemistry."¹⁶ And in response to a Presidential request to the State Department that a message of greeting be prepared for a dinner honoring Weizmann, Secretary Hull commented, in sending along

15. Roosevelt to Wise, Roosevelt Personal Papers File 8084, June 9, 1941 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library).

16. Weizmann, p. 426. "Actually," said Weizmann, "I devoted my time almost equally between science and Zionism."

the proposed draft on June 9, 1942, that ". . . if anything at all is to be sent, this is about as colorless as can be devised."¹⁷ There was apparently no disposition on the President's part to dispute the Department's estimate of what was called for by the Near East crisis. Roosevelt's letter of May 23, 1942, addressed to the American Palestine Committee, contained nothing more than traditional messages sent on such occasions. He expressed his "interest in the efforts of those seeking to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine," and looked forward to a time when "the great physical, economic, and educational development which has taken place in Palestine . . . may be continued in peace and harmony."¹⁸

Even after the German threat had somewhat diminished, the attitude of the Administration remained unchanged. Hull advised the President on December 29, 1942, not to send a message to the Jewish National Fund, in view of the situation in the Near East and in North Africa "where there is a strong feeling against Zionism among the Arab peoples."¹⁹ Roosevelt was even cautioned by the pro-Zionist Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, on April 8, 1943, against bestowing his good wishes on a campaign of the Palestine Foundation Fund. "In view of the highly controversial nature of the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine," said Welles, "it is suggested that you consider it inadmissible to make the statement requested, particularly since the Near East is now an important theater of American military operation."²⁰

17. Personal Papers Files 8084, June 9, 1942, (FDRL).

18. FDR to Wagner, May 23, 1942, Wagner Papers, Palestine File, (Georgetown University).

19. Official File 700, Box 3 Palestine 1940-1945. (FDRL).

20. *Ibid.*, April 8, 1943.

Military and diplomatic reports from the field reinforced the Department's stand against irritating the Arabs through pro-Zionist declarations. Zionist agitation in the United States, it was reported by diplomatic dispatches from Cairo and Baghdad, was causing uneasiness. Lieutenant-Colonel Halford Hoskins, an Arabic expert who had been sent by the Joint-Chiefs of Staff to the Middle East in 1942, reported his fears that unless steps were taken to reduce tension, conflict might break out in Palestine before the end of the war "and throw all the Arab Near East into turmoil."²¹ Arab diplomats in Washington supplemented these warnings from time to time. On February 3, 1943, the Egyptian Minister presented an "aide-memoire" to Hull telling of the "deplorable effect" on the Arab and Muslim worlds of Zionist activities which were becoming more pronounced in the United States, and of the possible repercussions on the Allied war effort.²² Impressed as they were with all of these reports, it is little wonder that the professional officers of the State and War departments showed themselves adverse to Zionist political pressure. Weizmann's report of his activities in early 1943 reveals this opposition which he termed "devious and secretive":

But our difficulties were not connected with the first rank statesmen. These had, for by far the greatest part, always understood our aspirations. . . . It was always behind the scenes, and on the lower levels, that we encountered an obstinate, devious and secretive opposition which set at naught the public declarations of American statesmen. And in

21. Hull, II, 1532.

22. *Ibid.*

our efforts to counteract the influence of these behind-the-scenes forces, we were greatly handicapped because we had no foothold there. . . . All the information supplied from the Middle East to the authorities in Washington worked against us.²³

The Refugee problem and Zionism.—While the President was deeply concerned in 1943 with the stabilization of the Near East and North Africa, the problem of the refugees was becoming more acute. The Nazi extermination campaign of 1942 and 1943 had seen several millions of Jews executed, while thousands of others managed to escape. But if these refugees had all been allowed to enter Palestine immediately, the White Paper's numerical quota would have been exhausted before the war's end, thus forcing the mandatory "to attempt a final settlement before the expected peace conference."²⁴ Such an attempted settlement, it was felt, would be extremely dangerous to the British position. It was therefore decided that the question of the stateless Jews should be considered as a part of the over-all refugee problem. The United States adhered in principle to this view at the Bermuda Refugee Conference held in April, 1943. As a result of the Bermuda Conference the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees was revived and sought to secure immigration visas for its charges wherever possible. However, this body excluded from the scope of its work the facilitation of Jewish immigration into Palestine since it regarded its activities as purely humanitarian and therefore avoided "being drawn into political issues or controversies."²⁵ But

23. Weizmann, p. 431.

24. Hurewitz, p. 175.

25. *Ibid.*

since this project did not further Zionist aims it was subject to continuous attack. Even the pro-Zionist Sol Bloom, as previously seen, was not free from attack because of the role he had played in the Conference.²⁶ According to Hull, the Administration's plan to treat the refugee problem independently of the Palestine issue was subject to heavy criticism from "the Jews, and some in high positions such as Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, [who] found grievous fault with the State Department and especially with every official handling of the refugee problem."²⁷

Roosevelt himself apparently learned something of Zionist tactics while attempting to solve the refugee problem. It was the President's personal feeling that all nations had a duty to lower their immigration barriers so as to accept all people regardless of race, color or creed. But when Roosevelt undertook to implement this program he discovered that the Zionists were against it. This developed when the President sent Morris Ernst to London for the purpose of ascertaining from the British Government whether that nation would be willing to take in 100,000 refugees. The President reasoned that once Britain had set the example, other nations, including the United States, would follow. Churchill's response was favorable and Ernst reported back to Roosevelt who then began exploratory talks. The President soon discovered, however, that the Zionists were opposed to his plan. The printed account of this episode by Ernst reveals the essential reason for the plan's failure:

. . . But it did not work out. I do not intend to quote FDR or even suggest that my appraisal of the

26. *Supra*, pp. 45-46.

27. Hull, II, 1539.

defeat would agree in every detail with his. But to me it seemed that the failure of the leading Jewish groups to support with zeal this immigration program may have caused the President not to push forward with it at that time. I talked to many people active in Jewish organizations. I suggested the plan. I made clear that no Jews or other people in Europe would be compelled to go anywhere and certainly not to any assigned nation. . . . I was amazed and even felt insulted when active Jewish leaders decried, sneered and then attacked me as if I were a traitor. At one dinner party I was openly accused of furthering this plan of freer immigration in order to undermine political Zionism. Those Jewish groups which favored opening our doors gave little more than lip service to the Roosevelt program. Zionist friends of mine opposed it.²⁸

The Administration and the Arab nations.—Not only did the Zionists refuse to support the President's refugee

28. Ernst, p. 175f. A further account of this matter is given by Alfred Lilienthal who quoted from a speech made by Ernst in Cincinnati after the publication of his book:

"A week later, or so, Mr. Ernst and his wife again visited the President.

"Roosevelt: 'Margaret, can't you get me a Jewish pope? I cannot stand it any more. I have got to be careful that when Stevie Wise leaves the White House he doesn't see Joe Proskauer on the way in.' Then, to Mr. Ernst: 'Nothing doing on the program. We can't put it over because the dominant vocal Jewish leadership of America won't stand for it.'

"'It's impossible! Why?' asked Ernst.

"Roosevelt: 'They are right from their point of view. The Zionist movement knows that Palestine is, and will be for some time, a remittance society. They know that they can raise vast sums for Palestine by saying to donors, "There is no other place this poor Jew can go." But if there is a world political asylum for all people irrespective of race, creed or color, they cannot raise their money. Then the people who do not want to give the money will have an excuse to say, "What do you mean, there is no place they can go but Palestine? They are the preferred wards of the world." *What Price Israel* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 32.

proposals, but as 1943 advanced they became more vocal in support of the Biltmore Program. Arab concern with this agitation was again manifested in April and May, 1943, when King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia wrote to the President informing him that although he had long been urged to warn the United States against the adoption of a pro-Zionist policy, he had until that time refrained from doing so. He had pursued this policy so as not to embarrass the Allied war effort which could only suffer from increased Arab-Jewish antagonisms. The King therefore asked for assurances that the United States would take no steps of an affirmative nature with respect to Palestine without informing him in advance.²⁹ Hull conveyed the President's reply (not publicly released until 1945) to Ibn Saud on May 26, 1943, wherein the Chief Executive expressed his appreciation of the King's silence and pointed out the desirability of an Arab-Jewish understanding on Palestine before the end of the war. But even if such an accord were not reached, the President promised that ". . . no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without fully consulting with both Jews and Arabs."³⁰ Roosevelt repeated his hopes for an Arab-Jewish accord in June.³¹ It is at this point, says Hurewitz, that American entanglement in the Palestine problem began:

American entanglement, at least as far as Arabs and Zionists were affected, originated with President Roosevelt's assurances to King ibn Saud in May 1943 that Arabs and Jews would be given ample opportunity to express their views before any

29. Hull, II, 1532.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, p. 1533.

long-range decisions were taken. With this pledge the President had assumed in the name of the United States Government an obligation to participate in the final settlement of the Palestine problem.³²

The State Department, meanwhile, had begun discussions with the British Government concerning a proposal made by Colonel Hoskins calling for a joint declaration that no final decision over Palestine would be taken until after the war, and then only after full consultation with both Jews and Arabs. It would also favor an understanding between both parties prior to the termination of the war. Such a declaration would thereby make public a policy already adhered to by the President in his message to the Arabian king.³³ The President's hopes for an Arab-Jewish accord were connected with an interview which he had held with Weizmann in the presence of Sumner Welles. Weizmann had discussed with Roosevelt a policy which had originated with St. John Philby and to which Churchill had given assent.³⁴ According to this plan, Ibn Saud would take the leadership among the Arabs, while

32. Hurewitz, p. 213.

33. Hull, II, 1533.

34. Weizmann hereby sought to secure an agreement on Palestine "through methods . . . calculated to excite the minimum of opposition." It reveals Weizmann pursuing his policy of "backstairs diplomacy," a tactic deplored by Silver. *Trial and Error*, p. 427 and ZOA, 47th Annual Report, p. 60.

St. John Philby was the British adviser and confidant of the King of Arabia. Impressed with the necessity of securing the good will and co-operation of both Arabs and Jews in the war effort, and convinced that the Arabs, in their own best interests, would do well to ". . . aim at an obtainable 'quid pro quo'" at the expense of an undeniable right, Philby hit upon a plan to spread the benefits of a settlement in Palestine over every section of the Arab world. With the support of Ibn Saud, Philby thought the plan might be accepted by the Arabs. It would at the same time enhance the position of the King as well as his adviser. The solution

Palestine would be constituted a Jewish state. Throughout the interview Weizmann was supported by the Under-Secretary of State who "expressed belief that America would be prepared to help financially in the setting up of the Jewish national home."³⁵ Welles was apparently taken up with this idea of working for agreement through the King, for in a letter to the President dated May 19, 1943, he wrote:

[Weizmann] believes, as I think you do, that the solution of this problem should, if possible, be

contained four parts: (1) All of Palestine was to be left to the Jews; (2) All displaced Arabs were to be settled elsewhere at the expense of the Jews, who would place twenty million pounds for this purpose at the King's disposal; (3) All other Arab countries in Asia were to be recognized as independent with the exception of Aden; (4) Britain and the United States were to propose these arrangements to Ibn Saud, and to jointly guarantee them in case of Arab acceptance. Philby reportedly launched this single-handed venture into diplomacy by first securing the "cordial approval" of both Weizmann and Moshe Shertok, director of foreign affairs for the Jewish Agency, in October, 1939, at a luncheon party in London. According to Philby:

"They agreed to use all their influence with the British and American Governments with a view to their accepting and implementing the pact, while I was authorized to inform Ibn Saud of its provisions and to endeavor to secure his goodwill in anticipation of the demarche to be made in due course by the two governments concerned."

Weizmann reportedly talked of the plan to Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, on December 17, 1939, and to President Roosevelt, in February, 1940, while Philby himself communicated it to Ibn Saud in January, 1940. Nothing came of these initial conversations, however, and in May, 1940, Weizmann wrote to Philby "assuring [him] of his confidence in securing acceptance of the plan and asking for news of [his] progress." The latter was still confident of its possibilities, but the matter was allowed to lapse for a time, due to the exigencies of the war. It was not until November, 1941, that Churchill expressed his active interest in the scheme and on March 11, 1942, he asked Weizmann to discuss the proposal with Roosevelt on his forthcoming visit to the United States. H. St. John Philby, *Arabian Jubilee* (London: Robert Hall, Ltd., 1952), pp. 211-14.

35. Weizmann, p. 435.

found by agreement between the Jews and Arabs, and it is his present hope that the way can be prepared for him to meet with King Ibn Saud and to try to work out the basis for an agreement.³⁶

Weizmann later related that the President, "to whom [he] repeated the substance of Mr. Churchill's last statement . . . asked me to convey his positive reaction."³⁷ The Zionist leader also reported that Roosevelt had spoken in particular of Ibn Saud, "whom he considered fanatical and difficult." This latter remark seems to be contradicted by Cordell Hull who has stated that Roosevelt was "drawn to the powerful personality of King Ibn Saud, and looked forward eagerly to making his personal acquaintance."³⁸

Roosevelt must have at least thought that the proposal advanced by Weizmann was worth investigating for in July, 1943, he instructed Hull to send Colonel Hoskins to Ibn Saud in order to ascertain whether the King would consent to see Weizmann or some other official of the Jewish Agency. At the same time, Hoskins was to extend an invitation to the King or to another member of his family to visit the United States. The King, however, would have none of the idea and angrily told Hoskins in August that he would not see Weizmann because he could not speak for Palestine, much less deliver that country to the Jews, "even if he were willing for even an instant to consider such a proposal."³⁹

Zionist reaction to Arab contacts.—Although the exploratory conversations conducted by Hoskins had not been productive, the Colonel's suggestion that the United

36. Personal Papers File, 8084, May 19, 1943, (FDRL).

37. Weizmann, p. 435.

38. Hull, II, 1512.

39. *Ibid.*, 1533.

States and Great Britain officially postpone further discussions on Palestine until the conclusion of the war, and fully consult with both Jews and Arabs, was under consideration by both governments. In the meantime, however, some information concerning these proposals had leaked out and brought a storm of indignation from the New York congressman, Emanuel Celler. He accused Hoskins and two other officials of having "contributed to the betrayal of Palestine"⁴⁰ and wrote to the President threatening a Congressional inquiry "unless the State Department ceases its absurd opposition to Palestine as a haven for the Jews."⁴¹ He then appealed to the President "as a last desperate measure" to intercede with Churchill at the Quebec Conference (August 17-24, 1943) for a Palestine homeland for the Jews.⁴² In view of these stirrings the text which Roosevelt and Churchill had prepared was not issued. Instead, the two leaders resolved to review the Palestine situation from month to month.⁴³

According to Hull, the President had been led to hold back the proposed text which embodied the promises made to Ibn Saud at the urging of the War Department.⁴⁴ When Under-Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, later presented the President with a proposed Anglo-American declaration in February, 1944, Roosevelt also declined to

40. Drew Pearson in *Washington Post*, August 9, 1943.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 19, 1943.

43. Hull, II, 1533.

44. *Ibid.* Kirk questions this statement on the grounds "of general probability," (*The Middle East in the War*, p. 314) but there seems to be no reason to doubt Hull's word. Kirk's doubt probably arises from the fact that Stimson acted against the Zionist-sponsored Congressional resolutions of 1944, and this would be taken to indicate an anti-Zionist attitude on the part of the Secretary. If Stimson were thereby considered an anti-Zionist, his objection to the proposed presidential statement would seem inconsistent since it could only comfort the Arabs. But in the light of Stimson's *Diary* the Secretary could hardly be called anti-Zionist.

issue it. This declaration would have (a) promised full consultations with Arabs and Jews before any decision was taken; (b) welcomed an agreement before the end of the war; (c) pledged a review of the Palestine situation after the war, to establish a just and definitive solution equitable to all parties concerned; and (d) involved a warning by the British that they would not permit force to change the "status quo" in the meantime. Such a statement, in Stettinius' mind, was needed to "clarify" the situation and to counteract the effects in the Arab world of the pro-Zionist resolutions then before Congress.⁴⁵ That this statement, and the earlier one indicated, were not issued can undoubtedly be traced to the advice of Stimson, Bloom and other like-minded persons who feared that such a declaration would appear as anti-Zionist.

Although the President was prevented from issuing a statement which would repeat his promises to Ibn Saud, he at the same time opposed any statement which might appear to favor the Jews. Essentially, he continued to work for a policy of postponement in line with his assurances to Ibn Saud. Thus, when Roosevelt was requested by Congressman Samuel Weiss of Pennsylvania, on October 13, 1943, to intercede with the British for the abrogation of the White Paper, he in effect declined to do so. His reply dated October 20, and drafted by the State Department, stated that the matter was receiving "careful thought," but that many "difficulties" and "complex problems" arose in connection with it.⁴⁶

While the Department of State continued to fear the adverse repercussions in the Middle East of any declaration which might appear to favor the Zionists, sympathy

45. Stettinius to FDR, in *Ibid.*, March 4, 1944.

46. Official File 700, *loc. cit.* (FDRL).

was shown towards the Zionist pleas for continued immigration beyond the March, 1944, deadline. Hull has stated that beginning with December 13, 1943, he and the Department made "numerous efforts" to induce the British to lower the barriers. He told Ambassador Halifax that:

The President and I . . . are in earnest sympathy with the Jews' proposal that immigration into Palestine be extended by the British Government beyond March 31, and that in every other possible way relief and aid be given to the Jewish people.⁴⁷

Other conversations followed in a similar vein but the Secretary's inference that American diplomacy secured the extension of the deadline until 31,000 more Jews should be admitted, is to claim too much.⁴⁸ As early as November, 1943, this policy had been formulated by the British Government.⁴⁹ Although it might be conceded that this support for Jewish immigration was merely a reaction to political pressures made more formidable by the approaching elections of 1944, it can still be maintained that Roosevelt did not see this as a reversal of his non-declared policy. As in 1939, when the President had expressed himself privately to Hull, he felt that the Arab immigration into Palestine had also vastly increased. This being the case, it seemed impossible that thirty thousand or more Jewish immigrants could affect the basic situation.

Renewed assurances to Zionists and Arabs.—The Pres-

47. Hull, II, 1584.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CCCXCIII, col. 1152.

ident's alarm over the Palestine resolutions of February, 1944, has already been alluded to.⁵⁰ In order to offset Zionist anger over the shelving of the resolutions, Roosevelt received the co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, Rabbis Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver, on March 9. They were authorized to say in the President's name that the American Government had never approved the White Paper of 1939. It is interesting to note that on the very day when he received the Rabbis, Roosevelt wrote to Rayburn concerning the "volume of protests" from the Arab world stirred by the impending resolutions. "It merely illustrates," he went on, "what happens if delicate international situations get into party politics." He was also "glad" that the resolutions were under control in the House.⁵¹

That party politics had influenced the President's announcement to the Rabbis seems clear. For not only was the Democratic party concerned with the coming elections, but the President and Rabbi Wise were friends of long standing.⁵² Wise had supported the President in all of his campaigns and had even made numerous addresses throughout the country on Roosevelt's behalf.⁵³ Wise had acted as a consultant on problems affecting Jews,⁵⁴ and it could be assumed that the President would give him a sympathetic hearing. However, Roosevelt would not be pressed too far. Encouraged by their favorable reception on March 9, Wise and Silver attempted to press their advantage. They therefore drafted another statement on March 13, 1944, for issuance by the President. This decla-

50. *Supra*, pp. 48-49.

51. Official File 700, *loc. cit.*, (FDRL).

52. Wise, pp. 216-32.

53. *Ibid.* and Personal Papers File 3292, (FDRL).

54. Wise to FDR, October 6, 1938, March 10, 1938, April 28, 1943, Personal Papers File 3292, (FDRL).

ration would have wholeheartedly committed the United States to support the Zionist program since it not only urged the opening of Palestine for further immigration, colonization and development, but went on to state that the purpose of the American people was to favor a Jewish commonwealth.⁵⁵ No reply was ever sent to this communication, and on Hull's advice, the President merely made a general declaration on March 24 dealing with European refugees.⁵⁶

Even as it was, Arab reaction to the President's statement of March 9 was prompt. A memorandum dated March 11, from Michael J. McDermott, press officer of the State Department, to the President's press secretary, requested confirmation of the accuracy of the President's remarks. Ambassador Kirk reported the same day from Cairo that the Egyptian Prime Minister was also anxious to verify the statement. Roosevelt's reply attempted to straddle the issue, for while admitting that he was correctly quoted, he also pointed out that his statement had mentioned a Jewish national home, rather than a Jewish commonwealth. Moreover, although the United States had never expressed approval of the White Paper, it had never, on the other hand, "taken a position relative to it."⁵⁷ "In general," noted Hull on this point, "the President at times talked both ways to Zionists and Arabs, besieged as he was by each camp. Rabbis Wise and Silver believed that the President had made pledges to them. The State Department made no pledges."⁵⁸

Palestine and the election of 1944.—Hull's suggestion

55. Note Lipsky's pressure on Bloom requesting that he urge the President to issue such a statement, *Supra*, pp. 52-53.

56. Official File 700, *loc. cit.*, (FDRL).

57. Hull, II, 1936.

58. *Ibid.* However, according to Lipsky, Roosevelt's pledge was not given too much weight, *Supra*, p. 52.

to the President on July 26, 1944, advising that the leaders of both parties refrain from making statements during the campaign which might "tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine,"⁵⁹ was not heeded by either party. The Secretary's warning was again repeated without effect on August 30, 1944, when he pointed out that a Palestine resolution would undoubtedly bring strong criticism of the United States from the Arab Conference which was about to organize. Despite the adverse Arab reaction to the Palestine planks which both parties had adopted in mid-summer, the pressure of domestic politics led first Dewey (October 12, 1944) and then Roosevelt to speak out on the Palestine issue. At stake in the election were the electoral votes of New York, a state which caused great concern to both parties. It was assumed, and Zionist leaders made every effort to prove, that the "Jewish vote" was going to be the decisive factor in the election. Judge Rosenblatt would later underline the importance of the Jewish vote in the crucial areas:

New York is entitled to 47 electoral votes, while only 266 electoral votes are necessary to elect a President. Whether the vote of the State of New York goes to one party or another (and that may be by relatively few votes in a population of over 13 million) will make a difference of 94 votes in the electoral college, so that it may be readily under-

59. *Ibid.*, p. 1537 and Personal Papers File 3500, August 30, 1944 (FDRL). Kermit Roosevelt believes that the President's statement marked a significant development, for "hereafter," he writes, "policy on Palestine began to be made in the White House, often against the express advice of the War, Navy and State Departments." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. II, No. 1 (January, 1948), p. 5.

stood why a presidential contest may hinge on the political struggle in the State of New York, and to a lesser extent in the large states of Pennsylvania (36), Illinois (27), or Ohio (23). Only once during the last three-quarters of a century was a President elected who failed to carry the State of New York. Now, New York, Illinois, Ohio, as well as the populous States of Massachusetts and New Jersey are normally "doubtful." . . . Perhaps 90% of the Jewish population is concentrated in these doubtful States besides Michigan and Pennsylvania which are less doubtful politically.⁶⁰

That Roosevelt, who up until this time had so studiously avoided any public declaration which might give full and uncompromising support to the Zionist cause, should now endorse the Biltmore Program, can only be attributed to Democratic election fears in 1944. Just as the question of the Polish Government-in-Exile was straddled in order to make a bid for the "Polish vote," it was hoped that a favorable statement on Palestine would ensure the "Jewish vote." This step was taken when the President addressed a letter to Senator Wagner who was to convey the message to a meeting of the Zionist Organization. After first citing the Democratic plank of July which had endorsed the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth, the President stated:

Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as

60. Bernard A. Rosenblatt in *Zionist Review*, November 29, 1946, p. 3. cf. Rosenblatt's warning to Wagner, *Supra*, p. 79. cf. Francis J. Brown, *One America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 271-73 for a discussion of the location of Jewish immigrants.

practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization.⁶¹

Indeed, it was a tribute to the effectiveness of the techniques set in motion by Dr. Silver that the Biltmore Program had at last found an echo in a presidential statement.⁶²

This message, says Manuel, was "as clear-cut as the Zionists could have asked for in time of war," and "was important for its basic departure from previous presidential salutations to the Zionists. It was not a mere expression of sympathy or favor; it was a promise to find ways and

61. FDR to Wagner, October 15, 1944, Wagner Papers. The President's message, however, was decidedly influenced by a message from Senator Wagner who said: "I would appreciate it exceedingly if you would agree to the inclusion of the following words as part of your statement to the convention—I know how long and ardently the Jewish people . . . realization.' I regard this inclusion of the utmost importance." Wagner to Roosevelt, 3500, October 13, 1944 (FDRL).

62. Halperin points out that Roosevelt's pledge to the Zionist Organization at this time placed the American Jewish Committee in an awkward, "out-of-step" dilemma. The Committee's leadership, which was always anxious to be portrayed in the role of "good and loyal Americans," was embarrassed by the sudden turn of events which found them arrayed seemingly against official American policy toward Palestine. After the election, therefore, Waldman recommended on November 6, 1944 that the Committee change its policy and lead a united front of Zionists and non-Zionists in a revived Jewish Agency. By doing this he felt that the Committee, as an organization, could gracefully withdraw from its controversial position vis-a-vis the Zionists, and thereby liberate itself from the unpopular position it had allowed itself to adopt. As members of the Agency, Committee representatives would have an opportunity to press for non-nationalistic views. Although this scheme did not materialize, the Committee thereafter moved closer to the Zionists and took almost identical action. Halperin, p. 169f.

means to fulfill a policy plank of the Presidential political party.”⁶³

Post-election policy.—Once the elections were over, however, Roosevelt again pursued his independent policy. Not only did the State Department advise against the passage of the Palestine resolutions in December, but the President himself spoke against them in a letter to Wagner:

... Here is the only trouble about additional action by either House in regard to Palestine at this time. There are about a half a million Jews there. Perhaps another million want to go. They are of all shades—good, bad and indifferent.

On the other side of the picture there are approximately seventy million Mohammedans who want to cut their throats the day they land. The one thing I want to avoid is a massacre or a situation which cannot be resolved by talking things over.

Anything said or done over here just now would add fuel to the flames and I hope that at this juncture no branch of the Government will act. Everybody knows what American hopes are. If we talk about them too much we will hurt fulfillment.⁶⁴

The new year was not long under way before Dr. Wise resumed private conversations with the President. Although Roosevelt had committed himself on the question of the Jewish commonwealth, Wise did not make an issue of the fact. In lieu of the President's attitude towards the Palestine resolutions, it seemed more diplomatic to stress other points. This policy was facilitated by the absence

63. Manuel, p. 312.

64. FDR to Wagner, December 3, 1944, Wagner Papers.

of Dr. Silver who had resigned from the Emergency Council. Wise and the President discussed various aspects of the Palestine question on January 22, 1945. Roosevelt inquired about the country's economic potentialities; discussed Arab fears that the Jews, if given Palestine, would infiltrate neighboring Arab countries; and wondered if the Soviet Union might not oppose a Jewish commonwealth.⁶⁵ On all of these points Wise attempted to reassure the President. The economic potentialities of the country, he said, could be greatly increased with a Jordan Valley Authority. Moreover, he felt that only a million Jews would enter Palestine in the near future and this would not over-tax existing economic resources. He discounted Jewish infiltration into Arab territory and said that, on the contrary, Jews in surrounding areas would emigrate to Palestine. Concerning possible Soviet opposition, Wise seemed not at all concerned. He related to the President a conversation held with President Benes of Czechoslovakia in which the Zionist leader had been told that Stalin did not oppose the idea provided the United States and Britain could agree on a solution.⁶⁶

65. Wise to FDR, January 24, 1945, OF 700, *loc. cit.*, (FDRL).

66. The shift of Soviet policy from condemnation of to support for Zionism is discussed in the *Bulletin of the Institute of Arab American Affairs*, May 15, 1948, pp. 2-3:

"Shortly after the Bolsheviks seized power thirty years ago, Zionism was banned in Soviet Russia. Official Red government literature since then has branded Zionists as 'the lackeys of British imperialism.' Joseph Stalin, Russia's present dictator, wrote a book *Marxism, Nationalism and the Colonial Question*, in which he vehemently repudiated the idea of Jewish nationality and the Zionist political state. About a year ago the same treatise was re-published but with this significant difference: the chapter which condemned Zionism was deleted.

"Other evidence of Russia's desire to foment trouble in the Arab world, of whose oil resources she is envious . . . is indicated in the support which the Comintern gave financially in backing the Arabs against the Zionists at the time when British policy was aiding and abetting

This conversation, together with a letter to James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, indicate that the President at this time was considering a plan in which the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth and the economic development of the Arab countries would go hand in hand. Writing to Landis on January 11, 1945, Roosevelt referred to a coming meeting (Yalta) and asked for a memorandum before Inauguration Day "giving me your thought on a possible rapprochement with Ibn Saud in regard to the Palestine question. It might come up."⁶⁷ Sumner Welles maintained that the President saw the establishment of a Jewish and Arab economic development as the key to a peaceful Middle East.⁶⁸ Later, while en route to Yalta, Roosevelt

. . . confided to Churchill his plans to visit King Ibn Saud on his return trip to discuss the Palestine question. He wished to bring about peace between the Arabs and Jews. Churchill wished him good luck but didn't seem very hopeful that the President would meet with success.⁶⁹

Jewish immigration into Palestine. . . . Russia at that time was not actually interested in the Arab cause, but it afforded her an opportunity to embarrass the British administraton. . . . It was when the Zionists turned against the British in 1942 . . . that Russia's policy veered from her previous, deadly opposition to Zionism to its support for a political state in the Middle East.

"Such a change in policy took on a more clear form after October, 1943, when Ivan Maisky, former Soviet ambassador in London, visited Palestine. The diplomat was escorted by Zionist leaders to their colonies and collective settlements. He inspected their industries. He returned to Moscow impressed with the close resemblance of Zionist operation to Communist realities."

67. Elliot Roosevelt (ed.), *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1564.

68. Welles, p. 29f.

69. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 22.

Roosevelt and Ibn Saud.—If the President seriously entertained the idea that the attractiveness of economic assistance could bring the Arabian monarch to sanction the creation of a Jewish commonwealth, his hopes were soon destroyed. Needless to say, such a plan presumed that Ibn Saud had it within his power to speak for the Arab world. At the colorful meeting with Ibn Saud which followed the Yalta Conference, the President found the King unmoved by the economic and social benefits he offered. Ibn Saud strongly protested any further Jewish immigration into Palestine, and, according to Frances Perkins, stated plainly that the Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews. While admitting that the Arab world needed help, the King did not want the resulting benefits "inherited by the Jews."⁷⁰ Some months after the conference, a news item from Cairo quoted Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, Secretary-General of the Arab League, as saying that not only did Ibn Saud threaten war should Palestine be given to the Jews, but that Roosevelt

. . . gave a pledge to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that he would not support any move to hand over Palestine to the Jews. . . . Azzam Bey said that Ibn Saud personally told him of the meeting at which the pledge was said to have been made.⁷¹

70. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Viking Press, 1946), pp. 87-89. cf. Grace Tully, *FDR, My Boss* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. 352-53; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 871-72; Ross T. McIntire, *White House Physician* (New York: Putnam's and Sons, 1946), pp. 230-31; Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 341-42.

71. *New York Times*, August 24, 1945.

William Eddy, the official interpreter at the meeting, states that Roosevelt

. . . gave Ibn Saud the double assurance, repeated just one week before his death in his letter to Ibn Saud, dated April 5, 1945: (1) He personally, as president, would never do anything which might prove hostile to the Arabs; and (2) the United States Government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs. To the King, these oral assurances were equal to an alliance.⁷²

The statement issued by Azzam Bey could quite conceivably have been the authentic interpretation which Ibn Saud placed upon the President's words. It was later reported that Roosevelt had admitted to Bernard Baruch that "of all the men he had talked to in his life, he had got least satisfaction from this iron-willed Arab monarch."⁷³ However, the impression that Roosevelt was disappointed with his meeting with Ibn Saud is contradicted by Eddy:

. . . the President wrote to me, February 16, 1945, that his meeting with Ibn Saud was "so outstanding a success" as well as "a most interesting and stimulating experience."⁷⁴

At any event, Roosevelt was aware that no solution of the Palestine problem could be reached by dealing with Ibn

72. William A. Eddy, *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud* (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1954), p. 35.

73. Elliott Roosevelt, *As I Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 245.

74. Eddy, *Ibid.*

Saud. While returning to the United States the President evidently concluded that a whole new approach would be necessary. He remarked to Stettinius that

. . . he must have a conference with Congressional leaders and reexamine our entire policy in Palestine. He was now convinced, he added, that if nature took its course there would be bloodshed between the Arabs and Jews. Some formula, not yet discovered would have to prevent this warfare, he concluded.⁷⁵

Aftermath of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud conversations.— Zionist hopes that the Big Three might reach a solution at Yalta favorable to their cause were dashed with the President's informal remark to Congress on March 1 when he stated:

Of the problems of Arabia, I learned more about the whole problem, the Muslim problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters.⁷⁶

Wise quickly telegraphed Roosevelt on March 5 asking for an interview and attempted to offset the sense of frustration voiced by the Jewish press.⁷⁷ So great was Zionist disillusionment that demands for the return of Dr. Silver and his more militant policies mounted rapidly. Zionist concern was temporarily allayed by Roosevelt's reception

75. Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Company, 1949), pp. 289-90.

76. *New York Times*, March 2, 1945.

77. Wise to Roosevelt, March 5, 1945, Personal Papers File 3292 (FDRL).

of Rabbi Wise on March 16 and the statement authorized in the President's name when he said,

I made my position on Zionism clear in October. That position I have not changed, and shall continue to seek to bring about its earliest realization.⁷⁸

Numerous protests against the President's remarks quickly poured in from the Arab world. In response to a letter from Ibn Saud, the State Department reassured the King that no decision would be reached without consulting Arabs and Jews, and assured the King that Roosevelt would take no action "which might prove hostile to the Arab people."⁷⁹ Similar replies were sent to other Arab leaders. The Zionist historian says of the President's stand:

It could be argued, of course, that the President did not regard a Jewish homeland as "hostile to the Arab people"—a standard contention of the Zionists for decades. Nevertheless, the general impression created by the communication is out of harmony with the precise commitment to the Zionists in October 1944 that he would move to bring about the realization of their goal. The promise to the Jews had been definitive and not contingent upon more Arab conferences which could only be delaying actions, though it could be argued that the Jews were never told explicitly that there would not be Arab consultations.⁸⁰

78. *New York Times*, March 17, 1945.

79. Stettinius, p. 290.

80. Manuel, p. 316.

Thus, up until the time of his death Roosevelt had given grounds for both Zionists and Arabs to believe that their respective interests were supported by the President. Sumner Welles has attempted to portray Roosevelt as continuously supporting the Zionist cause. The letters sent to the Arab leaders during the last few weeks of Roosevelt's life were said to have been prepared for the tired President by the State Department and routinely signed. Moreover, says Welles, even though some of the phrases may be open to misinterpretation, "there is in those letters no commitment which is at variance with the views which the President had previously maintained."⁸¹ The former Under-Secretary also maintained that Roosevelt had once remarked that if direct negotiations between Jews and Arabs failed, the United Nations would have to create a Jewish commonwealth and protect it by force.⁸² Not only is there no direct evidence from any available source which would indicate that this was a seriously considered policy on the President's part, but it would appear to contradict Roosevelt's admission to Stettinius. Moreover, the President was not unaware of the increasing strategic, economic and political value of the Middle East and he would hardly have risked such a danger to American interests. These factors, notes Hurewitz, would all condition the President's responses⁸³ and would possibly have presaged a new American policy in lieu of the region's growing importance. Manuel's conclusion that Roosevelt "was at once a pragmatist and an emotional idealist who initiated a vast complex of wildly contradictory movements"⁸⁴ seems more accurate an esti-

81. Welles, p. 30.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Hurewitz, p. 176.

84. Manuel, p. 317.

mate than Welles' version which seeks to set the President up as a constant supporter of the Zionist cause. Hurewitz emphasizes another aspect of the question when he observes that "these contradictory pledges, inherent in the Palestine question itself, were already implied in the American assumption of partial responsibility for resolving the deadlock to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned."⁸⁵

It is interesting to note that despite Zionist claims of Roosevelt's support, there appears to have been no great feeling of official satisfaction. In a tribute to Dr. Silver some years later, Emanuel Neumann wrote that although Roosevelt's friendship towards Jews was indisputable, "he had little time and less thought" for the Zionists. Roosevelt was said to have had a "deep-seated skepticism about Jewish Palestine and a cool indifference" which could be described as "uninvolved benignancy." Although the President was "unwilling to act," the Zionist leadership dared not go to any great length in opposing him, for, as Neumann admitted:

To the Jewish masses in America and throughout the world, Roosevelt loomed as the great friend and champion of their people. Now could such a friend oppose or ignore Jewish national aspirations? Not only was it difficult to accept such a painful thought—there was a strong psychological need to reject it. In a tragic hour and a hostile world there simply had to be a champion and protector. If it was not Stalin or Churchill, it had to be Roosevelt. This emotional dependence on Roosevelt was reinforced by eminently practical considerations. He

85. Hurewitz, p. 214.

might be re-elected, and he was re-elected for a fourth term. His would be the power to shape post-war settlement. To cross him, to offend him, to alienate his affection was to court disaster for the Zionist cause.⁸⁶

86. *American Zionist*, February 5, 1953.

V PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL FRONT, 1945 - 1946

The San Francisco Conference.—Shortly before Roosevelt's death, it was revealed that the President and Churchill had discussed the Palestine question at Quebec in 1944. However, the nature of these conversations was not known¹ and this, together with Churchill's announcement on February 27 that the forthcoming United Nations Conference at San Francisco would not settle the question of Palestine,² did not serve to encourage Zionist hopes. Despite the Prime Minister's statement that a final solution would be put off until the end of the war, the Zionists were anxious to participate in the Conference which was scheduled to convene on April 25, 1945. They were much concerned with the mandates system knowing that discussion on this point would certainly arise in conjunction with the official passing of the League. At the same time, there was growing fear that the delegates of the Arab states might obtain some concession in favor of their

1. *New York Times*, March 3, 1945, p. 6.

2. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, Fifth Series, CCCCVIII, cols. 1289-1290.

views. Even if there were no likelihood of pertinent political issues being discussed, attendance at the Conference would offer tremendous opportunities for lobbying.³ There was even some demand that the Jewish people, as such, be represented.⁴ This suggestion was never seriously considered. Nevertheless, the American Jewish Conference—the Zionist creation—and the American Jewish Committee, now acting in harmony with the Zionists, were asked by the State Department to serve as consultants to the American Delegation.

While many proposals were laid before the Conference by the Zionists and their allied groups, only two were discussed and acted upon. One concerned human rights while the other dealt with the Palestine mandate. A memorandum circulated by the Jewish Agency asked that no action be taken "inconsistent with or prejudicial to the special rights of the Jewish people under the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, and all such rights shall be expressly reserved and safeguarded," pending the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth.⁵ The Agency also requested representatives on any commission which might be created by the United Nations to deal with Palestine.

The Dumbarton Oaks draft had not provided for the

3. Nahum Goldman, "Jews at San Francisco," *New Palestine*, XXXV (April 13, 1945), 172-173.

4. In preparation for the San Francisco Conference, the American Jewish Conference and the American Zionist Emergency Committee jointly sponsored eighty-eight mass public rallies calling for a Jewish commonwealth. The largest of these attracted over 60,000 persons on April 29, 1945 in New York City. These rallies demanded "that the voice of the Jewish people be heard at San Francisco," and the claim was made that the Conference was speaking for the majority of American Jews. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 83.

5. Quoted in Jacob Robinson, *Palestine and the United Nations* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), p. 2.

disposal of mandated territories, and during the course of the debates the Jewish Agency continued to express the belief that Jewish rights in Palestine were not being properly safe-guarded. Secretary of State Stettinius acted to end the impasse created by Zionist demands for explicit reference to Palestine and Arab attempts to circumvent such maneuvers. Stettinius at last stated that only the general principles of trusteeship would be considered, not specific territories.⁶ The Agency then submitted a memorandum to the Conference on May 8 suggesting the following clause in the chapter on trusteeship:

No trusteeship arrangement shall deprive any people or nation of any rights or benefits acquired or impair any obligations assumed under existing mandates held by members of the United Nations.⁷

Arab delegates sought to modify the wording of the paragraph which eventually found expression in the Working Paper and read:

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship arrangements placing each territory under the trusteeship system, nothing in this chapter should be construed in and of itself to alter in any manner the rights of any state or any peoples in any territory.⁸

Arab efforts to replace "peoples" with "people of any territory"⁹ were not successful thanks to the determination of

6. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

the Agency which opposed the change since it would apply only to the Jewish people resident in Palestine. This paragraph (number 5) eventually emerged as Article 80 of the Charter in the following form:

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship arrangements placing each territory under the trusteeship system, nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.¹⁰

"It is to be added that, throughout this discussion the words 'Jewish people' and 'Palestine,' while in everybody's mind, did not appear in the records."¹¹ Although it failed to secure recognition from the United Nations of a Jewish commonwealth, the Zionist Organization expressed satisfaction with the results of its collaboration with the Jewish Agency.¹²

Efforts to secure national support.—In the meantime, Zionist activity was initiated and went forward in many other areas guided by the knowledge "of the weight which American public opinion carries in the formulation of foreign and domestic policy by our government."¹³ The Emergency Council could thus capitalize on the "latent American sympathy with the tragic and pressing Jewish

10. Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, XVI (1947), 967-70.

11. Robinson, p. 6.

12. ZOA, 48th Annual Report, p. 83.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

need" while realizing that "this sympathy had to be channelized into action."¹⁴ To secure this, "newspaper columnists, radio commentators and editorial writers, as well as prominent Americans in every field of activity, were constantly supplied" with material on Palestine.¹⁵ Christian support was further enhanced by the merger in 1945 of the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Council on Palestine. This group continued to count heavily on the influence of Senator Robert Wagner,¹⁶ a co-founder of the American Palestine Committee, and was henceforth known as the American Christian Palestine Committee. Under the directorship of Howard M. LeSourd, numerous conferences were held in New York, Houston, St. Louis, Baltimore and Detroit.¹⁷ LeSourd was especially aided by the efforts of Dr. Henry Atkinson, Dr. Carl Voss, Dr. Ralph Harlow and Rev. Richard Evans.¹⁸ Every effort was made to "interest the Jewish War Veterans of the United States in Zionist work," a goal at least partially attained when National Commander Maxwell Cohen urged all Jewish veterans to assist in the shekel collection.¹⁹ Nor were non-Zionist Jews ignored in

14. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

15. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 44.

16. In a letter to Wagner dated March 16, 1946, LeSourd proposed a banquet to be held in the Senator's honor in New York "sometime in the near future while you are still at the very height of your usefulness." The suggestion was advanced that the banquet might be held "at or near the convening of the General Assembly" or "during the meeting of the Security Council" so as to attract "international recognition." On August 6, 1946, the Senator was called upon "to cable immediately to influential friends of yours in England, insisting that they bring pressure to bear upon the authorities." LeSourd to Wagner, March 16, 1946 and August 8, 1946, Wagner Papers.

17. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 44.

18. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 10.

19. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 26.

this campaign to win public support. This group, significantly, was considered to be of the utmost importance by the Emergency Council since it threatened to shatter the picture of united Jewry which was being held before the country. During one year (June, 1945 to June, 1946) \$300,000 was spent among 20 per cent of the Jewish population "out of the conviction that it is unwise to neglect this influential twenty per cent which has plagued us since the organization through which it is able to express itself [the American Council for Judaism] came into being."²⁰ Leading the work of this Committee on Unity for Palestine "in its relentless fight against dissidents in American Jewish circles" was Nathan Straus III.²¹ In addition to general support from rabbis, Jewish chaplains were said to "have had a profound influence on Americans of every faith who are serving in the Armed Forces."²² Organized labor also made "an important contribution to the Zionist cause, primarily through the medium of the American Jewish Trade Union Committee headed by Mr. Max Zaritsky."²³ Radio time was secured through the efforts of local Emergency Council chairmen in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia. It was reported that sixteen stations in Pennsylvania, thirteen in Texas, and ten in New York carried Zionist programs in 1945.²⁴ At the same time "the Palestine Executive . . . flooded the whole American continent with *schlichim*, officers of the propaganda machine, and persuaded Jewish public opinion that this particular line was required under the cir-

20. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 28.

21. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 12.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

cumstances.”²⁵ All of these activities, said the Zionist report,

. . . only scratch the surface of the immensity of our operations and their diversity. We reach into every department of American life and create favorable public relations by giving the unvarnished truth of the plight of Jewry and the soundness of the Zionist solution.²⁶

Another appraisal of this outpouring of propaganda was offered by Walter Wright in the *Virginia Quarterly Review*:

The obvious purpose of flooding the press with this publicity is to give the public and the government the impression that everybody, Christian as well as Jew, is interested in the Zionist movement and favors its aims.²⁷

Fund raising activities.—In addition to propaganda activities the Zionists were greatly taken up with fund raising. The United States Palestine Appeal, whose principal beneficiaries were the Karen Hayesod and the Jewish National Fund, was able to raise fourteen and a half million dollars in 1945, over thirty-two millions in 1946, and almost forty-three millions in 1947.²⁸ Eighty-three

25. Kirk, p. 329.

26. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 12.

27. Walter L. Wright, “Contradictory Foreign Policies,” *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIII (Spring, 1947), 190.

28. *United Palestine Appeal Yearbook*, 1948 (New York: United Palestine Appeal, 1948), p. 46.

per cent of all the funds collected for the Karen Hayesod in the period commencing with October, 1946, and ending in September, 1947, came from the United States thus showing the heavy dependence of the Jewish community in Palestine upon the financial resources of America.

Illegal immigration and terrorist activities were financed by the American League for a Free Palestine. Resolving to collect three million dollars, the League sponsored a conference in New York on February 23 and 24, 1946, ". . . to foster direct action to force the doors of Palestine." Full-page advertisements then followed in the press asking for donations to achieve this end. It was claimed that two hundred and fifty dollars would defray the expenses of transporting one displaced person to Palestine.²⁹ Although the League did not originally inform the public that the money was going to an affiliate of the terrorist Irgun, the connection could no longer be hidden by March, 1947. The League still insisted, however, that collections were devoted exclusively to repatriation work.³⁰ It was estimated that the League had collected \$742,000 by 1946 through newspaper pleas and through receipts from a stage presentation of "A Flag is Born," written by Ben Hecht. Although this money was obtained in 1946 it was not until February, 1947, that the first rescue ship sponsored by these funds reached Palestine. Since the cost of the ship and the transportation together was not more than \$136,000, it was charged that the remainder of the money had gone for propaganda purposes.³¹

The Freedom Fighters also had a fund-raising affiliate in the United States. This group was known as the Polit-

29. *New York Post*, February 25, 1946, p. 13, and April 19, 1946, p. 21.

30. *Ibid.*, March 25, 1947, p. 30.

31. *Congress Weekly*, XIV (February 21, 1947), 10 and April 18, 1947, 16.

cal Action Committee for Palestine and was incorporated on February 25, 1946. Its stated aims were to press for the recognition of European and Palestinian Jewry as an "ethnopolitical entity"; to promote the repatriation of Jews to Palestine; to render "aid, understanding, and sympathy" to those Jews "persecuted by the British," and to ". . . do all and everything necessary, suitable and proper for the accomplishment of any propositions or the attainment of any of the objects hereinbefore set forth."³² Rabbi Baruch Korff, the executive vice-chairman of the group, indirectly admitted that the financing of terrorism was included in its activities. When asked at a press conference whether the Action Committee would foster military action, he replied that "all sanctions" necessary to get rid of the British would be taken.³³ Like all other Zionist groups, the Committee was able to win the support of Congressmen and other leaders in American life who were probably unaware of the Freedom Fighters' terroristic activities in Palestine. An advertisement in the *New York Times* listed Senators Mead, Young, Walsh, Langer, Capper, and Capehart, along with Representatives McCormack and Lane as sponsors.³⁴

Renewed pressure for a Palestine Resolution.—Of all the activities undertaken during this period by the Emergency Council of the Zionist Organization of America, the attempt to win Congressional support for Zionist aims was given high priority. It was realized that Congressional support would "stamp it [the Zionist aims] clearly as American governmental policy"³⁵ and thus facilitate the accomplishment of the Biltmore Program. While Silver's

32. From advertisement in *PM*, June 3, 1948.

33. *New York Times*, May 21, 1946, p. 15.

34. *Ibid.*, July 10, 1946, advertisement.

35. ZOA, *48th Annual Report*, p. 82.

persistent demands to press the resolutions in December 1944, in the face of Executive disapproval, had led to an internal reorganization, the goal was not abandoned. Although under the sole chairmanship of Dr. Wise, the Emergency Council "continued unswervingly on the straight line plotted and planned for it by the parties of the Zionist movement."³⁶ On January 2, 1945, Dr. Wise contacted Congressman Bloom on the subject:

Dear Sol:

"The Council, as you know, has acted and has accepted the resignation of Dr. Silver, who, I think, has exposed the Zionist movement to terrible risk and to great harm.

"You, Goldstein and I must meet soon and talk things over very carefully. A better resolution must be introduced and it must be pursued vigorously, but with due regard to all those things that must be taken into account. Perhaps you will be good enough to let me know when you will next be in New York. If you do not plan to come to New York soon, Dr. Goldstein and I could come to see you in Washington."³⁷

Whether the resolution introduced by Representative James P. Geelan, Democrat of Connecticut and successor to Representative Ranulf Compton, was inspired by Dr. Wise or Sol Bloom is not clear. This resolution was introduced on January 11, 1945, and was identical with the measure introduced in the previous session by Representative Compton but in its unamended and stronger version.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

37. Wise to Bloom, January 2, 1945, Bloom Papers, Biographical File (New York Public Library, New York).

Representative Emanuel Celler, the ardent New York Zionist, introduced a similar resolution into the House on January 15, 1945.³⁸ However, in view of the cautious approach indicated by Wise, as well as the lack of any strong Zionist organizational support for these resolutions, it might be assumed that neither Bloom nor Wise were enthusiastic supporters of the resolutions at that time. This attitude was probably reinforced by a brief note from Stettinius to Bloom on January 19, 1945, which possibly hinted at Executive disapproval:

With reference to the resolutions respecting Palestine that were recently being considered by your Committee, I am enclosing for you information a copy, in translation, of a note on this subject which the Iraqi Foreign Office sent to our Minister in Baghdad under date of December 21, 1944.

"You will observe from the text of the note that the Government of Iraq has expressed the desire that its viewpoint be made known to the United States Legislative authority."³⁹

No further action beyond studies⁴⁰ of the Palestine situation were undertaken by the House and the scene of activity gradually shifted to the Senate where the resolu-

38. Adler, p. 402.

39. Stettinius to Bloom, January 19, 1945, Bloom Papers, Biographical File (New York Public Library, New York).

40. "When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee needed a study of Palestine and the Arab states, the job was turned over to Senator Guy M. Gillette, Democrat from Iowa, an avowed pro-Zionist who had headed the American League for a Free Palestine. When the House Foreign Affairs Committee required a similar report, the task was assigned to Republican Congressman Jacob K. Javits of New York, a staunch advocate of Jewish nationalism. His views were well known, but Javits requested and received this assignment as a tacit acknowledgment by his Republican colleagues that objectivity on this subject was impossible as well as undesirable." Lilienthal, p. 110.

tion was pursued by Senator Robert Wagner. After Truman had taken office, the Senator had busied himself with securing Congressional support for a letter urging the Government to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth. The appeal to the President, who was uninstructed in the fine points of the Palestine question, emphasized "history," "good faith," and the tragic plight of the Jews. The Senator was anxious that these considerations should be brought to the President's attention before his attendance at the Potsdam Conference. Writing to Truman on July 3, 1945, Wagner said:

"I am enclosing herewith the letter to you signed by 54 senators and 250 members of the House of Representatives. . . . The liberation of Europe by our victorious armies has placed responsibility for the fate of the Jewish people and of their National home in Palestine squarely in the hands of the Democracies. In the light of existing conditions both in Europe and Palestine, a just and proper decision has become a matter of immediate urgency. Further delay would appear to be both dangerous and unwise, and it is our earnest hope that you will find it possible to give consideration to this pressing issue in the course of your forthcoming conversations abroad." ⁴¹

Another brief note was addressed to Secretary Byrnes the same day:

"I am enclosing a copy of a printed letter which I sent to President Truman today. . . . I

41. Wagner to Truman, July 3, 1945, Wagner Papers.

hope you will have an opportunity to read the letter to the President together with the letter signed by these Senators and Congressmen.”⁴²

Working closely with the Zionist-sponsored American Christian Palestine Committee, Wagner permitted that group to use his name freely in securing resolution which would favor a Jewish commonwealth from state legislatures. By concentrating on key state senators along with various governors, the Committee was able to secure favorable, if not identical resolutions from most legislatures. This process is clearly revealed in a letter to Wagner from Howard LeSourd, dated September 13, 1945:

“I have taken the liberty of sending the enclosed telegram in your name to Governor Sidney P. Osborn and State Senator David P. Kimball, of Arizona. I am quite sure that this is in keeping with your desire.”⁴³

This telegram, sent in Wagner’s name, read as follows:

“It is my earnest hope that the State of Arizona will join the rapidly growing number of sovereign states of our Union being recorded in favor of the reconstitution [*sic*] of Palestine as a free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I most respectfully urge you to lend your good efforts to the end that your State Legislature now in session may bring about the passage of the resolution calling for the opening of the doors of Palestine to free and unrestricted immigration of the helpless and harassed

42. Wagner to Byrnes, July 3, 1945, Wagner Papers.

43. LeSourd to Wagner, September 13, 1945, Wagner Papers.

Jewish refugees who have no other haven and for the implementation of British and American pledges calling for the redemption of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish State. I urge also that copies of your resolution to be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and Members of the House and Senate for Arizona." ⁴⁴

Few holding elective office would fail to attach their signatures to such a petition which apparently could only serve to strengthen their political position.

By October more determined efforts were under way to secure Congressional action on the Palestine resolutions. Following the instructions of the Emergency Council in New York, the local committees of the Emergency Council called at the homes of Senators Barkley, Gillette, George, Capper, La Follette, and Green. Reports were written up on each of these senators and relayed to national headquarters. Copies were in turn sent to Wagner for his information. The report concerning Barkley read:

He said that he would be glad to speak to Senator Connally to bring up the Palestine Resolution as early as possible. He stated further that he does not doubt that the Resolution will pass since it had been held up only at the request of General Marshall. He made a point of saying that the State Department should make known officially to the Committee that the military objections had been withdrawn so that the Resolution might have clear sailing.⁴⁵

44. Wagner to Kimball, September 13, 1945, Wagner Papers.

45. Report on Community Conferences With Senators, Wagner Papers.

On October 2 and 3, Senators Taft, Saltonstall, Ferguson, Brewster, and Smith, Republicans, and Barkley, Mead, Guffey, Murray, McMahon, and Wheeler, Democrats, all called for the end of the White Paper immigration restrictions. At the same time Senators Myres and Tobey introduced a strongly worded Palestine resolution.⁴⁶ Simultaneously with this activity in Washington, the American Christian Palestine Committee sponsored a conference in New York on October 14 - 16, which was attended by more than 2,000 lay and religious leaders. Messages were then sent to Truman, Attlee, Byrnes, Connally and Bloom appealing for quick action on Palestine.⁴⁷

Resuming discussions on Palestine in the House on October 16, 1945, a long line of representatives hastened to voice approval for unlimited immigration into Palestine and for a Jewish commonwealth.⁴⁸ A word of caution was once more introduced by Benjamin Cohen, State

46. *New Palestine*, XXXVI (October 31, 1945), 2. cf. *Congressional Record*, XCI, part 7, 9217-9222; 9242-9246; 9308-9309.

47. *Ibid*, pp. 6, 26.

48. *Palestine, Proceedings in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, October 16, 1945* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945). While all of this activity was proceeding apace, few dared to voice opposition. Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, noted American educator, wrote: "Of the few who had any real knowledge of the circumstances, almost no one was willing to speak out publicly against a project of the Zionists. The politicians feared the Jewish vote; others feared the charge of anti-Semitism; and nearly all had a kind of 'guilt complex' in their emotions towards the Jews because of the terrible tragedies inflicted upon them by Hitler. It seemed to me, however, that someone ought to speak out against the cowardly and immoral course to which our nation was being urged." Accordingly, Miss Gildersleeve wrote an open letter to the *New York Times* which appeared in its issue of October 9, 1945, urging that the United States admit 200,000 Jews rather than force the Jews on the Arabs. Thereafter, she said, "This letter brought a storm on my head. Many Zionists denounced me vehemently; some threatened violence." *Many a Good Crusade* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), pp. 185-86.

Department adviser to Ambassador Winant in London and Bloom's supporter at the Bermuda Conference:

Office of the Secretary of State
October 17, 1945

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Sol:

I do not wish to deter you from doing what you think best on the Palestine problem. Perhaps I do not see the situation as clearly as I should, but I fear in the end the resolution would stir controversy without advancing the solution of the problem.⁴⁹

On October 26, Senators Wagner, Taft, and Walsh placed before the Senate a proposed resolution which called upon the United States to

. . . use its good offices to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that they may reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights.⁵⁰

Three days later, Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts introduced an identically worded resolution into the House.⁵¹ Wagner, meanwhile, continued to be the chief link with the Zionist Organization in this matter.

49. Cohen to Bloom, October 17, 1945, Bloom Papers, Biographical File (NYPL).

50. S. J. Res. 112, 79th Congress, 1st Session, *Congressional Record*, XCI, part 8, 10070.

51. H. J. Res. 264, *Ibid.*, 10168.

Not only was he deluged with thousands of letters⁵² and cards from individuals, but the Emergency Council maintained constant contact with him. A letter from Dr. Silver—returned to the Emergency Council some months before in the wake of Zionist demands for more militant action—suggested immediate action:

It would be highly desirable if your Palestine Resolution, which you re-introduced last Friday, were acted upon promptly in the Senate, especially in view of the coming visit of Prime Minister Attlee which is scheduled for the next ten days or two weeks. The passage of your Resolution would strengthen the hands of Truman and Byrnes in dealing with Attlee. I believe that you and Senator Taft (perhaps also Senator Walsh who associated himself with your Resolution) should contact Senator Connally at once and request an early consideration of the Resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. With President Truman and

52. Although thousands of letters and cards, many of which were uniform in content, poured in to the Senator's office, an attempt was made only to answer those communications coming from important sources. An amusing situation developed as the result of a letter received from the employees of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., dated October 25, 1945. Wagner replied to this letter which urged him to vote in favor of House Resolutions 93 and 95 by writing to Alfred Knopf. The Senator assured Knopf that "he would do everything possible to achieve the creation of a Jewish commonwealth" by letter dated November 5, 1945. Knopf replied to the Senator's unexpected letter by advising Wagner that the views of his employees were certainly not his. Furthermore, he wrote, nothing "is more likely to destroy the possibility of peace than resurgent nationalism, and as a Jew I think it a great pity that Jews, above all people, should be advocates of still another national state. I am convinced that to advocate this can only, in this atomic age, contribute to the postponement, which could well prove fatal, of a proper international organization." Knopf Employees to Wagner, October 25, 1945; Wagner to Knopf, November 5, 1945; Knopf to Wagner, November 13, 1945, Wagner Papers.

Secretary Byrnes having given you the green light on your Resolution, there should be no delay.⁵³

Guy M. Gillette, a founder of the American League for a Free Palestine, wrote Wagner on November 1, 1945, congratulating the Senator while at the same time suggesting stronger wording:

. . . I am very anxious that there be Congressional expression along the lines sought in your resolution and that of Senators Tobey and Myres. There are two sentences in the Tobey resolution that I feel could be improved by amendment, and there is a strong feeling on my part that your resolution does not go far enough in that there is no suggestion for immediate action to bridge the clear interim period of suspended authority between the dissolution of the League of Nations and the perfecting of the machinery of the trusteeship system under the United Nations Charter.⁵⁴

More explicit in its advice was a letter addressed to Wagner by Arthur Lourie of the Emergency Council on November 3, 1945.⁵⁵ The Senator was informed that Dr. Wise and other members of the Emergency Council felt that the Palestine resolution then under consideration by the Foreign Relations Sub-Committee was open to serious objection and hence was unacceptable. The Emergency Council therefore proposed a suggested draft for the use of the Committee. The resolution under consideration by the

53. Silver to Wagner, October 31, 1945, Wagner Papers.

54. Gillette to Wagner, November 1, 1945, Wagner Papers.

55. Lourie to Wagner, November 3, 1945, Wagner Papers. (cf. Appendix III for letter.)

Committee had expressed approval of a plan agreed to by Truman to investigate jointly with Britain the entire Palestine situation through an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The Emergency Council objected to this and proposed merely to express approval of the interest shown by the President "in the solution of these problems." To endorse the Inquiry Committee was seen as "harmful to the Zionist position" since it meant more delay in immigration. Objection was also raised against the use of the phrase "peaceful offices" of the United States with the Mandatory Power. This was considered unnecessary because it might suggest that "there was some need to make specifically clear that no military intervention is sought." Knowing American sentiments on military involvement, it was believed best to avoid mentioning the possibility by substituting "good offices" of the United States. The Emergency Council objected strenuously to that clause in the Senate resolution which stated that Jews should be allowed to enter Palestine up "to the greatest feasible extent" of the country's economic potentialities. This criterion was considered vague and dangerous, and it was proposed that Jews should enter Palestine up to "the maximum of its economic potentialities." Lastly, the use of the pre-Biltmore formulas of "Jewish Homeland" or "Democratic Commonwealth" was completely rejected. The Emergency Council's counterproposals aimed at eliciting full Congressional support for Jewish nationalist aims.

Behind all of this anxiety for correct phraseology lay the fact that while perhaps the majority of Americans were concerned with the Jewish refugees, they were not so concerned with the establishment of a Jewish state. Even presuming that public opinion might support the creation of a Jewish state, it would not do so if that goal could

be obtained only by the use of force. Since various senators and Zionist leaders recognized these contingencies to different degrees, a certain amount of discord resulted. A subcommittee of five, headed by Senator Green was appointed on November 19, 1945, to consider the two proposed resolutions already advanced along with an amendment to S.J. Resolution 112 offered by Senator Gaffey on November 19, 1945. The subcommittee had a number of meetings, at two of which the Secretary of State was present. As a result, the Foreign Relations Committee decided to report favorably an original concurrent resolution, number 113.⁵⁶

Zionist hopes for easy passage were dashed on November 29 when Truman stated during a press conference that if the resolution were passed, there would be no need for the Anglo-American inquiry already agreed upon.⁵⁷ This statement brought quick response from Emanuel Neumann, acting president of the Zionist Organization of America, who asserted that Truman and Byrnes had both approved the resolution before its introduction in October.⁵⁸ David Stern, publisher of the *Philadelphia Record*, described the President's views after a White House conference as favorable to a free Palestine and to unlimited immigration but against a Jewish state since he did not feel any government should be established on religious or racial lines.⁵⁹

Senators Wagner and Taft immediately thereafter spoke out in defense of their resolution. In a letter to the

56. *Opening of Palestine for Free Entry of Jewish People, Report to Accompany H. Con. Res 113* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945).

57. *JTA Bulletin*, November 30, 1945, p. 1.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1945, p. 1.

President dated December 6, 1945, they denied that the intention of the resolution was to establish a "theocratic" state, or one based on racial discrimination.⁶⁰ All that was wanted, said the Senators, was to ensure that all Jews who wished to enter Palestine could do so. This would make Palestine "a Jewish state [only] in the sense that Jews will constitute the majority." Passage of the resolution was said to be more necessary now than ever, for if the Inquiry Committee understood that the pledges given to the Jews were to be honored, the Committee's hand would be strengthened. Truman gave only a brief reply to this letter on December 10, 1945. He said that he believed the appointment of the committee would serve a useful purpose and assured Wagner that he would not decrease his efforts to get additional Jews into Palestine. Nevertheless, he continued to maintain "that any resolution by Congress would be more effective after the Commission has made its study."⁶¹ Undaunted by presidential opposition, Wagner reported favorably to the Senate on December 12, 1945, on behalf of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44.⁶² In its final version this resolution in effect broadened the obligation contained in the Balfour Declaration and the League Mandate since it called for the upbuilding of Palestine as "the" Jewish National Home

60. Text in *New Palestine*, XXXVI (December 14, 1945), 53-54.

61. Truman to Wagner, December 10, 1945, Wagner Papers, Palestine File, *Ibid*. Truman's view was perhaps reinforced by a letter from William Bennet who wrote from London that "the use of the phrases 'Jewish state' and 'Jewish commonwealth' without explanation is doing a good deal of harm" in England. Bennet's message to the President was repeated in a "personal and confidential" letter to Senator Wagner for his information. Bennet to Wagner, December 8, 1945, Wagner Papers.

62. Wagner to Bennet, December 15, 1945, *Ibid*. The resolution was adopted by the full Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of seventeen to one, the lone dissenter being Senator Connally who supported the Administration. cf. *Congressional Record*, XCI, part 9 (December 17, 1945), 12170, 12167, 12138.

rather than "a" Jewish National Home as stated in earlier documents. The Senate passed the amended Wagner-Taft resolution on December 17, 1945, and the House concurred on December 19.⁶³ The Zionists thus secured the passage of a resolution to which they had no objections and which marked the end of a campaign undertaken in February, 1944. The Zionist victory, it was reported,

. . . was only . . . a result of the tenacity and unyielding insistence on action on the part of Zionist leaders like Dr. Silver and Dr. Emanuel Neumann, supported by the irresistible campaign of the Zionists of America, that the Congress of the United States was able to break through the solid wall of opposition set up by the National Administration —and the Palestine Resolution was passed.⁶⁴

Despite the successful passage of the Palestine resolution, the victory seemed of dubious value in the months that followed. The reason for this, said one Zionist publication,⁶⁵ was that it was not associated in the mind of the general public "with any imaginative and dynamic program of political action." However, when more dynamic action was undertaken, a certain amount of ill-will

63. Instead of a joint resolution, however, which is in a real sense a legislative measure since it requires the President's signature, the Foreign Relations Committee produced a concurrent resolution, which did not need the President's assent. On December 13, 1945, Representative Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania introduced a concurrent resolution into the House in which the same wording as that which emerged from the Senate Committee was employed. *House Report 1463*, 79th Congress, 1st Session. Introduced, p. 12393; p. 12383; hearings, *ibid.*, p. 12393, p. 12396, December 19, 1945. cf. Claudius O. Johnson, *Government in the United States* (New York: Crowell Co., 1951), p. 309.

64. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 44.

65. *Congress Weekly*, XIII (December 6, 1946), 7.

ensued. Two examples in particular bear this out: the question of the British loan and the November elections.

The British loan and anti-British demonstrations.—As a result of Britain's rejection of American demands for the immediate admission into Palestine of 100,000 refugees and Bevin's charges that the United States was overly concerned with the Jewish vote in New York, Dr. Silver declared that, "American citizens have the right to turn to their representatives in Congress . . . and inquire whether the Government of the United States can afford to make a loan to a government whose pledged word seems worthless."⁶⁶ Senators Wagner and Mead, both of New York, protested to the Foreign Secretary that his remarks were an "echo from Nazi dogma" and "anti-Semitic."⁶⁷ So strong was the reaction that there was some doubt whether the prospective loan to Great Britain of \$3,750,000,000, which had already passed the Senate in May, would survive in the House. Representative Celler of New York led a vociferous group of pro-Zionist congressmen in denouncing the bill. However, the more moderate voice of Dr. Wise, who announced that despite misgivings he was in favor of the loan since to oppose it would be "to adopt a punitive attitude toward all the peoples of the British Commonwealth,"⁶⁸ prevailed. A like view was expressed by Representative Bloom who once more sought to support the policy of the Administration. He insisted that the loan had nothing to do with Zionism, and that the best interests of the United States required affirmative action.⁶⁹ Although the bill

66. *New Palestine*, XXXVIII (June 13, 1946), 3.

67. *Ibid.*, June 17, 1946, p. 7.

68. *Ibid.*

69. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 26.

was finally approved, the Zionist stand on this matter of national interest gave some Americans cause for concern. "If the result had been otherwise," said the historian Thomas Bailey, "we would have had a striking illustration of the harm that can be done when the hyphenate hoists his own flag above that of his adopted country." ⁷⁰ It was also felt in some Zionist circles that defeat of the loan, "far from resulting in helpful pressure on the London Government, would have caused a serious wave of anti-Semitism." ⁷¹

On July 12, 1946, a mass demonstration was held in Madison Square Park under the auspices of the Emergency Council protesting solidarity with the Jewish resistance movement. The promise was made that American Zionism would fight at the side of the Palestinian Jew "with every effort at our command." Another manifestation of Jewish feeling was exhibited by a march on Washington on July 14 and 15, 1946, by four thousand Jewish war veterans. This group demanded immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 Jews and also expressed their readiness to enlist a division of American Jewish ex-servicemen for service in Palestine. At the same time, thousands of telegrams, letters and postcards poured in upon the White House and Congress, while mass picketing took place before the British Embassy in Washington and British consulates throughout the country.⁷² All of these activities served to attract the attention of the American public so that by August, 1946, a majority was registered as sympathetic to Jewish aspirations in Palestine.⁷³

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Congress Weekly*, XIII (December 6, 1946), 7.

72. ZOA, 49th Annual Report, p. 43.

73. Department of State, Report on American Opinion. Aug. 19, 1946.

The November, 1946, Congressional elections.—Although Zionist attempts to influence the November, 1946, elections will be dealt with in the following chapter, it might be noted here that this policy produced some adverse reaction. As David Benleon wrote in the pro-Zionist *Congress Weekly*, most American Jews resented the effort to organize a "Jewish vote" or to make Zionism a partisan issue in the elections. American Jews realized, he said, that various issues determined our Middle East policy and these issues would affect a Republican administration in much the same way as they affected the Democratic. Thus, "the suggestion that a successful anti-administration campaign would constitute a demonstration of political strength which would subsequently have to be heeded showed a deplorable lack of political insight."⁷⁴ That Zionist pressures were strong in November is revealed by a statement made publicly by *Times* publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who said:

I dislike the coercive methods of Zionists who in this country have not hesitated to use economic means to silence persons who have different views.⁷⁵

74. David Benleon, "Basle and American Zionism," *Congress Weekly*, XIII (December 6, 1946), 7.

75. Quoted in Lilienthal p. 124. Lilienthal went on to explain the details of this story: "The *Times* was then opposing the partition of Palestine and feeling the whip lash of the pressure group who had declared a virtual boycott of the *New York Times*. The details of that boycott action remained one of the guarded secrets on Times Square. There is a heavy file tucked away in Mr. Sulzberger's safe and no one will today talk about the frightening experience. . . . The big Republican rival of the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, was not slow in taking advantage of the difficult position in which the non-Zionist but Jewish owned *Times* had been placed by the Palestine controversy . . . and did its best to cut into the *Times* circulation. The paper went overboard in its support of partition."

Division in Zionist ranks.—Not only were official Zionist tactics causing resentment in Jewish circles, but the confusion was worse confounded by the “battle of the ads” which became especially prominent in 1946. This resulted from the attempts made by various groups to speak in the name of American Jewry concerning a new policy adopted by the Jewish Agency towards partition.⁷⁶ In 1937 a plan of partition had been advanced by the Peel Commission but was decisively rejected by both Jews and Arabs.⁷⁷ Now, however, due to Arab intransigence as well as the increase of Jewish power, it was hoped in London that partition might have a better chance. Seeing partition as the most to be hoped for under the circumstances, the Agency adopted the idea even though this meant setting aside the Biltmore demand for a Jewish commonwealth “within the historic boundaries of Israel.” But when the Zionist Organization of America convened on October 28, 1946, it passed a resolution affirming the right of the Jewish people to “the whole of mandated Palestine, undivided and undiminished.” Silver charged that the Jewish Agency Executive had no authority to alter the basic Zionist policy which was contained in the Biltmore Program.⁷⁸ Silver’s objections pointed out that the Agency’s position now represented maximum demands even though further retreat might be necessary. He therefore saw little hope for achieving the aims of “classic” Zionism should the Agency’s policy be followed. Nevertheless, he said that Zionists would consider proposals if made by “. . . Governments which we will find truly reasonable

76. *Congress Weekly*, XIII (December 6, 1946), 8.

77. Kirk, p. 232f.

78. *New Palestine*, XXXVII (November 15, 1946), 2.

and which will meet our fundamental needs and satisfy our national aspirations and our sense of justice." ⁷⁹ Perhaps this was Silver's way of saying that under certain conditions he would not reject partition, namely, if it were to receive official American backing. The Mizrachi Organization of America, the religious Zionist group, also pledged itself to work for ". . . the historical claim of an independent Jewish state with its historic boundaries as ordained by the Torah." ⁸⁰ The American Jewish Committee, on the other hand, supported the Agency's partition plan. According to the Committee president, Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, this solution was acceptable since it would not contravene the "democratic principles" of the American Jewish Committee. It would not mean a Jewish minority ruling an Arab majority, as envisioned in the Biltmore Program, said Proskauer, but would establish a Jewish state where there already existed a Jewish majority.⁸¹ Perhaps the most extreme position on this question was adopted by the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation which called approval of any partition scheme an act of "cowardice," and the Agency itself an "obsolete" body.⁸² However, a final policy decision could be made only by the World Zionist Congress scheduled to convene in December, 1946, at Basle, Switzerland.

The Basle Conference and Zionist strategy.—Out of deference to the Basle Congress, the British Government had postponed the London Conference so that a new

79. *Ibid.*

80. *American Jewish Year Book*, XLIX, 250.

81. Joseph M. Proskauer, *A Segment of My Times* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1950), pp. 242-43.

82. *Answer*, IV (September, 1946), 23.

Jewish Agency Executive, having a clear mandate to negotiate, might be elected.⁸³ The contrary, however, took place since the Congress peremptorily refused the Agency permission to take part in the Conference. Behind this development lay the fact that a violent shift in the balance of forces within world Jewry had taken place. The East European Jews, the stronghold of Zionism for fifty years, had been virtually liquidated and had given place to American Jewry. By 1946 American Jews were contributing about two thirds of the total budget for the development of Palestine.⁸⁴ Moreover, Zionist membership in the United States had climbed to 956,250 while the Jewish population of the world had fallen from almost seventeen million to about eleven million.⁸⁵ Having a total of 121 delegates out of a total of 385, the American Zionist groups were destined to play a leading role at the first Zionist Congress held since 1939. Silver headed the Zionist Organization of America, which, with its 56 votes, constituted the largest single bloc. Silver and Emanuel Neumann, the vice-president of ZOA, led the fight against partition and participation in the London Conference. Dr. Wise aligned himself with Weizmann and the other Agency leaders who were willing to negotiate with the British but lost out to Silver in the final vote. The Biltmore Program was re-endorsed by a margin of seventeen votes and participation in the London Conference was blocked.⁸⁶ Silver was made the chairman of the six-member section of the Agency Executive in the United States⁸⁷

83. R. H. S. Crossman, "Silver Imperialism," *New Statesman and Nation*, XXXIII (January 4, 1947), 3.

84. *Ibid.*

85. *Survey of Palestine, op. cit.* (supplement), pp. 132-33.

86. *New Judea*, XXIII (December 1946-January 1947), 34-81.

87. *JTA Bulletin*, December 30, 1946, p. 1.

which included two members each from the Zionist Organization and Poale Zion, and one each from Hadassah and Mizrachi. International supervision of political matters was to remain under the direction of Moshe Shertok who would reside in Washington. While refusing to give Dr. Weizmann the free hand he demanded as a condition for reelection as president, the Congress "did not have the effrontery to put one of his transatlantic assailants in his place, but preferred to remain leaderless in the coming year of decision."⁸⁸ For Silver and "for his colleagues," wrote Crossman, "most of whom are completely ignorant of the Middle East, but expert in the arts of American politics—the Palestinian Jews are not a nation but colonists who must obey the instructions of World Jewry, which means, in effect, the American Zionists."⁸⁹

As a result of his triumph at Basle, Silver became the leading spokesman of American Zionism. Dr. Wise announced on January 3, 1947, that he was severing all ties with the Zionist Organization of America, because he

88. Crossman, *New Statesman and Nation*, ibid. Of this shift in power Weizmann says: "My stand . . . was well known; I made it clear once more at the Congress. I stated my belief that our justified protest against our frustrations, against the injustices we had suffered, could have been made with dignity and force, yet without truckling to the demoralizing forces in the movement. I became, therefore, as in the past, the scapegoat for the sins of the British Government and knowing that their 'assault' on the British Government was ineffective, the 'activists,' or whatever they would call themselves, turned their shafts on me. About half of the American delegation, led by Rabbi Silver, and part of the Palestinian, led by Mr. Ben Gurion, had made up their minds that I was to go. On the surface it was not a personal matter; the debate hinged on whether we should or should not send delegates to the Conferences on Palestine, which were to be resumed in London toward the end of January 1947, at the instance of the British Government. By a tiny majority, it was decided not to send delegates—and this was taken as the moral equivalent of a vote of no confidence in me. *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 442.

89. *Ibid.*

could not ". . . substitute the Zionism of the present imperilling regime . . . for the Zionism of Weizmann and Brandeis, Nordau and Herzl."⁹⁰ The ruling Executive which had emerged from Basle was assailed by Wise as having "unholy and unlimited" ambitions. Nevertheless, it quickly appeared that the General Zionists were satisfied with the decisions of the Congress and were happy with the knowledge that American Zionism would now play a leading role in the world movement.⁹¹ Under the militant leadership of Silver the Zionists would enter the final stage of their effort to translate the Biltmore Program into American foreign policy. The effectiveness of Silver's practical leadership would be attested to by victory within the year.

90. *JTA Bulletin*, January 5, 1947, p. 4.

91. *New Palestine*, XXXVII (January 24, 1947), 2, 7.

VI ZIONISM AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION. 1945 - 1947

Truman receives the Palestine question.—President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and within eight days the Zionists were seeking assurances from his successor that there would be no departure from the promises made by the Democratic Party and the late President. However, Truman had not inherited any clearly formulated Palestine policy from Roosevelt such as the Zionists sought to imply existed. While coming into office amid strong pro-Zionist sentiment—insofar as there was any articulate public expression on Palestine — Truman was faced much more squarely than his predecessor with the economic, political and strategic² implications of the post-war Middle East situation.

On the morning of April 20 Truman received Dr. Stephen S. Wise who laid before the President the plight of the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. The Rabbi spoke of the problems involved in resettling the refugees and then launched into a discussion of the proposed Jewish state. The interview was not unexpected by the Presi-

1. In 1945 fewer than one third of the American people were aware that Palestine was a British mandate. cf. Bailey, p. 132.

2. cf. George A. Brownell, "American Aviation in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal*, I (October, 1947), 401-16.

dent since he had been informed by Secretary of State Stettinius two days earlier that he could expect Zionist leaders to call on him in the near future.³ In preparation for this expected call, Stettinius clearly set forth for the President the Zionist goals, which, he said, aimed at "unlimited immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state."⁴ In view of later remarks by the President it appears that he did not retain or grasp the essential connection between these two goals as conceived in the minds of the Zionist strategists. The Secretary pointed out that in dealing with the Palestine question the long-range interests of the country must be kept in mind. Accordingly, Stettinius attempted to draw a distinction between traditional American sympathy for the oppressed Jews, and the problem of settlement in Palestine which, he said, "involves questions [that] go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe."⁵ The Secretary's expression of concern was shortly bolstered by Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew, who sent further information to the President two weeks later. The late President, said Grew, despite his expressions of sympathy for certain Zionist aims, had also given assurances to the Arabs which were regarded by them as "definite commitments."⁶ Accompanying Grew's memorandum was the text of Roosevelt's last letter to Ibn Saud written one week before his death. Also enclosed was a summary of the late President's conversation with the King, "the original [of which], said Grew, "is presumably with Mr. Roosevelt's papers."⁷

3. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, I (Year of Decisions), (Time Inc., 1955), p. 67.

4. *Ibid.*, II (Years of Trial and Hope), (Time Inc., 1956), p. 132.

5. Truman, I, 69.

6. Truman, II, 132.

7. *Ibid.*

The Acting Secretary went on to inform Truman of the militant resistance which could be expected on the part of the Arabs should there be any attempt to establish a Jewish state. The danger of this situation, said Grew, had been more clearly realized by Roosevelt after his conversation with Ibn Saud.⁸

According to Truman, he was fully aware of Arab hostility to Jewish settlement, but, like many other Americans, he "was troubled by the plight of the Jewish people in Europe."⁹ Taking the words of the Balfour Declaration concerning a "national home" for the Jews in a sense long repudiated by the British Government, Truman somehow imagined that Wilson's principle of self-determination was linked to the document. While applying self-determination to the Jewish people, he apparently did not apply it to the Arab majority in Palestine. Moreover, Truman's basic outlook on the situation was colored by his own deep personal sympathy for the survivors of Hitler's racism and a very legalistic approach to the Balfour Declaration. He expressed no doubt either as to the content or circumstances of that document and assumed that its existence involved a "solemn promise . . . [which] should be kept, just as all promises made by responsible, civilized governments should be kept."¹⁰

In these circumstances Truman did not find it hard to reassure Rabbi Wise. He informed the Zionist leader that he was in agreement with the expressed policy of the Roosevelt administration on Palestine" and promised to do everything possible to carry it out.¹¹ Truman attempted to justify his lack of concern for the advice tendered by

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

11. *Ibid.*, I, 67.

"the striped pants boys" in the State Department by asserting that these officials were not concerned enough about the fate of the displaced persons. He, however, felt that these people could be helped while still watching out "for the long-range interests of our country,"¹² and this conviction was communicated to Rabbi Wise. Unfortunately, the President's belief that long-range interests of the country could be properly cared for was compromised by linking the refugee problem solely to Palestine.¹³

While possessing neither the world prestige nor vision of his predecessor, Truman had no alternative but to dispel the vagueness enveloping American policy toward Palestine. His forthright expression led Emanuel Celler, congressman from New York, to declare on April 25 after an interview with the new president, that, "he will not deviate one iota from the Palestine plank in the Democratic convention which he and I helped to frame."¹⁴ Action of some kind was forced upon Truman with the German surrender on May 7, 1945, which induced the Zionists to demand the immediate removal of Jews in German concentration camps to Palestine.¹⁵

Despite his avowed sympathy for Zionist aims, Truman was forced to pick up the second aspect of Roosevelt's policy within a few months. In a reply to Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha of Egypt, Truman renewed "the assurance which your Government has previously received to the effect that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision should be taken regarding the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with

12. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

13. M. S. Agwani, "The United States and the Arab World. 1945-1952" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utrecht, 1954), p. 59.

14. Quoted in Kirk, p. 329.

15. Sakran, p. 175.

both Arabs and Jews." Considering that "full consultation" later meant informing the Arabs of intended steps to be taken, Truman's statement that this assurance "was by no means inconsistent with my generally sympathetic attitude towards Jewish aspirations"¹⁶ was perhaps forthright. But Truman's assurances to Arab leaders can certainly be viewed as wavering if not inconsistent to some degree at least. This tendency became more pronounced on future occasions when, despite his sympathies and many Jewish friends, he was faced by the realities of the world situation and national security. "Hence the waverings, inconsistencies, and contradictions in American policy as one or another pressure was ascendant."¹⁷

Truman's approaching departure for Potsdam was the signal for a concerted Zionist effort designed to secure presidential support for the position presented by the Jewish Agency to the British Government on May 27, 1945. At that time the British were urged to proclaim a Jewish state and to allow the Agency complete control over immigration into Palestine. In accord with Zionist policy, it was declared that the Jewish people and Palestine were "inseparable twin problems" which only an "undivided and undiminished" Jewish state could resolve.¹⁸ Speaking in New York on June 26, David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Agency Executive, declared that the Jews in Palestine would resist further implementation of the White Paper by force, if necessary.¹⁹ These demands were reiterated on July 3 when the American Zionist Emergency Council presented a memorandum to the President similar to the proposals made by the Agency

16. Truman, II, 134-35.

17. Manuel, p. 319.

18. Esco, II, 1188.

19. *JTA Bulletin*, June 27, 1945, p. 3.

on May 27.²⁰ The American Jewish Committee also backed official Zionist demands by requesting a liberalization of the policy affecting immigration into Palestine.²¹ The Zionist report could thus state that "Jewish organizations representing more than two million persons telegraphed the President urging him to use his good offices to see to it that the Palestine issue be settled there [Potsdam] in accordance with the Jewish need and claim . . ." ²² And lest this demand issue only from Jewish organizations, the campaign of the American Christian Palestine Committee, aided especially by Senator Wagner, also played a vital role. Having already secured resolutions and declarations from most state legislatures, thirty-seven of the forty-eight governors assembled at Mackinac Island, Michigan, for the annual Governor's Conference, were induced to send a message to Truman shortly before his departure for Potsdam. The Governors asked the President to take immediate steps to open Palestine ". . . to Jewish mass immigration and colonization, and to bring about the earliest transformation of that country into a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."²³ It was hoped that the President would discuss ways and means of achieving these ends at Potsdam. A similar message had been addressed to Truman on July 2 by 54 Senators and 251 Representatives although at the request of the President, that petition was not made public at the time.²⁴

On his part, Truman asserted that he "had already decided that Palestine would be one of the subjects [he]

20. *American Jewish Year Book*, XLVIII (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1946), 228.

21. *Thirty-Ninth Report of the American Jewish Committee*, pp. 627-28.

22. ZOA, 48th Annual Report, p. 83.

23. *New York Times*, July 5, 1945.

24. Silver to Wagner, September 6, 1945, Wagner Papers.

would want to bring up in discussion with Churchill at the Potsdam meeting.”²⁵ Without making reference to the specific appeals he had recently received, the President informed the Prime Minister on July 24 that “there is a great interest in America in the Palestine problem” and that the restrictions imposed by the White Paper on Jewish immigration “continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans . . .”²⁶ He therefore expressed the hope that the British Government would lift the restrictions and act to achieve a definite settlement. The President doubted whether the difficulties involved could be lessened by delay.

After his return from Potsdam the President was questioned on August 16 about the position taken by the American Government on Palestine. The American view, he said,

. . . is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.²⁷

The President’s advocacy of free and open settlement of Palestine “in effect, put the United States Government on record as opposing the British White Paper and represented, now that the war was over, an abandonment of the

25. Truman, II, 135.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

policy of circumventing the Palestine question on grounds of military expediency.”²⁸ This statement induced the State Department to present a further memorandum to the President dealing with the White Paper which, it was pointed out, “sought to strike a medium” between Zionist demands and Arab resistance to them.²⁹ The memorandum advised that

No government should advocate a policy of mass immigration unless it is prepared to assist in making available the necessary security forces, shipping, housing, unemployment guarantees. . . . In view of the foregoing, the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period. The United States could support a Palestine immigration policy during the interim period which would carry restrictions as to numbers and categories, taking into account humanitarian considerations, the economic welfare of Palestine and political conditions therein. The British Government, as the mandatory power, should accept primary responsibility for the policy and be responsible for carrying it out.³⁰

But all of this advice, to Truman’s mind, failed to solve “the basic human problem.”³¹ He was concerned that the Jews should not be “denied the opportunities to build new lives” yet he did not “want to see a political structure imposed on the Near East that would result in

28. Esco, II, 1188-1189.

29. Truman, II, 135-36.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

31. *Ibid.*

conflict.”³² The fundamental impossibility of Truman’s view is thus revealed. He desired unlimited immigration and a Jewish state if that could be had without war and the involvement of American troops. He failed to realize, or refused to admit, that support for the Zionist demand for unlimited immigration could only result in a Jewish state born in conflict. While believing that “the long-range fate of Palestine was the kind of problem we had the United Nations for,” he in effect precluded or predetermined a long-range solution by adding in the same breath that “some aid was needed for the Jews in Europe,” and presumably this could be secured only in Palestine.³³ It was, of course, in the Zionists’ interest to maintain the illusion on the President’s part that support for immigration would not necessarily involve force. Silver thus desired to secure an appointment with Truman through the help of Senator Wagner so that he could

. . . give him the true facts about the military implications of the proclamation of a Jewish Commonwealth. His recent public statements gave many of us the impression that British propaganda at Potsdam has left an impression with him which he has voiced in public that it would require a half million American soldiers to keep the peace in Palestine. This is, of course, fantastic and I should like to make available to the President some facts and data at my disposal. We have never had a chance to sit down with President Truman for a down-to-the-ground discussion of the subject.³⁴

32. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Silver to Wagner, August 27, 1945, Wagner Papers.

Truman's very real concern for the refugees thus played into the hands of the Zionists. And fortunately for their cause, the President apparently failed to realize that in Zionist strategy the existence of the refugee problem constituted the surest avenue leading to a political state. His basic lack of comprehension is revealed in the remark expressing surprise that

The Zionists, on the other hand, were impatiently making my immediate objective more difficult to obtain. They wanted the American Government to support their aim of a Jewish state in Palestine.³⁵

The President's thinking on this score was probably not enlightened by a delegation from the American Jewish Committee, which, on October 1, 1945, pointed out to him the distinction between Palestine as a refuge, and the question of statehood, and also the absolute necessity for securing a substantial number of certificates through American good offices.³⁶ The American Jewish Committee, it will be remembered, had long since ceased opposing Zionist goals. While the Committee did limit itself to supporting immigration into Palestine, avowedly with no intention of urging a political state, such an academic distinction undoubtedly bolstered the President in his view that immigration could be pursued without necessitating a new political structure.

A program of action: the Harrison Report and aftermath.—On August 31, 1945, the President took what proved to be his first positive step on behalf of Zionism.

35. Truman, II, 139.

36. *JTA Bulletin*, October 1, 1945, p. 4.

Now he requested Prime Minister Attlee on behalf of the United States Government to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine.³⁷ This request grew out of a report submitted by Earl G. Harrison who had been sent to Europe by the President in June in order to investigate the condition of the "non-repatriables," particularly the Jewish refugees. In his interim report, submitted on August 24,³⁸ Harrison disclosed that many Jewish displaced persons were living in grim conditions, devoid of any hope or desire for resettlement in Europe. Their first choice, he said, was definitely to go to Palestine. Even those Jews who were not convinced Zionists were said to have realized that their chances of being admitted into the United States or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere were slim.

Attlee's reply to the President's letter was not particularly encouraging. The Prime Minister stressed previous commitments made to the Arabs and reportedly agreed to the admission of a greater number of refugees into Palestine only on condition that the United States assume joint responsibility, even if this should mean troops. Since Truman would have none of this, British reaction was extremely critical. Even a pro-Zionist paper declared that Truman's actions were dictated by an awareness of the Jewish vote and went on to state that America's request would be more impressive if that country were itself alleviating the refugee problem through more liberal immigration policies.³⁹

Since Truman's letter to Attlee was not officially disclosed until November 13, 1945,⁴⁰ the Emergency Council was still disturbed about the exact meaning of the remarks

37. Truman, II, 137.

38. *New York Times*, August 26, 1945.

39. Cited in Hurewitz, p. 230.

40. Esco, II, 1189.

made by the President at his press conference on August 16. In a letter to Wagner dated September 6, 1945, Silver confessed that, "What our Government intends to do in the matter is still a mystery to us." ⁴¹ Reports from London that British representatives from the Middle East had been recalled for consultation made Silver even more apprehensive. It was therefore said to be "urgent" that the Senator quickly make definite arrangements for the co-chairmen of the Emergency Council to be received by the President. Silver had already promised the Senator in a previous communication ⁴² that he would not seek to elicit another statement from the President at that time; a procedure which had caused considerable irritation among official quarters in the past, and a technique to which Silver was particularly attached.

The President received Wise and Silver at the White House on September 29. The interview had perhaps been hastened by a series of Zionist activities designed to impress both the British and American governments. Several days earlier, on September 23, Wise and Silver had issued a joint statement reiterating Weizmann's rejection of a British offer to permit 1500 immigrants a month to enter Palestine. The Jews of Palestine, said the co-chairmen, would never permit such a catastrophe which would make them a minority in an Arab state. Accordingly, they called upon the President to prevent such a "shameful injustice" by implementing "American commitments" to the Jews.⁴³ On September 27 a statement signed by Wise and Silver appeared in fifty newspapers throughout the country.⁴⁴ The Zionists warned that they were at the end of their

41. Silver to Wagner, September 6, 1945, Wagner Papers.

42. Silver to Wagner, August 27, 1945, Wagner Papers.

43. *New Palestine*, XXXV (September 28, 1945), pp. 1, 3.

44. *JTA Bulletin*, September 28, 1945, p. 1.

patience and that nothing less than unrestricted immigration into Palestine and the proclamation of a Jewish state was acceptable. While undoubtedly impressed by all of this activity, the President's reaction at the interview must not have been particularly encouraging; at least the Zionist leaders declined to comment on their conversation.⁴⁵ Truman's reluctance to commit himself stemmed from the fact that to his mind, "the aims and goals of the Zionists to set up a Jewish state were secondary to the more immediate problems of finding means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons."⁴⁶

The State Department suggests caution.—Another element of caution was introduced by James Byrnes, the new Secretary of State. Byrnes was becoming more concerned over the reaction to Truman's remarks in the Middle East and conveyed his alarm to the President. During the first week of October, Byrnes had recalled four chiefs of United States Missions in the Near East so that they might testify as a group before the President regarding the deterioration of American political interests in that area. Although the interview was set for about October 10, the Ministers were kept idle in Washington for four weeks, "because the White House advisors, including David K. Niles,⁴⁷ persuaded the President that it would be impolitic to see his Ministers to Arab countries, no matter how briefly, prior

45. *Ibid.*, October 1, 1945, p. 4.

46. Truman, II, 144-45.

47. David Niles had long been a key link in the White House between the Zionists and the Chief Executive. Brought into the White House by Roosevelt, Niles was soon given great authority on the question of minority groups. He was retained by Truman and occasionally was publicized as the President's "Mystery Man," (cf. Alfred Steinberg, "Mr. Truman's Mystery Man," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 24, 1949) even though he played a prominent role on major issues. Later, he was charged with giving secret information to the Israeli authorities and resigned. cf. Lilienthal, pp. 93-94.

to the November Congressional elections.”⁴⁸ After the elections, the ambassadors were brought into the President’s office but their remarks provoked little reaction:

The spokesman for the group, George Wadsworth, presented orally an agreed statement in about twenty minutes. There was little discussion and the President asked few questions in the meeting whose Minutes have been carefully guarded by the Department of State. Finally, Mr. Truman summed up his position with the utmost candor: “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”⁴⁹

Although Truman had thus declined to receive his Near East representatives until after the November elections, Byrnes’ remarks made some impression. It was early in October that the Secretary began to suggest that Roosevelt’s last letter to King Ibn Saud be published. Byrnes’ intention was to “make it plain to the American public that we would not endorse the Zionist program. In fact,” said Truman, “he prepared a statement for me to make that would reaffirm it from the White House along with Roosevelt’s letter of April 5.”⁵⁰ While deciding that the American public should be aware of the Government’s intention “to maintain friendship with the Arabs as well as with the Jews,” the President authorized Byrnes to release only the letter in question. He declined, however, to make

48. Eddy, p. 36.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Truman, II, 140.

any additional remarks since he "saw no reason . . . why . . . by a public statement, [he] should take a position on a matter which [he] thought the United Nations ought to settle."⁵¹

The Zionists were consequently dismayed, when, on October 18, the State Department released the texts of the letters exchanged by President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud the previous spring. In an accompanying statement the Secretary made some explanatory remarks:

On several occasions this matter has been the subject of oral and written discussions with various Jewish and Arab leaders. The substance of this Government's position has been that this Government would not support a final decision which in its opinion would affect the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs.

At a press conference today President Truman referred to his exploration with Prime Minister Attlee of ways and means of alleviating the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe, including consideration of Palestine as a possible haven. . . .

Should any proposals emerge which in our opinion would change the basic situation in Palestine, it would be the policy of this Government not to reach final conclusions without full consultation with Jewish and Arab leaders. . . .⁵²

The effect of the release of this correspondence was to hearten the Arabs and stun the Zionists. Rabbis Wise and Silver quickly delivered a memorandum to Byrnes on

51. *Ibid.*

52. Text in *New York Times*, October 19, 1945.

October 23 refuting Ibn Saud's attacks on Zionism and denying that the Arab states had any right to be consulted on Palestine's future. They demanded, on the other hand, that immediate action be taken to relieve the suffering of the European refugees, in conformity with "expressed American policy."⁵³

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.—Although the British Government had toyed with the idea of turning the Palestine question over to the United Nations, her increased fears of Russian motives in the Near East led to a new American advance.⁵⁴ On October 19, Attlee formally proposed the creation of a joint Anglo-American inquiry committee to examine the position of the Jews in occupied territories, and to estimate the number which must be resettled outside of Europe. It was pointed out by the British that Palestine would be only one of a number of areas to be considered as a possible refuge. Truman, however, desired "speedy results" and insisted that Palestine be made the "focus of the inquiry."⁵⁵ He regarded anything else as a retreat from his letter to Attlee of August 31, and the British were at length compelled to accept Truman's condition.

The American Zionist Emergency Council looked upon any joint investigation with suspicion.⁵⁶ Having learned of the exchange of messages between Washington and London, the Zionist spokesmen addressed a wire to the President on October 30. They protested against any further inquiry which would only "complicate the situation" and assured the President that any attempt to secure Jewish immigration into other countries would come to

53. *New Palestine*, XXXXVI (October 31, 1945), pp. 5-6.

54. Hurewitz, p. 231.

55. Truman, II, 142.

56. *Supra*, p. 112f.

naught. A plan of immediate action was instead advanced: admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine; revocation of the White Paper; a joint Anglo-American declaration "consonant with the original purpose and underlying intent of the Balfour Declaration;" and a joint Anglo-American committee to implement this policy.⁵⁷

On November 13 the State Department announced the agreement to establish a joint committee and at the same time released the text of Truman's letter of August 31 to Attlee which had called for the entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.⁵⁸ This announcement of American participation in a joint committee quickly brought forth a Zionist protest. A statement issued on November 14 stated that the President had "fallen into a carefully prepared trap . . ." because he was raising no objections to the British proposal to admit only 1500 refugees a month.⁵⁹ A telegram sent by Wise and Silver the same day urged the President to reconsider the whole matter saying that the committee could serve no useful purpose.⁶⁰ Despite these objections, however, the Jewish Agency and other Zionist bodies later testified before the Committee of Inquiry.

The names of the American members of this joint committee were announced on December 10, and included Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Frank Aydelotte, Frank W. Buxton, Bartley Crum, James G. McDonald and William Phillips.⁶¹ All of these appointees were soon contacted by both Arabs and Zionists who volunteered background information. Weizmann stated that he "estab-

57. Truman, II, 143-45.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *JTA Bulletin*, November 15, 1945, pp. 3-4.

60. *American Jewish Year Book*, XLVIII, 230-31.

61. Esco, II, 1218-1219.

lished friendly relations" with them and did what he could "to place the facts before them." ⁶²

Two of these committee members deserve special mention in view of their later activities. Mr. McDonald, destined to be the first American ambassador to Israel under most unusual circumstances, "was the only one of us," said the British member, Richard Crossman, "who had publicly committed himself to supporting Zionism." ⁶³ "McDonald," said the Palestinian economist, David Horowitz, "[was] a man . . . sympathetic to Zionism. It was to be supposed that his considerable experience as High Commissioner for Refugees would convince him of the necessity of finding a solution in Palestine of the D.P. problem, thereby also vindicating Zionism." ⁶⁴

Bartley Crum, "a skilled politician and lawyer with large ambitions, friendly to any unorthodox cause, somewhat of a rebel," was correctly judged by Horowitz as "likely to be an ally" of the Zionist cause.⁶⁵ Crum, said Richard Crossman,

. . . was more keenly aware than any of his colleagues of the domestic issues involved in our investigations. Indeed, he was the only American with us who had a political career in front of him which could be made or marred by the attitude he adopted towards the Jewish question.⁶⁶

Crum's "liberal" outlook on foreign affairs is interestingly revealed in his own account of the Anglo-American Com-

62. Weizmann, p. 441.

63. Richard Crossman, M.P., *Palestine Mission: A Personal Record* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 22.

64. David Horowitz, *State in the Making* (translated from the Hebrew by Julian Meltzer; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 51.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Crossman, p. 22.

mittee. While en route to Europe on the *Queen Elizabeth*, Crum was warned by Evan Wilson of the State Department's Near East desk, that "if the committee reaches a decision which could be interpreted as too favorable to the Jews, an aroused Arab world might turn to the Soviet Union for support . . . a matter the committee must consider seriously."⁶⁷ This warning was also echoed by Harold Beeley of the British Foreign Office, who explained to Crum that the Palestine issue must be seen in the framework of Soviet expansionism which intended to move down into the Middle East. He therefore advised that the United States and Britain would do well to join in establishing a "*cordon sanitaire*" of Arab states.⁶⁸ All of this concern for Russia, did not, however, strike Crum as necessary. He could hardly conceive that the United States and Russia were in conflict on points of "basic interest" and instead saw this as an attempt by Britain, now a "fourth-rate power in the Middle East," to establish a bloc against the Soviets.⁶⁹

As commissioned, the Committee held its initial hearings in Washington. Missionaries and others who took up the Arab cause presented their case to the Committee as did the Zionists. Canon Bridgman of the American Episcopal Church, who had been in the missions from 1924 to 1944, sought to show the difference in attitude between the Eastern and Western European Jews. This distinction, said the Zionists, was "a variety of anti-Semitism which seeks to destroy Jewish unity on Palestine by encouraging the disaffection of Western European Jews."⁷⁰ Missionary opposition to Zionism, charged the

67. Bartley Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1947), p. 32.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

70. Manuel, p. 322.

Zionist historian, Frank Manuel, arose from the "fear that the so-called 'Jewish spirit' might regenerate the whole Near East and a cultural upheaval undermine the vested interests of the missionaries . . ." ⁷¹ At the same time, Bartley Crum made known his conviction before the Committee that a Jewish state was the ultimate goal envisaged by the Balfour Declaration.⁷² The fact that none of the Zionist witnesses who appeared before the Committee themselves wished to go to Palestine was of considerable interest to Mr. Crossman. American Zionism, he felt, was not a creed with the American Jew but arose only from concern for his less fortunate brethren abroad. This, however, did not diminish the American Zionists' passion or energy; rather, said Crossman, they too revealed something of the neurosis of separateness and homelessness as found in the displaced-persons camps. The British Committee member also came to understand one of the basic reasons explaining American sympathy for the Zionist cause. He attributed this to a frontier mentality still prevailing in America which, unconcerned with the background of the problem, knew that settlement could be advanced only at the expense of the native inhabitants.⁷³

After conducting hearings in Washington the Committee explored the plight of the Jews in Europe and then visited Palestine and other Arab countries. The problem of Palestine was accordingly linked with that of the European refugees and this confusion was clearly borne out by the Committee's report submitted on April 20, 1946.⁷⁴ The Committee emphatically endorsed a binationalist

71. *Ibid.*

72. Ben Halpern, "The Anglo-American Committee," *Jewish Frontier* (February, 1946), p. 27.

73. Crossman, p. 22.

74. Text in *New York Times*, May 1, 1946.

solution setting up an independent, democratic government based on equal rather than proportional representation. Since it was recognized that existing hatreds made independence impossible at the time, it was recommended that the mandate be converted into a United Nations trusteeship. The Committee also recommended that one hundred thousand Jews be admitted to Palestine immediately. Although forced to work within the framework of American and British policy, the report seemed to be an honest effort to deal with a difficult problem.⁷⁵ This is particularly emphasized by the fact that it was a unanimous report even though certain members of the Committee were reputed Zionist sympathizers. Hence, even these members had been led to modify their stand when representing the American Government. The fact that these same public officials later changed their views when exposed to the pressures of political Zionism, serves to underline the significance of the Committee's unanimous vote.⁷⁶ The Committee report, said Truman, seemed to be pointing in the right direction and he registered approval of the "substance" of the findings.⁷⁷ However, when the President referred to the report he singled out for praise the recommendation that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine immediately, together with two other aspects

75. Public opinion surveys indicated qualified approval of the report throughout the country. Moderates, conservatives, and some liberals saw it as a fair document and this sentiment was reflected in the *Baltimore Sun*, *New York Sun*, *Philadelphia Record*, *New Republic*, *New York Post*, *New York Times*, *Washington Star*, and the Hearst Press. Opposition was reported from such pro-Zionists as Representative McCormack, Senator Johnson, Senator Brewster and commentators Martin Agronsky, David Wills and I. F. Stone. The *Daily Worker* registered complete opposition. cf. Department of State, Reports on American Opinion, May 1 to May 8, 1946.

76. K. Roosevelt, p. 11.

77. Truman, II, 145.

of the report favorable to Zionism. The rest of the report, said Truman, "deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."⁷⁸

The President's treatment of the report was indicative that the American Government was willing to take only those steps which harmonized with existing policies. Truman's reaction was undoubtedly influenced by the response of the American Zionist Emergency Council which, while finding the recommendation for 100,000 immigrants "most gratifying," held that parts of the program could never be accepted. The Council regarded the report as denying "Jewish historic rights and aspirations" although it cautiously postponed further comment to a later date.⁷⁹ The report at the same time heartened other Jews—some Zionists among them—who feared the dangers implicit in a Jewish state.⁸⁰

78. *New York Times*, May 1, 1946.

79. *New Palestine*, XXXVI (May 3, 1946), p. 3.

80. The significant reaction from the distinguished Jewish philosopher of the non-political Zionist school, Hannah Arendt, is of considerable merit. According to Miss Arendt: "During the twenty centuries of their Diaspora the Jews have made only two attempts to change their condition by direct political action. The first was the Sabbatai Zevi movement, the mystic-political movement for the salvation of Jewry which terminated the Jewish Middle Ages and brought about a catastrophe whose consequences determined Jewish attitudes and basic convictions for over two centuries thereafter. In preparing as they did to follow Sabbatai Zevi, the self-appointed 'Messiah,' back to Palestine in the mid 1600's, the Jews assumed that their ultimate hope of a Messianic millennium was about to be realized. Until Sabbatai Zevi's time they had been able to conduct their communal affairs by means of a politics that existed in the realm of imagination alone—the memory of a far-off past and the hope of a far-off future. With the Sabbatai Zevi movement these centuries-old memories and hopes culminated in a single exalted moment. Its catastrophical aftermath brought to a close—probably forever—the period in which religion alone could provide the Jews with a firm framework within which to satisfy their political, spiritual and everyday

Nor was the report acceptable to the Arabs who felt that the admission of the 100,000 Jews would serve as a big step toward the establishment of a Jewish state, especially since there was no provision that immigration would be halted in the future.⁸¹ The diplomatic representatives of the Arab states registered their protest on May 10 through an "aide-memoire" to the Secretary of State and were informed on May 17 that "no decision regarding the Committee's report will be made without prior consultation with the government of Iraq" and other Arab countries.⁸²

Formal Arab and Jewish reaction to the report was

needs. . . . A Jew . . . was henceforth to judge secular events on a secular basis and make secular decisions on secular terms. Jewish secularization culminated at last in a second attempt to dissolve the Diaspora. This was the rise of the Zionist movement. . . . What the survivors [of the Nazi persecution] now want above all else is the right to die with dignity. . . .

As great an asset as this new development would be to an essentially sane Jewish political movement, it nevertheless constitutes something of a danger within the present framework of Zionist attitudes. Herzl's doctrine, deprived as it now is of its original confidence in the helpful nature of anti-Semitism, can only encourage suicidal gestures for whose ends the natural heroism of people who have become accustomed to death can be easily exploited. Some of the Zionist leaders pretend to believe that the Jews can maintain themselves in Palestine against the whole world and that they themselves can persevere in claiming everything or nothing against everybody and everything. However, behind this spurious optimism lurks a despair of everything and a genuine readiness for suicide that can become extremely dangerous should they grow to be the mood and atmosphere of Palestinian politics.

There is nothing in Herzlian Zionism that could act as a check on this; on the contrary, the utopian and ideological elements with which he injected the new Jewish will to political action are only too likely to lead the Jews out of reality once more—and out of the sphere of political action. I do not know—nor do I even want to know—what would happen to Jews all over the world and to Jewish history in the future should we meet with a catastrophe in Palestine. But the parallels with the Sabbatai Zevi episode have become terribly close." Hannah Arendt, "The Jewish State: Fifty Years After," *Commentary* I (May, 1946), pp. 3-8.

81. *Bulletin of the Institute of Arab-American Affairs* I (May 15, 1946), pp. 1-2.

82. Truman, II, 148.

requested on May 20.⁸³ It was pointed out that the report was "advisory in character" and that its recommendations were not binding on the Department of State which was only looking for assistance in formulating its policy on "several difficult and complex problems." The complexity of the problems was indicated by a listing of American interests in the area, which included: "compassion for and a desire to assist victims of Nazi and Fascist persecutions;" the contribution of Americans in building up Palestine; the "deep interest" which the American government and its citizens had in promoting "mutually beneficial and harmonious" relations with the countries of the Near East in "the political field, in education and other cultural activities, in trade, and in economic development"; the value placed by the United States upon the contributions of the Near Eastern states to world peace and prosperity and to the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is significant that the memorandum did not—either directly or by inference—make any claim that there was ever a specific American governmental commitment or promise to participate in the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Attlee, in the meantime, had requested American military and financial assistance as a required condition prior to his Government taking any action on the report. Although Truman felt that the country was neither disposed nor prepared to assume obligations which might lead to the use of military force, he nevertheless sought an opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military leaders advised against any action likely to involve American troops and noted that the use of force would prejudice

83. *New York Times*, May 22, 1946.

American and British interests in the Middle East, thereby enabling the Soviet Union to gain a foothold. Pressures then being exercised by the Soviet Government against Turkey and Iran gave this warning a very real foundation. This report was said to have put the military leaders on record. Almost by way of reproach, the President said that the military leaders "were primarily concerned about Middle East oil and in long-range terms about the danger that the Arabs, antagonized by Western action in Palestine, would make common cause with Russia."⁸⁴ While stating that he "had not lost sight [of this argument] at any time," Truman continued to press for the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The President's policy of calling upon the British Government to pursue a program which could only lead to the necessity of exercising force, while declining to commit American troops, brought forth bitter denunciations in the British press.⁸⁵ This unreasonable attitude on the part of the President was stimulated by the demands of a group of senators, led by Taft and Wagner, who insisted that 100,000 certificates be issued at once while making no mention of possible American military help. Taft simply said that the British had "many thousands" of troops in Palestine and could handle the situation.⁸⁶

American Zionist organizations refused to accede to the State Department's request for a formal reply to the Committee's report. On May 28 the American Jewish Conference declared that to enter upon discussions of the long-term recommendations of the report would be "pre-

84. Truman, II, 149.

85. *Ibid.*, 148.

86. *Congressional Record*, Vol. XCII, part 5, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (June 6, 1946), pp. 6375-6383.

mature and harmful," for it would delay the admission of the 100,000.⁸⁷ This was followed on June 4, by a statement from the Emergency Council, which pointed out that its position had been made clear during the hearings at Washington, and termed further consultations and comments "meaningless."⁸⁸ Thus, by declining to take a formal stand on a document which had widespread domestic approval, the Council avoided a head-on clash with public opinion and continued to press for immediate admission of the 100,000.

Finally, the comment of the Arab League Council left no doubt as to the views of the Arab states. American interests in the Arab world would be undermined, said the Council, if the Inquiry report were implemented. In addition, the Council pointed out that it did not consider the State Department's request for comment as "consultation" in the sense employed by President Roosevelt during his conversations with Ibn Saud.⁸⁹

The Morrison-Grady Committee and the end of Anglo-American efforts.—In the meantime, the British and American governments were unenthusiastically attempting to discover a way of dealing with the report of the Inquiry Committee. On June 11 President Truman announced that he had selected a committee composed of the secretaries of State, War and the Treasury, to advise him on "such policy with regard to Palestine and related problems as may be adopted by this government."⁹⁰ The actual work of the Cabinet Committee was delegated to a board of alternates headed by Henry F. Grady.

While these preparations were under way, the British

87. *JTA Bulletin*, May 29, 1946, p. 3.

88. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1946, p. 1.

89. *New York Times*, July 9, 1946.

90. *Ibid.*, June 12, 1946, p. 3.

were forced to take drastic action in Palestine against a wave of terrorism. The imprisonment of a number of prominent leaders in the Jewish Agency Executive brought a protest from the American members of the Executive. In reply, the President stated on July 2 that this action had been taken without his prior knowledge. He expressed the hope that the members of the Agency Executive would be shortly released.⁹¹ Fearing repercussions in the United States which might block the British loan then coming up for debate in the House,⁹² the British Government was eventually forced to release the Zionist leaders.⁹³

After preliminary conversations between the "experts" in London during June and early July, the Cabinet Committee at length arrived in the British capital on July 12. Although secrecy had been agreed upon leaks developed, and on July 25 the American press published a fairly detailed account of the Committee's recommendations—basically a federal system of two autonomous states with a strong central government under British direction.⁹⁴ The admittance of the 100,000 was made conditional upon the acceptance of the report as a whole.

As soon as Zionist circles had learned of the Morrison-Grady proposals, as the report was known, they immediately began a storm of protest. Forrestal wrote on July 26 that the

Jews are injecting vigorous and active propaganda to force the President's hand with reference

91. Truman, II, 150.

92. *Supra*, p. 117f.

93. Hurewitz, p. 255.

94. Great Britain, Palestine No. 1, 1947, *Proposals for the Future of Palestine, July, 1946—February, 1947*, Cmd. 7044 (London: His Majesty's Government Stationery Office, 1947), pp. 3-8.

to the immediate immigration of Jews into Palestine . . . The problem is complicated by the fact that the President went out on the limb in endorsing the Barkley-Krum [sic] report saying that a hundred thousand Jews should be permitted entry into Palestine.⁹⁵

Silver called the scheme a "conscienceless act of treachery," and said that it was far from being a means of implementing the Inquiry Report.⁹⁶

Faced with this opposition the President hesitated. However, Rabbi Silver disclosed in a press conference on August 1 that as late as July 30, Truman had been ready to accept the Morrison-Grady plan. Only appeals from Herbert Lehman and other prominent Jews, by influential members of Congress (Wagner, Johnson, McMahon, Magnuson, and Smith), and by three of the six American members of the Inquiry Committee (Crum, McDonald, Buxton) were said to have caused Truman to delay. It was also reported that party leaders in New York had warned of the possible consequences of approval on Democratic chances in the November elections.⁹⁷ Secretary Byrnes, it was true, after a conference on July 28 with Attlee in Paris, had urged the President to accept the report.⁹⁸ After conferring with the Secretaries of War and Treasury, and with the Acting Secretary of State on the Palestine issue, Truman announced that he reserved decision pending discussion with members of the Cabinet Committee alternates. Also during the first week of

95. Walter Millis and E. S. Duffield (editors), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 188.

96. *New Palestine*, XXXVI (August 28, 1946), p. 5.

97. *JTA Bulletin*, August 2, 1946, p. 6.

98. *Palestine Affairs*, I (September, 1946), p. 6.

August, the American members of the Inquiry Committee held a series of conferences presided over by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson.⁹⁹ As a result of all these discussions and warnings Truman informed Attlee that his first impression was unfavorable. On August 12, Truman advised the British Government that

. . . I cannot give formal support to the plan in its present form as a joint Anglo-American plan. The opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion to give it effective support.¹⁰⁰

The President's virtual rejection of the Morrison-Grady report was attributed by the Zionist Organization to the fact that a program of mass action had been instituted by Dr. Silver in Washington and had been carried on successfully even though the State Department had all but committed Truman to the plan.¹⁰¹

An additional reason for what amounted to a disavowal of the Morrison-Grady plan, although a formal rejection was not yet made, may have been the knowledge that the Jewish Agency had decided at its Paris meeting that it would accept an agreement on the basis of partition—a partial retreat from the Biltmore Program. Nahum Goldman had informed American officials that the Zionists were now prepared to accept a "viable Jewish state in an

99. Whether Acheson opposed Byrnes' advice is not clear. There was no doubt, however, that Acheson was closely associated with Sol Bloom of whom Acheson said "there is no person for whom I have greater affection." (Acheson to Farley, January 24, 1947, Biographical File, Bloom Papers).

100. Truman, II, 152.

101. ZOA, *49th Annual Report*, p. 44.

adequate area" of Palestine.¹⁰² The President forwarded this proposal to the British Government while declaring that the United States had not presented any definite proposition for Palestine.

Thus, by the fall of 1946, Truman confessed that the situation looked "insoluble" and that "the Jews themselves are making it almost impossible to do anything for them."¹⁰³ The President was therefore forced to seek a solution along the lines explored by Roosevelt, namely, to disassociate the refugee problem from Palestine, at least in part. He expressed the hope that various countries, including the United States, would admit many of these people as permanent residents.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, he planned to ask Congress to authorize entry into the United States of a fixed number of displaced persons.¹⁰⁵ This program, like Roosevelt's, did not receive Zionist support.¹⁰⁶

As the British Government convoked the London Conference on September 10, 1946, in a final effort to secure agreement between Jews and Arabs, the United States continued to drift along with no definite policy. Top Jewish leaders in the United States, said Truman, were active in "putting all sorts of pressure on me to commit American power and forces on behalf of the Jewish aspirations in Palestine"¹⁰⁷—a measure which Silver had said would never be contemplated. It was decided therefore that the United States would not even send an observer

102. *New Palestine*, XXXVI (August 28, 1946), p. 3. cf. *Supra*, p. 120.

103. Truman, II, 153.

104. *Ibid.*

105. *New Palestine*, XXXVI (August 28, 1946), p. 3.

106. With the exception of several token witnesses, Jewish groups made no attempt to secure passage of the Stratton Bill. cf. Lilienthal, pp. 34-35.

107. Truman, II, 153.

to the Conference although Senator Wagner had most appropriately written to the State Department suggesting Mr. McDonald for the position.¹⁰⁸

This non-committal policy came to an abrupt end in early October when the Zionists had their bargaining position unexpectedly strengthened by the American election.¹⁰⁹ Apprehensive over Congressional efforts to devise a Palestine resolution and pressed by Democratic leaders in New York,¹¹⁰ Truman formally rejected the Morrison-Grady plan on October 4, even though Bevin had begged that this statement be withheld. In reply, Byrnes had orally informed the Foreign Secretary that the President had no other alternative since Dewey was about to issue a competitive statement.¹¹¹ Not only did Truman officially reject the Morrison-Grady proposal, but he went on to call for the immediate entrance of the 100,000 and to recommend a partition plan along lines suggested by the Jewish Agency. It was his belief, said the President, "that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States."¹¹² Quite coincidentally, at least according to Truman, this statement was issued on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. But while Truman might contend that there "was nothing

108. Clayton to Wagner, September 10, 1946, Wagner Papers.

109. Hurewitz, p. 264.

110. It was felt by Mead and Lehman, candidates for Governor and Senator respectively in New York, that the Zionists in that state would vote as a block and might win or lose the election for the Democrats. Consequently, both candidates informed the White House that a pro-Zionist statement must be released immediately. Further delay caused Mead and Lehman to threaten that they themselves would issue such a statement. It was under this pressure that the October 4 statement was produced. K. Roosevelt, pp. 12-13. cf. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 346 for the role played by Niles and Rosenman in this matter.

111. Bailey, p. 26.

112. *Palestine Affairs*, I (September, 1946), 6.

unusual" about the timing,¹¹³ the general comment was critical.¹¹⁴ The President's action was called an empty gesture made at getting votes and even the sizeable group of commentators favorable to Zionism could not check the tide of criticism. The well-known Washington reporter of the *New York Times*, James Reston, summarized this criticism:

President Truman's statement on Palestine illustrates the influence of domestic politics on U.S. foreign policy and demonstrates the limitations of the theory that politics stops at the water's edge. The President went against his advisers on foreign policy and chose to follow the promptings of those who were primarily interested in retaining Democratic majorities in Congress. The general conclusion is that if the Palestine question is approached from the viewpoint of American politics, it is not likely to be solved and America's prestige and authority in the world are likely to be impaired.¹¹⁵

That political considerations had played a major role was indicated on October 6, when Governor Dewey advocated the admission, not merely of 100,000, but of "several hundreds of thousands," and the "transformation of Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth."¹¹⁶ Hurewitz also affirms that the President's endorsement of the Zionist program was more of a political than a policy statement since his review of the case completely ignored the Arab

113. Truman, II, 154.

114. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, October 15, 1946.

115. *New York Times*, October 7, 1946.

116. Text in *New Palestine*, XXXVII (October 21, 1946), p. 3.

side.¹¹⁷ The statement was considered a fateful one by Kermit Roosevelt because, in Truman's mind, it committed the United States to thoroughgoing support of partition.¹¹⁸ Henceforth, the role of the State Department in this matter was definitely limited. White House officials reportedly informed the State Department that its personnel must not criticize the government's position. Knowing that Byrnes had opposed the President's statement, Dr. Wise had asked the Secretary on October 23 if the State Department was giving full support to that statement.¹¹⁹ Although Byrnes obediently assured the Zionist leader that he was in accord with the President's statement,¹²⁰ he recalled to Forrestal a year later "that he had disassociated himself from his decision . . . to turn down the Grady report."¹²¹ The treatment accorded the State Department, along with the rejection of the Grady report,

. . . amounted to a denunciation of the work of his own appointee. It also resulted in Secretary of State Byrnes washing his hands of the whole Palestine matter, which meant that it was allowed to drift without action and practically without any American policy.¹²²

The reaction from the Arab world to the President's statement was not long in coming. A letter from Ibn Saud accused the Jews of having designs on neighboring Arab countries and went on to charge that Truman's statement

117. Hurewitz, p. 265.

118. K. Roosevelt, p. 13.

119. *Department of State Bulletin*, XV, 383 (November 3, 1946), 822.

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 346.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

had altered ". . . the basic situation in Palestine in contradiction to previous promises."¹²³ In a reply dated October 26, 1946, Truman claimed that support of the Jewish National Home had been a consistent American policy. The President denied that "responsible Jewish leaders" contemplated a policy of aggression or that his statement was inconsistent with earlier promises:

I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people.¹²⁴

Truman also indicated that there had been "a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews" during 1946, and he felt assurances in this regard had been satisfied. This assertion could, of course, only be regarded as true in a very narrow sense as the Arabs had pointed out when notified of the Inquiry Committee's report. Truman's letter to the Arabian King was said by the Zionist historian, Manuel, to have introduced a new element of diplomatic policy:

. . . for the first time an American president formally assumed a "certain responsibility" in the disposition of Palestine. The letter became the first diplomatic document to a foreign power in which the United States, in however circumscribed a manner, stated its historic obligations towards the Jewish homeland.¹²⁵

123. Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, XV, 384 (November 10, 1946), pp. 848-51.

124. *Ibid.*

125. Manuel, p. 328.

A prominent Zionist paper called the letter "the clearest and most forthright official declaration of American policy as regards Palestine that has ever been made."¹²⁶

Although the British Government had been angered by Truman's statement, various conversations took place in a final effort to solve the problem before resorting to the United Nations. Bevin discussed the situation with Byrnes in New York in December with the result that the State Department urged both Jews and Arabs to attend the London Conference.¹²⁷ Byrnes also said that the United States was now willing to send an official observer provided that both Jews and Arabs attended the Conference. But since the Basle Conference, dominated by American Zionists, had ruled out any participation by the Jewish Agency, the British were forced to resume talks with the Arabs alone. The British at last announced a plan which was essentially a modified version of the Morrison-Grady proposals and which could gain acceptance from neither Jews nor Arabs. Consequently, with all hope exhausted, Bevin announced that the problem would be taken to the United Nations. He pointed out in Parliament that the mandate contained contradictory promises and, somewhat undiplomatically, blamed Truman's statement of October 4 for preventing what had been good prospects of agreement with the Jewish Agency¹²⁸—an assertion which the Zionists promptly refuted. Bevin's tirade, linking the President and the American Jewish

126. *Palestine Affairs*, I, 11 (December, 1946), p. 2.

127. The Conference had been adjourned on October 2 until December 16 (further postponed until January 27, 1947) and this postponement made it unlikely that the Palestine question would be raised at the session of the General Assembly opening on October 23. It was felt by the British that with the Congressional elections out of the way in the United States, that country could then take a more active part. Hurewitz, p. 264.

128. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, CCCCCXXXIII, Fifth Series, cols. 1907-1926, February 25, 1947.

community, definitely served the Zionist cause.¹²⁹ Truman's self-justifying statement of February 27, 1947, indignantly declared that ". . . the impression . . . that America's interest in Palestine and the settlement of the Jews there is motivated by partisan and local politics is most misleading."¹³⁰ It was on this sour note of Anglo-American discord that the United Nations received the Palestine problem; a development which called forth new Zionist energies and techniques in a final effort to secure implementation of the Biltmore Program.

129. Manuel, p. 331.

130. *New York Times*, February 27, 1947.

VII BACKGROUND TO PARTITION

Zionist strategy at the United Nations.—Britain's decision to place the Palestine problem before the United Nations demanded a new approach on the part of the Zionist parties. Within three days of Bevin's announcement the Zionist Emergency Council called a special conference to deal with the changed situation. On February 17 the Emergency Council asked the United Nations to issue an interim order instructing the British Government to apply the mandate free from all restrictive enactments. It also urged that the Jewish Agency be represented in the deliberations to follow and asked the United States to assume leadership by supporting Jewish national aspirations. These proposals were submitted to many Congressmen the same day.¹ The Council statement contained two important elements: (1) it emphasized "fulfillment" of the mandate and, (2) it sought support for Jewish national aspirations. Although both of these propositions were merely two sides of the same coin, it is interesting to note that the Zionists once more hesitated to proclaim their professed goal in a forthright manner. Perhaps in criticism of the Council's statement, a revealing article entitled

1. *New York Times*, February 18, 1947.

"Toward a New Zionist Strategy" ² suggested a different path. It was pointed out that the Zionists must now deal with the United Nations, a body which, unlike the League of Nations, was not committed to a pro-Zionist solution. It therefore did not seem expedient for the Zionist Organization to press for an immediate determination of the ultimate political status of Palestine. Rather, it was suggested that the Zionists stress the need for a return to the principles of the mandate. In this way the question of a national state was toned down while unlimited immigration was still pressed. Naturally, this did not constitute an abandonment of the Biltmore Program but was merely a longer if less direct route to the same goal. The suggestion therefore sought to emphasize only the first element of the Council's February 17th statement. Another suggestion was that the Zionist Organization should not negotiate with Britain but should "seek to induce the American government to accept and indeed, to demand a share in the determination of Near East policy." The Zionist Organization could thereby bring its full power to bear on that government which was most susceptible to Zionist pressure and through which its ends could best be attained. Such a program was nothing more than what Dr. Silver evidently had in mind when the Basle Conference refused permission to the Agency Executive to negotiate with the British. Lastly, it was suggested that the "Yishuv" (Palestinian Jews) should be played up as the bulwark of democracy against "any" kind of totalitarianism in the Near East. Whereas the "democratic Jewish commonwealth" of the Biltmore Program could be taken as a contrast to Arab "feudal" government, here the idea was to associate the Yishuv with America's new anti-Russian policy in the Near East. The suggestion was

2. *Reconstructionist*, XIII, 3 (March 21, 1947), pp. 3-4.

not immediately followed, however, since Russian support was still needed in the United Nations. All of these suggestions were employed to some extent in the months which followed.

Another tactic which commended itself to the Emergency Council was to take advantage of, and exploit, the growing American concern for the Near East along with Britain's financial difficulties in the same area. Thus, during the debate on the Greek-Turkish aid bill, a measure designed to pick up the traditional British containment policy against Russia, sentiment was voiced that the United States should make a bargain with London whereby the British would receive financial help in those countries only if she agreed to the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.³ The American press seemed oblivious of the fact that such an approach was to threaten Western security at the expense of the Zionist objective.

The origin of this maneuver can clearly be traced to Emanuel Neumann, Vice-Chairman of the Emergency Council. In a letter to Senator Wagner, Neumann had suggested a plan which had "not been tried before and which might yield results where past methods have failed."⁴ The "confidential" memorandum pointed out that the American Government had treated the Palestine issue as an isolated problem rather than linking it with the rest of Anglo-American relations as they affected the Near East. According to Neumann, the Department of State must be made to inform Britain that she could not expect to have her burdens lightened in Greece and Turkey unless she agree to American demands concerning Palestine.⁴ Wagner replied to Neumann on April 15 in

3. *New York Times*, April 1, 1947.

4. Neumann to Wagner, March 14, 1947, Wagner Papers. (cf. Appendix IV for letter.)

forming him, as his actions in Congress had already proved, that their feelings on the subject were similar.⁵

While the Emergency Council concerned itself with political strategy, the American Christian Committee for Palestine undertook to check any comment which might throw a critical light upon the Zionist movement. Activities of this nature when undertaken by non-Jewish Zionists were obviously superior to the same activities when pursued by Jewish groups since a certain impartiality could be claimed. Although articles critical of Zionism had been almost non-existent in the American press, thanks to the fact that both "liberals" and "conservatives" found reason to support the movement, the appearance of an anti-Zionist article caused considerable worry. In a move duplicated both before and after the creation of Israel,⁶ an attempt was made to frighten the offending magazine so that such articles would be avoided in the future. The appearance of William T. Stace's article, entitled "The Zionist Illusion" in the February, 1947, issue of *Atlantic Monthly*, caused alarm and attempts were made to check it. Various "leaders," Senator Wagner among them, were informed of the article which it was feared might "have wide influence among the uninitiated."⁷ It was therefore suggested that the Senator write to the editor, Mr. Edward Weeks, "protesting the opening of their columns to this untruthful and dangerous attack upon a great movement of redemption."

5. Wagner to Neumann, April 15, 1947, Wagner Papers.

6. An experience was related to the author by an editor of a prominent national Catholic paper. Having once printed an article critical of Zionism, the paper lost \$40,000 in advertising. Certain advertisers, said the editor, were not interested in a paper which criticized Israel. Consequently, the bishop of the diocese directed that Israel was not to be discussed. Personal interview, November 27, 1959.

7. Le Sourd to Wagner, February 11, 1947, Wagner Papers.

The United States and UNSCOP activities.—The United Nations received Britain's formal request for consideration of the Palestine problem on April 2, 1947. In order to avoid delay in dealing with the matter, the Secretary General was requested to call a special Session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting a Special Committee which in turn could prepare for the regular United Nations Assembly scheduled for November.⁸ By April 13 a majority of members had concurred in this request⁹ despite Arab disapproval. Once the Session was inevitable, the Arab nations sought to include an additional item designed to broaden the scope of the body to include the question of the termination of the mandate and the declaration of Palestine's independence.¹⁰ The suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it prejudged the issue; an attitude also adopted by the United States.¹¹ Before any inquiry was made into the Palestine question itself, considerable discussion took place on the binding force of any resolution which the United Nations might offer. There was no doubt that a recommendation of the Assembly "always remains a recommendation, i.e. not binding in the legal sense."¹² With that point understood—although it was later argued that failure to comply with the resolution was tantamount to the destruction of the United Nations—various attempts were made to secure assurance from Britain that the Assembly's recommendation would be followed. Britain, however, refused to commit herself to such an agreement although she assured the members that as a good member of the

8. Robinson, p. 50.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 52f.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-84.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

United Nations she would act accordingly.¹³ Another procedural question revolved around the request of numerous groups to testify before the committee to be constituted. At the suggestion of the American delegate, Warren Austin, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee were alone permitted to testify.¹⁴ Neither group was to speak before the full Assembly since that privilege was reserved to member nations alone. At length, on May 15, a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was composed. This committee was made up of eleven "smaller" nations after the "Big Five" had been excluded.¹⁵ Between May 26 and August 31 UNSCOP held sixteen public and thirty-six private meetings at Lake Success, Jerusalem, Beirut and Geneva.

During the three months in which UNSCOP conducted its hearings and received written testimony, the Truman Administration remained cautious and non-committal. On May 5 General Marshall, who had succeeded Byrnes as Secretary of State, revealed the Administration's position in answer to a request for a statement on Palestine by thirty Republican pro-Zionist Representatives. The Secretary stated that the United States considered it premature to develop its policy on the Palestine question in such a way as to limit the usefulness of the investigation.¹⁶ As further evidence of this policy, and in the face of growing evidence that numerous American citizens were contributing to illegal immigration activities in Palestine, the President called upon all citizens to refrain from activities hazardous to the settlement of the

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-124.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

16. Exchange of letters in *Congressional Record*, XCIII, part 11. 80th Congress, 1st Session, pp. A2201-A2202.

Palestine problem.¹⁷ On July 31 Marshall once more declined to state officially American policy. In a letter to Representative Jacob Javits, a pro-Zionist congressman from New York, the Secretary declared that the State Department would make its views known only after UNSCOP had published its findings. This silence on the part of the Administration was maintained despite strong pressure from other Zionist supporters in Congress who called upon the Government to exercise "continued adherence" to the policy laid down by the President and Congress in the past.¹⁸ A remark made by the President at a cabinet meeting on August 8 explains the reason for this official silence:

The President interjected at this time that he proposed to make no announcements or statements upon the Palestine situation until after the UN had made its finding. He said he had stuck his neck out on this delicate question once, and he did not propose to do it again. (He referred to his statement about the desirability of the British admitting a hundred thousand Jews, made in the autumn of 1945).¹⁹

But while the Administration called for an end to activities which might further promote violence in Palestine, the Zionists became increasingly bold in supporting illegal immigration. Emanuel Neumann had announced in January that American Zionists intended to save as many Jewish lives as possible, regardless of the obstacles

17. *Department of State Bulletin*, XVI, 415 (June 15, 1947), 1154.

18. *Congressional Record*, XCIII, part 7, 80th Congress, 1st Session, H. Con. Res. 75-103, pp. 9236-9237, July 17, 1947.

19. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 304.

and the cost.²⁰ Further support was given this effort on March 2 when the Zionist Organization promised whole-hearted support for the campaign to assist refugees without visas in reaching Palestine.²¹ The *Exodus* affair²² in July was given highly colored treatment and served to stimulate a large New York rally which demanded action by the United States.²³ This demand was repeated both by the American Jewish Committee²⁴ and various members of Congress.²⁵ Also in July, Americans for Haganah was formed by representatives of all Zionist parties in the United States excepting the Revisionists.²⁶ Illegal immigration was thus openly espoused and a determined effort was made to sway public opinion and to win financial support. Bartley Crum became chairman of this group in October, with Herbert H. Lehman,²⁷ Sumner Welles, and William O'Dwyer, among others, on the National Council. Great assistance was also rendered the Zionist

20. *New York Times*, January 30, 1947.

21. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1947.

22. In July, 1947, the refugee ship *Exodus* had been boarded off the coast of Palestine after three of its occupants had been killed. The passengers were put aboard three British transport ships and returned to Hamburg. Although the French Government had offered asylum to the deportees, only a few accepted the offer. Each stage of the journey was publicized by the world Press. Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 150.

23. *New York Times*, July 25, 1947.

24. *Ibid.*.

25. *Congressional Record*, XCIII, part 6, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 10271-10273; 10396-10397. Ironically enough, it was during these months of great agitation on behalf of the refugees that the hearings on the ill-fated Stratton bill were held (June 4 to July 18) without benefit of Zionist testimony.

26. *Americans for Haganah*, I (August 15, 1947), p. 4.

27. When Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan, chief of UNRRA in Germany, had issued a report on the Zionist underground early in 1946, Lehman, who was then Director-General of UNRRA, had relieved Morgan of his post on the charge of anti-Semitism. cf. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1953) footnote p. 276f.

cause at this time by the C.I.O., Eleanor Roosevelt, and of course, the American Christian Committee for Palestine.

After UNSCOP had completed its investigations it found itself unable to present a unanimous recommendation. While Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay proposed partition, India, Yugoslavia and Iran suggested a single state with a federal structure. Australia supported neither plan since it was felt that either suggestion prejudiced a fair judgment by the General Assembly.²⁸

On September 3, 1947, an *Ad Hoc* Committee was designated by the General Assembly to consider both suggestions. All member states of the United Nations were represented on this committee which held thirty-four meetings between September 25 and November 25. Once again the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee were heard. The chief defenders of the majority report were Garcia Granados of Guatemala and Rodriguez Fabregat of Uruguay, both of whom were showered with Zionist, and later, Israeli favors.

Although the United States maintained its official silence for some weeks following the formulation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, it at length gave way in the face of strong pressure.²⁹ Secretary Marshall's statement of Sep-

28. United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee Report on Palestine, sub-committee 1, Doc. A/AC.

29. Growing "behind-the-scenes" pressure is indicated by Cabinet discussions as revealed by Secretary Forrestal. On September 4, Forrestal reported: "At the end of the lunch Hannegan (Postmaster General) brought up the question of the President's making a statement of policy on Palestine, particularly with reference to the entrance of a hundred and fifty thousand Jews into Palestine. He said he didn't want to press for a decision one way or the other but simply wanted to point out that such a statement would have a very great influence and great effect on the raising of funds for the Democratic National Committee. He said very large sums

tember 17 that the United States attached "great weight" to the partition plan was perhaps indicative of what was to follow.³⁰ Yet, as late as September 22 it was reported that Marshall had assured the Arab states that the United States had an "open mind" on Palestine.³¹ The President himself reportedly made his final decision in favor of partition only several days before he instructed the State Department to support it.³² With the issue therefore decided, Herschel V. Johnson, the American representative on the *Ad Hoc Committee*, officially revealed United States support for the majority plan of partition and Jewish immigration on October 11. A similar position was taken by the USSR within two days.³³ A basic premise of this decision was the inclusion of economic union in the partition scheme in view of the fact that 60 per cent of Palestine's best territory would be under the rule of one-third the people. Johnson also noted that the transition period might require the establishment of a police force recruited on a volunteer basis. His remark that he was not referring to the possibility of any member nation

were obtained a year ago from Jewish contributors and that they would be influenced in either giving or withholding by what the President did on Palestine. . . . I pointed out that the President's remarks on Palestine of a year ago did not have the expected effect in the New York elections. (It was added) that the President was prompted to make the statement by Rabbi (Abba Hillel) Silver . . . who was neither a Democrat nor friendly to Truman, and said that the net effect of the President's observation was to make the British exceedingly angry, particularly when it was coupled with the rejection of the Grady Committee Report." *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 309. Hannegan further pursued the subject on October 6 (*Ibid.*, p. 323) while Forrestal sought to take Palestine out of politics. This effort by the Secretary brought a warning from Bernard Baruch that close identification with the anti-Zionist position was not only bringing the distrust of his own party, but was exposing him to the charge of anti-Semitism.

30. Hurewitz, p. 304.

31. *New York Times*, September 25, 1947.

32. Lillie Shultz, "The Palestine Fight—An Inside Story," *Nation* Vol. 165 (December 20, 1947), 675.

33. *United Nations Bulletin*, III, 17 (October 21, 1947), pp. 532-535.

using force³⁴ seemed somewhat naive in view of repeated statements from Arab sources. During all of this period Johnson and General Hilldring, adviser to the American delegation, were in constant communication with representative of the Jewish Agency.³⁵

The American statement of October 11 was undoubtedly hastened by the fact that Dr. Silver, representing the Jewish Agency for Palestine, informed the *Ad Hoc Committee* on October 2 that the Agency would recommend partition to the Zionist movement.³⁶ Silver contended that the Agency was in reality making a great sacrifice in agreeing to partition since it meant a state limited to "one-eighth of the territory set aside for it by the Balfour Declaration." But this "heavy sacrifice," which Silver said would be accepted in order to secure a Jewish state, was a simple recognition of the fact that the United States could not be expected to further incur Arab hatred. Silver accepted eleven recommendations of the Special Committee including economic union, but rejected the twelfth recommendation which stated that,

. . . in the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution

34. *Ibid.*

35. The course of these contacts and the nature of the Zionist approach is described by David Horowitz. Although Johnson was said to have been unfamiliar with the Palestine situation and at first regarded partition as a surrender to internal political pressures, he gradually came to support the Zionist cause as he became more familiar with details. Believing the Zionist case a just one, Johnson "no longer lagged behind the sympathies of the State Department but rode ahead, doing his best to help us [the Zionists] and even favorably influenced the State Department's attitude. General Hilldring . . . was a tower of strength from the outset. . . . As information link with the Jewish representatives," he frequently conversed with the Zionist strategists. *State in the Making* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 255-56.

36. *United Nations Bulletin*, III, 16 (October 14, 1947), 477.

for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.³⁷

According to Silver, the Jewish problem was homelessness and the only solution was a national home. The United States later voted against the same resolution.³⁸

During the course of the United Nations debates on UNSCOP's report, the Russian threat in the Middle East took on more ominous proportions. Russia's assurance that she was prepared to take upon herself "the responsibility not only for the final decision which may be taken . . . but also for the preparation of these decisions,"³⁹ gave American military leaders cause for concern.⁴⁰ Thus, when Johnson spoke on October 31, he did not mention an international constabulary, but rather, in view of Russian designs, suggested that the transitional period be shortened. Obviously fearful that any trusteeship arrangement would involve Soviet participation, the United States delegate advocated advancing the date of independence from September 1, 1949, to about July 1, 1948.⁴¹ This American suggestion to advance the termination of the British mandate apparently fitted in with Soviet designs since that Government began advocating a cessation of the mandate as early as January 1, 1948, possibly with the idea of gaining a foothold in the confusion which was likely to arise.⁴² At the same time, the policy of the

37. Text in *Palestine Year Book*, III, 54.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *United Nations Official Records*, Vol. I, 71-75.

40. Forrestal again repeated his suggestion at a Cabinet meeting on November 7 that a serious attempt should be made to lift Palestine out of American partisan politics. His efforts to convince Senator McGrath proved unsuccessful. *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 341-344.

41. *United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 21 (November 18, 1947), 655.

42. Hurewitz, p. 306.

United States was to avoid any American involvement in the form of military intervention. While it first seemed desirable to keep the Palestine problem in the hands of the General Assembly or a committee, the United States at last felt it would be more safe with the Security Council where the veto could be exercised.⁴³ A compromise between the American and Russian plans for cessation of the mandate was reached on November 10 when the terminal date of May 1, 1948 was adopted.⁴⁴ The British Government, meanwhile, had declared that it would not impose by force of arms a settlement unacceptable to either Arabs or Jews⁴⁵—an announcement which brought criticism from Johnson on November 22.⁴⁶

In an effort to salvage as much as possible of Arab good will, thereby minimizing the chances of either Soviet or American intervention, the United States proposed that Jaffa be included in the Arab state. This maneuver on

43. Horowitz reveals how the Russian menace affected the thinking of the American delegation on this problem: "The form of organization required to implement Partition caused us no little worry. We knew the Russians would insist on transferring ultimate authority over enforcement to the Security Council, whereas the Americans preferred to leave it with the Assembly or one of its committees. We drew the attention of the Americans to the snag. But they brought up an important point against vesting authority in the Security Council by indicating its current membership. Indeed, most members were opponents of Partition or "neutrals." Britain, China, Colombia, and Syria were opposed, Belgium and France were irresolute. Under these circumstances, it would be enough for the Council to remain passive to nullify any resolution the General Assembly adopted. Gen. Hildring, however, went beyond the official attitude of his delegation and said reassuringly, 'But don't worry! We won't allow the difference between ourselves and the Russians to upset matters and prejudice the solution.' He dropped a delicate hint of a possible compromise on the basis of a devision of powers. And, in fact, that was the way it eventually worked out." *A State is Born*, p. 273.

44. United Nations Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 21 (Nov. 18, 1947), 655.

45. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. II, 1629.

46. *New York Times*, November 23, 1947.

the part of the American delegation was never made a part of the record, but it was pointed out in private conversations with members of the Jewish Agency that unless the change were made, partition would not receive the necessary two-thirds vote.⁴⁷ Johnson and General Hilldring had already summoned Mr. Shertok of the Jewish Agency about three o'clock in the afternoon of November 19 to inform him of the decision to exclude Aqaba from the Jewish state. This reversal was secured by Weizmann in conversations which he held with the President only a few hours before the afternoon call. After consultation with the Agency Executive, Weizmann had rushed to Washington to plead for Jewish retention of Aqaba. Truman had agreed to this request and promised to communicate at once with the American delegation, and obviously, as Weizmann remarked, "the President had been as good as his word."⁴⁸

After the *Ad Hoc* Committee had listened to all contending parties, voting was begun on the resolutions submitted by Subcommittee Two which represented the Arab point of view. The first resolution proposed to call upon the International Court for a decision as to the competency of the United Nations to deal with the Palestine question.⁴⁹ By a vote of twenty-five to eighteen, with eleven abstentions, the full Committee rejected this proposal.⁵⁰ A second and closer vote of twenty-one to twenty decided that the United Nations was competent to enforce, or recommend the enforcement of partition without the

47. Shultz, p. 676.

48. Weizmann, pp. 457-459.

49. United Nations General Assembly, *Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Report of sub-committee 2*, Doc. A/AC. 14/32, November 11, 1947, memo., pp. 57-62.

50. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, II, 1635.

consent of the majority of the people of Palestine. In view of later developments it is important to note that on both of these issues Argentina, Greece, Haiti, and Liberia were among the countries which supported the Arab states. A third resolution recommended the absorption within the territories of members of the United Nations of those Jewish displaced persons who were unable to be repatriated. The vote on this was sixteen to sixteen with twenty-six abstentions; as previously noted, the United States cast a negative vote. On November 25 the *Ad Hoc* Committee approved a plan of partition with economic union by a vote of twenty-five to thirteen with seventeen abstentions.⁵¹ This resolution differed in some respects from the UNSCOP majority plan and included a reduction of the Jewish area by the transfer of Jaffa and some 500,000 acres in the Negev to the Arab state. Jerusalem was to be administered by the Trusteeship Committee on behalf of the United Nations.⁵² The reduction of Jewish territory involved was attributed to action on the part of the State Department.⁵³ In contrast with a straw vote taken on November 22, the Committee vote on partition indicated a one vote gain by its supporters, a four vote loss for its opponents, and an increase of two abstentions. This would still not suffice for the required two-thirds vote needed in the General Assembly.

The vote for partition.—On the evening of November 26 the vote had come close to being taken in the Assembly. Had partition been put to the vote at that time it would have failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary. This session, however, was adjourned by President

51. *Ibid.*, p. 1637.

52. *Ibid.*, Resolutions, pp. 131-150, Res. 181 (11).

53. Shultz, p. 676.

Aranha⁵⁴ of Brazil on the grounds that insufficient time remained to complete the list of speakers. However, it was then only 6:30 P.M. and it was not unusual for the Assembly to sit until midnight. Even the offer of the Arab delegates to withdraw their names from the speakers' list was not sufficient in Aranha's mind to continue the debate. The Arab delegates were fully aware, as General Romulo of the Philippines had pointed out, that great pressure was being exercised to secure a change of vote on the part of various countries and they were anxious to bring the question to an immediate vote. The adjournment on the grounds of lack of time was carried even though the inclusion of the French adjournment on Friday and the new Arab proposals on Saturday, caused the remaining debate on partition to take only about four hours.⁵⁵

It was after the Committee vote on November 25 that the Zionist leadership took matters into its own hands so as to secure the necessary votes in the Assembly. Although the circumstances surrounding these tactics are still shrouded in secrecy,⁵⁶ enough has emerged through the

54. Dr. Oswaldo Aranha was considered a staunch friend of the Zionist cause for many years. His sympathies are clearly shown in Jorge Garcia Granados', *The Birth of Israel* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 247.

55. T. R. Little, "How Partition Was Adopted," *Arab News Bulletin* (January 16, 1948), p. 6.

56. Communications addressed by the author to the delegates of Liberia, Haiti and the Philippines were never acknowledged. Similarly, no answer was received from Bernard Baruch. A secretary for Warren Austin replied that the former delegate was too ill to communicate. The author has been fortunate enough to speak with various persons who attended the debates either in official or non-official capacities and who were fully informed of the situation. Although names may not be cited since several persons are still in the State Department and other branches of the Government, the information related seems to have been general knowledge among those reporting events at the United Nations.

press and other channels so as to leave little doubt as to what took place. David Horowitz, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, indicates how the initial disillusionment with the Committee vote was dispelled and a period of feverish activity commenced:

. . . The fighting spirit rose in us again. We met at the Agency offices and consulted on ways and means to turn the wheel of events once more. The struggle began again. The telephones rang madly. Cablegrams sped to all parts of the world. People were dragged from their beds at midnight and sent on peculiar errands. And, wonder of it all, not an influential Jew, Zionist or non-Zionist, refused to give us his assistance at any time. Everyone pulled his weight, little or great, in the despairing effort to balance the scales in our favor.⁵⁷

Since Thursday, November 27, was Thanksgiving, the Assembly was not scheduled to convene. When the Assembly reconvened on Friday, nothing new was said and Ambassador Parodi of France proposed a twenty-four hour adjournment to allow a new conciliation move.⁵⁸ Just which side this move was designed to conciliate is not completely clear.⁵⁹ The Arab delegates met privately thereafter and proposed a compromise scheme for a unitary Palestine which entailed local autonomy with guarantees for the Jewish minority.⁶⁰ This plan was pre-

57. Horowitz, p. 300.

58. Shultz, p. 676.

59. Granados charged that France was thereby attempting "to assure her large Moslem colonies that she was doing all she could before voting in favor of partition." p. 267.

60. Little, p. 6.

sented to the Assembly on Saturday but it was not discussed since both Johnson and Gromyko opposed any further delay.⁶¹ The vote was then taken and the partition resolution adopted by thirty-three votes in favor, thirteen against, ten abstentions and one absentee.

The explanation for the increase of the pro-partition vote within the space of three days is revealed through various sources. Horowitz pointed out that the Latin American block was of particular importance and that efforts among these countries were "appreciably successful." Under the direction of the Argentinian, Moshe Tox, who was in charge of Zionist political work in the Latin American countries, "all the means at his disposal" were used to persuade and convince:

Explanations, cajolings, pressure, and use of pull—all these he operated with skill and success. He was glued to the telephone day and night, speaking with the capitals of the Latin American republics, and his emissaries sped to every part of the continent.⁶²

Jose Figueres, an ex-president of Costa Rica and part Jewish, was reportedly given a blank check book, while the wives of Latin American delegates became the recipients of mink coats. The coat received by the wife of the Cuban delegate, Dr. Belt—a vigorous opponent of partition—was returned, while the Ambassador himself turned down high offers for pro-Zionist speeches. Dr. Belt later referred in a public speech to the existence of these

61. *United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 24, (December 9, 1947), 773-776.

62. Horowitz, p. 259.

pressures.⁶³ The vote of Haiti was reportedly secured through Adolph Berle, who used the promise of American economic assistance. An ex-governor, well known for his Zionist and White House connections, personally telephoned the Haitian Government urging that its delegate be ordered to change his vote.⁶⁴ Consequently, the Haitian delegate, Mr. Antonio Vioux, who had voted against partition on Wednesday, explained that his Government had ordered a reversal for economic reasons.⁶⁵ Robert Nathan gave various Latin American delegates to understand that their vote for partition would greatly increase the chances of a Pan American road project. Nathan went so far as to use the name of the State Department and even of the President in making these promises. Admission of this was later made by Nathan in a memorandum to Secretary Acheson. Nathan's memorandum has not been released but it is still to be found in the files of the State Department. Of vital importance among the Latin Americans were the activities of Garcia Granados, a close associate of Guatemala's leftist President Arevalo.⁶⁶ Granados later spent considerable time in Israel where he was regarded as a founding-father. Argentina's Dr. Arce, who had declared against partition in the *Ad Hoc Committee*, abstained in the final vote.

63. Little, p. 7.

64. K. Roosevelt, p. 15.

65. cf. T. Little, p. 7. Evidence available leaves the Zionist explanation of Haiti's reversal quite unconvincing. According to Edward B. Glick, Antonio Vieux voted for partition on the legal grounds that the United Nations succeeded the League and possessed sovereignty over Palestine. But more practically, said Glick, "Haiti was overcrowded and feared being asked to absorb even a fraction of displaced refugees." *Latin America and the Palestine Problem* (New York: Herzl Foundation, 1958), p. 58.

66. Granados, pp. 22, 289.

Liberia's vote was also secured for partition even though that country had abstained in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and had promised to abstain or vote against partition on Wednesday. Here again, Robert Nathan, the prominent Washington economist, seems to have interfered. The Liberian delegate was informed by Nathan that pressure would be brought to bear through the Firestone Company. This was considered as attempted intimidation and Mr. Dennis, the Liberian delegate, protested to the State Department.⁶⁷ Indeed, the Firestone Company was approached but its response was to inform the State Department that "it had been telephoned to and asked to transmit a message to their representative in Liberia directing him to bring pressure on the Liberian government to vote in favor of partition."⁶⁸

The most obvious exercise of pressure is seen in the case of the Philippines, whose delegate, General Romulo, had made one of the most bitter attacks against partition that the Assembly had heard.⁶⁹ After the General had attacked partition he boarded the *Queen Mary* on Wednesday leaving instructions with his deputy to vote against partition. Already feeling the force of Zionist pressure, Romulo had warned the Arabs to force a vote quickly.⁷⁰ However, the Philippine Ambassador in Washington phoned President Roxas informing him of the great pressures being exercised to change that country's vote. While not himself in favor of partition, Ambassador Elizalde reported that the United States seemed determined on

67. Little, p. 7; cf. Lilienthal, p. 64.

68. *Forrestal Diaries*. p. 346.

69. Little, p. 7.

70. Little, p. 7.

partition and that it would be foolish to vote against it. A vote against partition seemed especially dangerous in the face of a joint telegram from twenty-six pro-Zionist Senators led by Robert Wagner.⁷¹ Since seven bills were pending in Congress which would affect the Philippines, it seemed wise not to resist. After the Ambassador had come from Washington to take over the delegation, Romulo was phoned and cabled while enroute to Europe. He replied that the vote must remain against partition unless the President instructed otherwise. By Friday night the President had intervened.

Another incident which took on peculiar significance under existing circumstances was the sudden withdrawal of the credentials of the Siamese delegate. A few days earlier his credentials had been thrown into doubt by a "coup d'etat" which had changed the Siamese Government. The delegate, however, had thereafter voted in the Assembly and had expressed his intention of voting against partition.⁷²

Great assistance was rendered the Jewish Agency by the American Jewish Committee headed by Judge Proskauer who had long recognized the path which must be followed.⁷³ Bernard Baruch, who had in earlier years opposed Zionism now, said Weizmann, "was helpful to us in many respects, and used his influence freely in our favor."⁷⁴ More specifically, Weizmann indicated that

71. This telegram was also sent to twelve other delegations. Of the recipients, four votes were changed to yes, seven abstained and only Greece voted no. Some papers expressed surprise that Greece, which was so dependent on American aid, should vote against United States policy. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*

73. Weizmann, p. 436.

74. *Ibid.*

Baruch and Herbert Bayard Swope "were helpful among the various delegations."⁷⁵ Weizmann also saw fit to single out for praise Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Truman's friend, Eddie Jacobson. Whether the last two mentioned persons played an active role in the United Nations decisions is difficult to determine at this time.

The question as to what degree, if any, the Administration personally took a hand in enlisting votes for partition is not completely clear. Truman noted the pressures brought to bear upon the White House but disclaimed any attempt to intimidate other countries. Commenting on a letter from Weizmann (November 27, 1947) who denied the exertion of undue pressure by the Zionists, Truman remarked:

Unfortunately, Dr. Weizmann was correct only to the extent that his immediate associates were concerned. The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly. . . . This

75. *Ibid.*, p. 456. Personal conversations with informed official sources reveal that Baruch and others were given the admittance cards of various American delegates in order that they might "button-hole" doubtful delegations on the floor of the Assembly. Mr. Baruch declined to answer a letter from the author on this question.

kind of "direct approach" some of my correspondents had been making could never gain my approval.⁷⁶

Under-Secretary Robert Lovett also reported that

. . . he had never in his life been subject to as much pressure as he had been in the three days beginning Thursday morning and ending Saturday night. (Herbert Bayard) Swope, Robert Nathan, were among those who had importuned him.⁷⁷

But while Truman's intent was clearly to deny that these pressures influenced the Administration to exercise any pressure, other sources seem to indicate the contrary. Sumner Welles claimed that the White House was directly involved in this matter:

In the light of later events it is important that there be no misunderstanding of the position that the United States assumed at that juncture. By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and indirect, was brought to bear by American officials upon those countries outside of the Moslem world that were known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would at length be secured.⁷⁸

76. Truman, II, 158-159.

77. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 346.

78. Sumner Welles, *We Need Not Fail* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 63.

David Horowitz recalled that,

America's line of action had swung in a new direction. As a result of instructions from the President, the State Department now embarked on a helpful course of great importance to our interest. The improved atmosphere swayed a number of wavering countries. The United States exerted the weight of its influence almost at the last hour, and the way the final vote turned out must be ascribed to this fact.⁷⁹

The *Catholic World* also asserted that American influence was exercised in order to secure partition:

The situation was desperate. To gain time for electioneering, Herschel Johnson, Warren Austin, and other Americans won a postponement of the questions. Johnson made two speeches in one day pleading for a larger majority and asking the abstaining nations to vote. He and his collaborators worked in corridor corners and on the backstairs.⁸⁰

While declaring that the United States Government had exercised no influence on the representatives of Haiti or Liberia, even the Zionist supporter, Lilian Shultz, admitted that the United States perhaps produced the vote of the Philippines. Shultz indicated that the opposition of the State Department to partition existed down to the very end:

79. Horowitz, p. 301.

80. John E. Uhler, "America and the Partition of Palestine," *Catholic World*, Vol. 166 (March, 1948), 493.

By the evening of November 28 even the State Department could no longer stall in face of the President's directive. For perhaps the first time in the more than two months of deliberations the American delegation was instructed to hold the lines and to insure that nothing would prevent a vote on the report as the first business on the agenda of the plenary session. These directives were issued by the President from the White House and Secretary Marshall from London. This time they could not be ignored.⁸¹

According to Garcia Granados the United States delegates at the United Nations had not been instructed to take steps to obtain votes for the resolution until as late as seven days before the vote. Even then, no attempt was made, said Granados, to go over the heads of the delegates.⁸² Dean Rusk, then Director of the State Department's Office of United Nations Affairs, also said that his Government never exerted pressure although "certain unauthorized officials and private persons violated propriety and went beyond the law."⁸³ Although the question of official American interference remains cloudy, it is indisputable that various persons purported to speak for the United States and this seemed conclusive proof to many that partition was an American scheme.

81. Shultz, p. 677.

82. Granados, p. 269.

83. Quoted in Lilienthal, p. 67.

VIII AFTERMATH OF PARTITION

Background to American reversal.—During the General Assembly debates on Palestine, the United States had brushed aside the question of the employment of American troops as almost irrelevant to the issue. Moreover, since American public opinion as well as military inadequacy mitigated against armed intervention, the Zionists had steadfastly maintained that partition could be carried through without the employment of American forces. The confusion and bloodshed in Palestine which followed upon the United Nations vote destroyed the "simpliste" attitude taken by many Americans "that, but for British malignity, there would be no serious trouble in Palestine."¹ Gradually, however, it appeared that partition could be effected only through the use of force, a stand taken by Mrs. Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, Herbert Lehman and other Zionist supporters.

The military, however, foresaw that the presence of American troops in the area could only assist the Soviets. The appearance of American troops, it was felt, would

1. Denis W. Brogan, "U.S.A., Britain and Palestine," *Spectator* Vol. 180, No. 6259 (June 11, 1948), 699. Nevertheless, there did seem to be grounds for the Zionist charge that Britain was doing very little to maintain law and order. According to Welles, Britain's intention was to seek Arab friendship by allowing Jordanian advances which in turn would again insure a British position in Palestine. p. 67f.

put the United States in the position of supporting an anti-Arab program. This would then allow the Soviet Union to appear as the only real friend of Arab nationalism should that country then elect to desert the Zionist cause.² For these and other strategic reasons Secretary of Defense Forrestal became increasingly active in seeking to remove Palestine from politics lest that unfortunate situation develop.³ While testifying before a subcommittee of

2. Cf. Halford Hoskins, *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 18-38, 232-254, for a treatment of American Near East concern.

3. On December 18 Forrestal spoke to Dewey about removing Palestine from the realm of partisan politics. The Governor said that while agreeing in principle with Forrestal, he was skeptical that the Democrats would really abide by any such decision (*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 348). Dewey's response was more or less relayed through Senator Vandenberg whose published papers, interestingly enough, contain not a single reference to Palestine (Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952). The Secretary's concern was heightened after hearing from Mr. Jennings of Socony Vacuum on January 6, 1948, that various oil companies had decided to suspend work on their Arabian pipelines because of disturbed conditions in Palestine (*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 356f.). Forrestal's efforts met with little success either with the Republicans or with members of his own party. At the same time, Forrestal came to believe that the gravity of the situation demanded that the Secretary of State should attempt to secure bi-partisan agreement on this matter. A paper to this effect was drawn up and presented to Under-Secretary Robert Lovett on January 21 who agreed in general with Forrestal's conclusions (*Ibid.*, p. 359f.). A visit from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. on February 3, 1948 was obviously aimed at toning down Forrestal's activities. But to Roosevelt's warning that failure to implement partition could only harm Democratic chances in certain key states, the Secretary characteristically remarked that he "thought it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States." Forrestal also informed Roosevelt that the tactics by which partition had been secured bordered on scandal but on this the young Congressman professed ignorance (*Ibid.*, p. 362f.). Even a warning from his friend Bernard Baruch, who somewhat strangely affirmed that while himself not in sympathy with the extreme Zionists, that he was identifying himself "to a degree that was not in [Forrestal's] own interests, with opposition to the United Nations policy on Palestine," failed to daunt the Secretary. Forrestal, in fact, persisted in his efforts to remove Palestine from politics until mid-February when he made two appeals to Secretary Marshall.

the House Armed Forces Committee in January, Forrestal pointed out the possibility of Russian meddling in the Near East and indirectly admitted that the United Nations decision two months earlier was inimical to American interests.⁴ The Secretary also revealed that there were only about 53,000 deployable troops in the United States while General Grunther informed the President that from 80,000 to 160,000 men would be needed to implement partition.⁵ As early as December 1, 1947, the Associated Press had been permitted to reveal that United States military observers were opposed to partition on the grounds that it might put Russian troops on the Mediterranean within flying minutes of the Suez Canal and of American oil concessions.⁶ Behind Forrestal's fears lay the fact that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated rapidly since the Assembly had approved partition. Russia had actively set about undermining the European Recovery Program while Communist campaigns were being waged in a forceful way in Italy and France. Russian support of revolutionary activities in China, Korea, Iran and Greece heightened the tension, and military demands on Finland and the suppression of representative institutions in the Balkans caused an acute awareness of the necessity of meeting the Soviet threat through global planning.⁷

In addition, the State Department, or at least the Near East Division, had not been convinced of the wisdom of partition. According to one report, Loy Henderson drew up a program against partition in early December. This

4. *New York Times*, January 20, 1948.

5. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 376f.

6. Ladislas Farago, "An Inside Report on the Palestine Fiasco," *United Nations World* (May, 1948), p. 14.

7. Welles, p. 81.

plan supposedly called for the recommitting of the entire Palestine question to a Special Session of the General Assembly, the placing of Palestine under United Nations trusteeship pending a different solution, and finally, the securing of a solution which would follow the outline of the Morrison-Grady plan.⁸ Whether such a plan was actually formulated at that time or whether this is merely a "reading-in" to later events in an attempt to discredit Henderson is not clear.

Military and diplomatic arguments for a new approach to the Palestine problem were reinforced by the lobbying activities of the oil interests. Their representatives pointed out that if the United States continued to press for partition, the oil of the Near East would not be available for national defense. More immediately, the success of the European Recovery Program was linked to an uninterrupted supply of Near Eastern oil.⁹

Perhaps the first indication of a new American attitude came on December 5 when it was announced that, "for the present," no licenses for arms shipments to "troubled areas" in the Middle East would be granted.¹⁰ Since the Arab governments were receiving arms under treaty arrangements with the British, the embargo appeared to favor the Arabs.¹¹ This policy brought strong Zionist agitation for repeal of the embargo¹² but it did not prevent illegal shipments from American ports to Palestine.¹³

At a time when American officials were indicating

8. Farago, p. 14.

9. Welles, p. 82.

10. *New York Times*, December 6, 1947.

11. *Ibid.*, December 19, 1947, p. 21.

12. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 376f.

13. Barnet Litvinoff notes that an engineer named Slavin purchased "many millions" worth of war equipment for \$800,000. *Ben-Gurion of Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 159.

doubt as to the wisdom of the United Nations resolution, the Palestine Committee formally requested armed assistance from the Security Council in order to implement partition. Not only did this request appear to run counter to American interests but it was complicated by the fact that Britain had announced she would not permit the establishment of a Jewish militia. It was in this difficult situation that Warren Austin, the American spokesman at the United Nations, took a different tack in the Security Council on February 24:

The Council under the Charter can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council by these same powers can take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. But this action must be directed solely to the maintenance of international peace. The Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.¹⁴

Although the United States, at least on the surface, still supported partition, it thereby served notice that it would do nothing to help ensure partition unless the situation in Palestine developed into civil or international war. America's response in the Security Council foreshadowed a piecemeal program toward Palestine destined to go through various stages. Basically, four objectives seemed to emerge from Austin's statement: (1) A settlement must avoid Russian interference; (2) It must project the United States into an active role in Palestine; (3) This must be done without the use of force; (4) The procedure must

14. *Department of State Bulletin*, XVIII, 453 (March 7, 1948), 295.

be designed to soften the bad reaction expected from the American statement.¹⁵ Austin's speech, coming after conferences in Washington with Secretary Marshall, was regarded by most observers as a legalistic interpretation thought up to evade the decision involved in partition.

Undoubtedly influencing and determining Austin's statement was the meeting of the National Security Agency held on February 12. Marshall had then pointed out that a paper prepared by his Department had outlined three alternative courses: (1) direct abandonment of partition; (2) vigorous support for implementation of partition by the Security Council, which would necessarily involve the use of American forces either unilaterally or with Russia; (3) "an effort to refer the question back to the Assembly and attempt to reshape the policy, not surrendering the principle of partition but adopting some temporary expedients such as a trusteeship, or a joint Anglo-American-French mandate with a revision of the partition decision along the lines of the original British cantonal plan."¹⁶ Even though Marshall hastened to state that none of these alternatives as yet had his approval, it would seem that the Secretary himself was being won over to the outlook of Robert Lovett who had said on January 21 that partition was not workable and that the United States was not obliged to support it.¹⁷ Truman himself sheds no light on the matter since he simply states that on February 17 he gave approval to a State Department proposal to invoke the conciliatory powers of the Security Council.¹⁸

Zionist reaction to American retreat.—Press reaction

15. *United Nations World* (July, 1948), pp. 31-33.

16. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 372.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

18. Truman, II, 159.

to Austin's statement was almost completely critical. The move was variously called an attempt to "straddle" the issue making it even "more confused," and a "retreat" from partition. Some held that the statement represented a "blow" to the prestige of the United Nations and of the Truman Administration.¹⁹ Zionist denunciation was particularly strong and went so far as to consider the statement anti-Semitic and as an attempt to destroy the United Nations. On February 25 the *New York Post* published a large advertisement issued by the Political Action Committee for Palestine and written by Rabbi Baruch Korff. The Rabbi said that this generation would have to answer for its "diabolical treachery" and went on to charge:

I cannot but look upon the shameless cycle of deceit as pure and simple anti-Semitism—no oil, no gold, no imperialism, but plain everyday anti-Semitism, incorporated in the hearts and minds of those who govern free America in 1948. . . . This form of anti-Semitism . . . is camouflaged in the words of Austin . . .²⁰

An editorial of the same newspaper declared on February 27 that "the President has no mandate to kill the United Nations, however convenient this method of appeasing Arabia and Great Britain may seem to the men of power . . ."²¹ In particular, this newspaper demanded that Loy Henderson be called before the Senate and tried for

19. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, February 27, 1948.

20. *New York Post*, February 25, 1948.

21. *Ibid.*, February 27, 1948.

usurping the powers of the Government.²² Dr. Wise demanded the enforcement of partition even should it necessitate the help of Soviet soldiers whom the Rabbi did not consider a threat.²³ The *Nation* claimed that Austin's statement was an outgrowth of the State Department's fear of American-Russian unity on Palestine, which it was hoping to end.²⁴ It was therefore claimed that the suggestion made by Austin for the Big Five to form a committee which would look into the whole question, was merely devised to bring a Russian veto. The Russians, said the *Nation*, would consider that an attempt was being made to end partition and would thus oppose the move—exactly what the State Department desired. Another prominent critic at this time was Bartley Crum who violently denounced Forrestal and Secretary of Air Stuart Symington. Both of these officials were charged by Crum as acting in behalf of oil and banking interests and for this reason sought to force the Government's change of policy by devising a Russian scare.²⁵ Only a minority of those commenting viewed the statement as an expression of the difficulties that the United Nations and the United States faced in formulating partition policy. The Scripps-Howard press said that those who criticized the statement overlooked the fact that it was designed to preserve the United Nations and avert a world war.²⁶

22. Within a few months Congressman Celler demanded and secured the transfer of Loy Henderson outside the country. Having first been sent to Turkey, the Zionists protested that he was too close to Israel. He was subsequently posted to India.

23. *Congress Weekly*, XV (March 5, 1948), 8.

24. *Nation*, Vol. 166 (March 6, 1948), 264.

25. *Jewish Outlook*, XII (April, 1948), 2-4.

26. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, February 27, 1948.

The renewed Zionist propaganda campaign had, in fact, not awaited Austin's statement of February 24. Danger signals had gone out in January and Weizmann was summoned back to New York in the middle of that month to assist "in the gathering crisis."²⁷ The entire political apparatus of the Zionist Organization was mobilized to counteract the growing opposition to partition. Dr. Silver hurriedly returned from Palestine to lead in the offensive. A conference of Emergency Councils was held in Washington on February 15 and 16 and inaugurated a mass telegram and letter campaign as well as nation-wide rallies. Every effort was made to secure support from ministers, mayors, city councils, labor civic and veterans organizations.²⁸ Of particular value was the support of the American Association for the United Nations headed by Clark Eichelberger. This group organized a conference of sixty-two national organizations which called for the invocation of non-military sanctions against the Arabs. With the intention obvious in its name, the Emergency Conference to Save the United Nations by Supporting the Palestine Resolution, sought to win public backing in a mass advertising campaign.²⁹ The combined pressure of all of these activities became so strong in Washington that the President gave instructions that he "did not want to be approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause."³⁰

That the Zionists had some cause for worry is evident by the fact that for the first time opposition to partition

27. Weizmann, p. 471.

28. ZOA, *51st Annual Report*, pp. 52-53.

29. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, March 8, 1948.

30. Truman, II, 160.

was voiced in leading publications.³¹ Shortly after the turn of the year *Reader's Digest*, *Harpers Magazine*, *Life*, *Look*, *Collier's*, along with several newspapers, carried articles critical of Zionism. Kermit Roosevelt traced out Soviet intentions in supporting partition³² while a group of prominent Americans, led by Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, formed the Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land. This body called upon Secretary Marshall in February and pointed out the dangers of partition.³³ Even the stream of 100,000 or so letters and postcards which were flooding Washington at the time³⁴ was not particularly significant as far as general public opinion was concerned since they were chiefly from Zionist sources. A writer for the Jewish monthly *Commentary* admitted that of the hundreds of telegrams he had inspected in Washington, only about one name in fifty was non-Jewish. It was "troublingly significant," said *Commentary*, "that, west of the Hudson during the fateful months after partition, the American grassroots seemed apathetic to the

31. This new trend is seen in the following articles: "America and the Jewish Appeal," *Arizona Daily Star*, February 27, 1948; Lessing Rosenwald, "Fallacies of Palestine," *Collier's Magazine*, March 13, 1948; Stephen B. L. Penrose, "Four Steps Suggested as Policy on Palestine," *Washington Sunday Star*, March 14, 1948; Judge J. C. Hutcheson, "Trusteeship Plan for Palestine," *Houston Chronicle*, March 26, 1948; "The Palestine Problem," *Life*, February 16, 1948; "Peace in Palestine," *Life*, March 29, 1948; Carroll Binder, "Can We Escape War in Palestine?" *Look Magazine*, April 7, 1948; Bayard Dodge, "Must There Be a War in the Middle East," *Reader's Digest*, April, 1948. Zionist concern over these articles is indicated in the *51st Annual Report* wherein the details of a campaign of protest against *Collier's* was described. p. 34.

32. K. Roosevelt, pp. 7-8.

33. Virginia C. Gildersleeve, *Many a Good Crusade* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 409. Although Marshall did not commit himself, Miss Gildersleeve felt that the Secretary was "rather sympathetic with our views."

34. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, March 10, 1948.

heroic spectacle of beleaguered Palestine Jewry.”³⁵ The Zionist publication *Hataassayi* conceded that a Jewish Palestine and the American vote in favor of partition just did not fit into the pattern of American military and economic power; hence the vacillation.³⁶

Reversal at the United Nations.—The trend away from partition and towards conciliation was evident in the American attitude displayed at a series of meetings beginning March 8 and attended by all the permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of Britain. The Soviet Union continued to stress the necessity of agreeing on steps leading to the implementation of partition but Austin criticized this procedure as a pre-judgment of the case.³⁷ Austin expressed the hope that agreement would be reached by the Arabs, Jews and British without outside interference. The Jews and Arabs were formally asked by the United States, China and France on March 15 to agree to a truce in Palestine; a step which, strictly speaking, had not been authorized by the Security Council.³⁸ However, the opinions expressed by both parties indicated that agreement was as far away as ever.

It therefore seemed that the American policy statement of February 24 had proven ineffectual and that force alone could effect partition. Having been brought to the crucial issue, the United States thereupon refused to recommend to the Security Council that a threat to peace and security existed in Palestine. This stand was obviously taken in view of the rapidly deteriorating international situation. The Czech coup had spread a sense of nerv-

35. Hal Lehrman, “Partition in Washington,” *Commentary*, V (March, 1948), 212.

36. *Hataassayi*, XII (February, 1948), 2.

37. *New York Times*, March 9, 1948.

38. *Ibid.*, March 16, 1948.

ousness and excitement throughout the free world further complicating an already explosive international situation. A top-secret telegram from General Clay on March 5 warned that war might be imminent.³⁹ On March 17 Truman appeared before Congress and requested broad powers which just fell short of mobilization. The following day Secretary Marshall delivered testimony before the Armed Services Committee on the relation of military strength to diplomatic action.⁴⁰ In these circumstances, even a tentative agreement that the United States join with the other major powers on the Security Council in declaring that the situation in Palestine might lead to war was forgotten. Obviously near the end of its tether in attempting to deal with the problem on the basis of the February statement, the American delegation only consented to a proposal which need not involve troops, and which again called upon the contending parties to reach agreement before sanctions might be imposed.⁴¹

With the trend of American policy away from the enforcement of partition, the Jewish Agency sought to reach the President directly. Soon after his return to the United States on February 4, Weizmann had requested an interview with Truman. But since the President had forbidden further approaches from the Zionists, Weizmann was put off. In what was clearly a Zionist stratagem to overcome this bloc, Eddie Jacobson, Truman's intimate friend and old Kansas City partner, suddenly appeared in Washington and was received by the President on March 14. Just exactly how Jacobson was enlisted and brought to Washington is not known at this time, but Jacobson was a mem-

39. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 387.

40. *New York Times*, March 25, 1948.

41. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1948.

ber of B'nai B'rith and enjoyed the friendship of Weizmann. Always devoted to a friend, Truman could not resist Jacobson's comparison of Chaim Weizmann with the President's own hero, Andrew Jackson. Consequently, Truman agreed to a visit from Weizmann on March 18 but at the President's order the Zionist leader was to be brought in through the East Gate and the interview was to be "off the record."⁴² After a conversation lasting almost three quarters of an hour, Truman seemed convinced that the Zionist leader "had reached a full understanding" of his policy.⁴³

The day after the President's interview with Weizmann, events at the United Nations reached a new stage. On March 19 Austin asserted before the Security Council that the Assembly resolution of November 29 did not constitute an obligation for the United Nations or any of its members. The partition plan itself, said Austin, had been agreed to only on the presumption that all parts of the plan would be carried out together. Since this was now manifestly impossible, the job of the United Nations was to see to it that peace and order were restored. It was therefore proposed that a temporary trusteeship under the Trusteeship Council be established. Such a procedure, said Austin, would remove the threat of violence and would make it possible for Jews and Arabs to reach an agreement on the future government of the country. Trusteeship, it was said, would not prejudice the character of the eventual political settlement. The American Delegate accordingly asked the Security Council to recommend the creation of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory. Pending a special session of the

42. Truman, II, 160-161.

43. *Ibid.*

General Assembly, it was suggested that the Palestine Committee suspend its efforts to implement partition.⁴⁴

Reaction to Austin's statement was instantaneous. "Black Friday," it was called by the Zionist *Congress Weekly* because it sounded "the death of the United Nations . . . to the assembled representatives."⁴⁵ Speaking for the Jewish Agency, Dr. Silver stated that the partition plan represented the "maximum sacrifice" the Jewish people were prepared to make. Any other plan would have to be imposed by force.⁴⁶ The Jewish Agency categorically rejected trusteeship on March 22 and announced that a Provisional Jewish Government would be established by May 16, even if the United Nations failed to implement partition proposals.⁴⁷ "To have accepted this decision [trusteeship]," said Weizmann, "would have meant to make ourselves ludicrous in the eyes of history."⁴⁸ The majority of press, radio and Congressional comment was also severely critical of trusteeship and even among those who were not active partitionists, Austin's statement was termed weak and vacillating. Some called it a clear reversal of partition.⁴⁹ Sharpest criticism came from those New York papers such as the *New York Post*, *PM* and the weekly *New Republic* which called for the recognition of a Jewish state; this viewpoint was particularly supported by Congressmen Javits, Klein, Celler and Isaacson, all of New York.⁵⁰ The March 19 statement also led the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America to

44. United Nations, Security Council, *Verbatim Record of the Two Hundred and Seventy-First Meeting*, March 19, 1948, Doc. S/P. V. 271.

45. *Congress Weekly*, XV (March 26, 1948), 12.

46. United Nations, Security Council, *Ibid.*

47. *New York Times*, March 23, 1948.

48. Weizmann, p. 474.

49. Manuel, p. 344.

50. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, April 2, 1948.

assert that the Government was under the control of the military and was threatening peace and the existence of the United Nations. Only a few papers, particularly the Scripps-Howard press, approved the move as necessary to avoid the intrusion of Soviet troops as well as Arab hatred. Judge Hutcheson, formerly a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, felt relieved by Austin's statement. Hutcheson believed that the force of Zionist pressures was clearly endangering American foreign policy.⁵¹ But whatever the opinions which were expressed, the public comment in 1948 suggests to the researcher a dozen years later that the American public did not feel greatly concerned about partition as such.⁵²

Generally speaking, writers have held that Austin's statement was proof that the President was deceiving Weizmann, or that he was not informed by the State Department of the import of the orders given to the United Nations delegate.⁵³ Truman's own comment on this development does not reveal any shock at Austin's statement. Rather, he stated that Austin's announcement was proof that he, the President, knew what Weizmann wanted and that Weizmann understood his policy.⁵⁴ Austin's statement had, in fact, been sent to the White House for clearance and Robert McClintock, an official high in the Department of State's United Nations Liaison Division, was told by one of Truman's assistants that it had received Presidential clearance.⁵⁵ On March 20 Truman asked Judge Rosenman to inform Weizmann that there was no

51. *Bulletin of the Institute of Arab-American Affairs*, April 15, 1948, pp. 1-3.

52. Department of State, Report on American Opinion, April 2, 1948.

53. Manuel, p. 345.

54. Truman, II, 162.

55. Lilienthal, p. 77.

change in his long-range policy.⁵⁶ To Truman, then, Austin's statement meant that the trusteeship proposal was merely an effort to postpone partition. At the same time, he claimed that various individuals in the State Department were reading into Austin's statement a complete abandonment of partition.⁵⁷ That such was likely to be the case, in view of traditional State Department policy, is understandable. Truman asserted that Weizmann at least understood his real intention since he, practically alone among the Zionist leadership, "did not choose this opportunity to castigate American policy."⁵⁸ Weizmann himself, however, termed the March 19 statement a "reversal" and as indicative that the President "had been bulked by subordinates in the State Department."⁵⁹

The shift from partition, designed to allow for delay while a new effort at conciliation was attempted, and to remove the threat of the use of Soviet troops, since there was no veto in the Trusteeship Council, raised new problems for American policy. The nature of the regime and numerous other administrative problems posed a multitude of difficulties. The problem of enforcement was still basic to the situation but the President was reluctant to make any firm commitment. Forrestal was queried on March 29 by Robert Lovett as to what forces, if any, Austin could say that the United States would offer. The Secretary discussed the matter with Truman who said

. . . that he felt if we had to respond (we would say) that we would participate in the implementation of

56. Truman, II, 162.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

59. Weizmann, pp. 471-472.

the trusteeship mandate . . . up to the limit of our ability.⁶⁰

As of April 4 Lovett was still asking for concrete estimates of what forces the United States could offer. A special meeting of top military and State advisers felt that Russia was bound to take advantage of the situation if the United States did nothing. But since the country was far from prepared for such a move, "it was suggested that the British might undertake to hold the fort alone pending the augmentation of our forces following the adoption of Selective Service."⁶¹ There were also reports that an Anglo-French-American trusteeship would be established so as to obviate Russian designs.⁶²

In the storm that followed Austin's statement of March 19, Truman announced on March 25 that trusteeship was not proposed as a substitute for partition, but was only an effort to fill the vacuum created by the termination of the mandate:

Unfortunately, it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as a matter of national policy. The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon the mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserv-

60. *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 405-406.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 410f.

62. *New York Times*, March 25, 1948.

ing law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large-scale fighting among the people of that country will be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and of the world.⁶³

Accordingly, the United States introduced into the Security Council on March 30, two resolutions: one calling on Arabs and Jews to meet with the Security Council to arrange a truce, and the other requesting the Security Council to convene a special session of the General Assembly. Both resolutions were adopted by the Security Council within two days.⁶⁴ Subsequent attempts by the United States to draw up a trusteeship formula—while ruling out the intervention of American troops unless both Arabs and Jews should agree to a truce—failed to find support in the Assembly.⁶⁵ In the absence of direction from Lake Success, the Arabs and Jews drifted into full-scale war and the attempt of the Security Council to secure a truce proved ineffectual.

Creation and recognition of the State of Israel.—As May 15, the date set by Britain for the termination of the mandate approached, the Zionist leadership continued to plan for the proclamation of an independent state. Refusing to acquiesce in the proposed trusteeship, the Jewish Agency decided to confront the world with “facts.” Weizmann informed Truman on April 9 that the choice for the Jews was simply “between statehood and extermina-

63. *Ibid.*, March 26, 1948.

64. *Ibid.*, April 2, 1948.

65. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Special Session, Vol. II, pp. 4-10, 10-21.

tion" and he refused to sanction the proposals of the American delegation.⁶⁶

With trusteeship bogged down in the General Assembly, President Truman decided to recognize a Jewish state as the only alternative. On May 13 the President received a letter from Weizmann advising him that at midnight, May 15, the Provisional Government of the Jewish State would come into existence.⁶⁷ It was therefore suggested that the United States take the lead in recognizing the world's "newest" democracy. The United States, however, was still officially committed to truce and temporary trusteeship. But if the President had any scruple on this score, it was overcome by Clark Clifford and David Niles. Clifford had been in constant contact with the Democratic leadership and that group seemed convinced that trusteeship would defeat Truman in the coming elections.⁶⁸ On the morning of May 14 the President received Frank Goldman, President of the B'nai B'rith.⁶⁹ At eleven-thirty the same morning Elihu Epstein, the representative of the Jewish Agency in Washington, was received at the White House. Epstein presented a formal notification that Israel would be born the same day at 6:01 P.M. Washington time and expressed the hope that recognition would be granted.⁷⁰ At 6:11 P.M. a short statement was released to the press announcing that the United States recognized the "de facto" authority of the new State of Israel.⁷¹ This message was then communicated to the startled American delegation at Lake Success but not before ticker-tape re-

66. Weizmann, p. 474.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 476f.

68. *New York Times*, March 22, 1948.

69. Lilienthal, p. 81.

70. *Department of State Bulletin*, XVIII, 464 (May 23, 1948), 673.

71. *Ibid.*

ports had already brought the news. Not only did this duplicity anger and embarrass the American delegation, but it brought forth expressions of indignation from other delegates. Dr. Belt of Cuba sarcastically remarked that the representatives of the USSR and Poland seemed better informed of events in Washington than the American delegation. Under these circumstances, said Dr. Belt, further debate on the internationalization of Jerusalem seemed pointless.⁷²

It seems that Truman had reached his decision to recognize Israel without the knowledge of the State Department. At the White House meeting of May 14, with Marshall, Lovett, Niles, Clifford and other presidential advisers present, the President reportedly stated that recognition would be granted.⁷³ Marshall expressed the belief that the question should not be decided on the basis of politics and possibly left the meeting feeling that Truman had concurred in his view. However, the President's advisers seemed to have won Truman over to their side so that Marshall was only informed between three and four o'clock the same day that Israel would be recognized. The Secretary was instructed to keep this information secret from all others in the Department,⁷⁴ since, as Truman correctly understood, various officials there "would want to

72. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Special Session, Vol. I, Plenary Meetings.

73. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 440.

74. Lilienthal, p. 84. Truman's continued distrust of the State Department, or fear of outside pressure, was shown by the summary appointment of James G. MacDonald as first Minister to Israel on June 22. When Lovett questioned the appointment on the grounds of MacDonald's identification with Zionism as well as for other reasons, "Clifford said he did not know anything about that but that the President had told him he did not want any discussion of the matter but to have action followed at once in the form of an announcement that afternoon by the State Department." Cited in *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 441.

block recognition of a Jewish state.”⁷⁵ Truman, however, declared that Marshall and Lovett, as well as Warren Austin, “saw eye to eye” with him on this matter.⁷⁶ The fact that recognition was granted before it had even been requested by the Provisional Government of Israel was not explained by the President, but this unprecedented step did provoke severe criticism from a minority of writers who regarded the whole affair as inconsistent with accepted principles of diplomacy.⁷⁷

Conclusion.—American recognition of the State of Israel signified the successful accomplishment by the Zionist Organization of the essential object of the Biltmore Program. Indeed, it can be said that during the course of the six years which followed the enunciation of the Biltmore Program, that document had been effectively translated through a variety of means and stratagems into United States foreign policy.

Although internal discord at times threatened Zionist solidarity of action, the fundamental goal was firmly maintained since there was no dispute on that point. Political Zionism, both on the international and national levels, either through positive action or through judicious silence, constantly operated throughout these crucial years to take advantage of existing circumstances. The shift of world Zionism to the United States was a calculated attempt to win over that country to the Zionist program by working through its political institutions. The Zionist leadership was well aware that the favor of the United States would be of utmost importance in the post-war world when it

75. Truman, II, 164.

76. *Ibid.* Attempts to verify this statement by the author proved unavailing since all those mentioned were under medical care at the time of writing.

77. cf. *Catholic World*, Vol. 167 (July, 1948), pp. 289-90.

came time for making decisions. This turning towards the United States was also indicative of the fact that here was the source of large-scale financial support. But while turning to America the Zionist leadership intended to play a prominent role in the direction of American Zionism. The Emergency Council thus provided for the representatives of world Zionism while at the same time making possible on the part of American Zionists the feeling that they were of particular importance.

After winning over the organizational apparatus of American Jewry through somewhat dubious means, the Emergency Council gradually functioned with less reliance on world Zionist leadership. The duality of purpose involved in the creation of the Emergency Council gave rise to conflict and was resolved in favor of American Zionism. While Weizmann continued as the recognized "spiritual" leader of the Zionist cause, his willingness to seek some agreement with Britain led to the dominance of American Zionism which did not rely on friendship of the government. Feeling that he could take advantage of American domestic politics so as to force the acceptance of the Zionist program on the United States, and thereby on the United Nations, Dr. Silver offered the hope of realizing the Biltmore Program in the immediate future. Although Silver's pledge was reluctantly accepted by many Zionists, the events of 1947 and 1948 proved the correctness of his judgment.

The success of Silver's efforts can be attributed to the fact that although not an American by birth, he had come to understand fully the essentials of the American political system and believed in the workings of democracy. Knowing that policies can be made or un-made through force of public opinion and pressure, Silver set out to create an atmosphere friendly and favorable to the Zionist program.

Through a variety of means long known for their effectiveness in the American political tradition, Silver succeeded in creating a pressure on the American Congress which proved irresistible. In seeking to prod the Congress and the Administration Silver antagonized the other prominent American Zionist leader, Dr. Wise, but his militant policies eventually produced the victory.

While clearly fostered and engineered to a great extent by the Zionists, Congressional and Administrative support for Zionist aims must also be recognized as motivated by other factors. In addition to the great natural and spontaneous sympathy exhibited by most Americans for the victims of Hitler's persecutions, a variety of other circumstances facilitated the Zionist efforts. The fundamentalist element in American Protestant thinking played a great role. The selfishness if not anti-Semitism (although often not recognized as such) of many Americans who sought a secular solution to a spiritual malaise seemingly inherent in the Western Christian tradition served the Zionists well. The fact that support of Zionism could be diversely viewed in the American tradition either as a liberal or conservative attitude was another advantage for the Zionists. These and a host of other factors explain the material which the Zionists could mould, exploit or direct, and without which their efforts, no matter how skillful, would have remained ineffectual. Somewhat ironically, it was primarily the disastrous events of the twentieth century which almost destroyed European Jewry that brought into existence a state which, by Zionist admission, constitutes an "historic injustice" from the viewpoint of national sovereignty and self-determination;⁷⁸ and this in a century

78. Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 22.

when self-determination is taken as a self-evident proposition.

All of these currents were successfully manipulated with such skill that the Zionists could well point out their efforts with pride. It must also be said that although the techniques employed, as those of other pressure groups, might cause a certain amount of disapproval, in general they operated within the accepted framework of American politics. This means that the critic of Zionism, even though convinced that American foreign policy facilitated the creation of the State of Israel and thereby jeopardized the best interests of the United States, must reserve his severest criticism for the shortcomings of public opinion.

In the pluralistic American system it is taken for granted that the various religious, national, social or economic groups will espouse their respective interests with a certain amount of self-righteousness and will very often claim that they represent the best interests of the country. However, it is also taken for granted that in the interplay of these interests a decision will be taken which at least will not seriously prejudice the best interests of the majority. The danger in relation to the Zionist Organization as it has acted in the past in American politics has been the fact that it has operated virtually unopposed insofar as any major segment of public interest is concerned. It cannot be denied that oil interests and perhaps certain missionaries and their supporters in the State Department have acted as countering factors. Nevertheless, these groups, even in their most successful days, such as immediately following the General Assembly vote in November, 1947, have never succeeded in attracting a large number of supporters. Although there are considerable numbers of Americans of Arabic extraction, these do not constitute a comparable bloc to the Zionists since they are divided

on religious grounds. Hence, it can be seriously feared that being unopposed and possessing adequate funds and fixity of purpose, the Zionist Organization might not be viewed in that critical light which is necessary in a democracy.

Since political Zionism, although incorrectly, has been linked with the Jewish faith, there has been additional reason on the part of the American public to accept its claims if for no other reason than that the failure to do so might be construed as anti-Semitic. In the circumstances of modern history, this identification has served the Zionists well. Conversely, given the possibility of new international or domestic developments wherein Zionism might not appear in the best interests of the country, this same link between Zionism and Jewry might prove very unfortunate. But having been greatly responsible for the birth of Israel, the American Zionists are still heavily relied upon by the State of Israel. Somewhat characteristic of this reliance is a private and personal letter by Chaim Weizmann to Sol Bloom, written on the eve of the Zionist leader's return to Israel. Weizmann pointed out that it was to such as Bloom that victory was due and then, somewhat ominously perhaps, he went on to express the hope that Bloom could be counted on in the future to help with difficulties which he feared "may still have to [be] overcome."⁷⁹ It is this attachment which Koestler says must now be broken so that the Jews of America may "go their own way, with the nation whose life and culture they share, without reservations or split loyalties."⁸⁰

79. Weizmann to Bloom, May 16, 1948, Bloom Papers.

80. Koestler, p. 335.

APPENDIX I

Extract from Henry Stimson's Diary, March 8, 1944

The President on the instigation of the State Department, was anxious to have me give out my letter to Tom Connally [probably the same as that sent to Bloom] in relation to the Palestine situation. McCloy was on the point of giving it out. I told him not to because I wanted to talk to the chairman of the two Congressional committees who had the Palestinian matter in charge. So this afternoon I got immersed in that matter. I found that my hunch was correct. Bloom was very much against any further stirring up of the matter by publicity and said that both committees he thought could control it if we didn't mess in any more. With this I thoroughly agree. Bloom also told me that there was a meeting of the Jewish Zionists coming on Thursday evening in Washington and if we gave out that letter today it would be taken as an attempt to backfire their meeting. I told all of this to Stettinius who had been the man who had stirred up the President on the subject and he agreed with us that the giving out of the letter should at once be held off, certainly until after the Hotel Statler meeting of the Jews. Later in the afternoon, however, Bloom called me up and said he had read again carefully my letter and that he thought it ought not to be published at all. I told him that if he felt so strongly about it he had better go see the President himself and tell him his grounds; that I would hold the matter in status quo in the meanwhile. I am inclined to think he is right and that the President and all the rest of them are wrong. The whole thing has been stirred up by the activities of Drew Pearson who has as usual inferred a huge conspiracy against the Jews and is playing it for all he is worth together with the help of a few Congressmen. I do not believe in letting the output of a person like Pearson control the pub-

licity policy of the United States on a very ticklish matter such as this. The whole matter was stirred up early in February when I was away by Marshall's going to meet the Senate Committee. I had arranged the matter then so that it was pretty safely bottled up so that on the advice of Bloom then I was going to let nobody go to the Committee except underlings from the War Department if they wanted them; but in my absence Connally got after Marshall and called him over to meet what was represented as "a few trusted members of the Committee in strictly confidential session." He got there and found practically the entire Committee and of course the matter leaked out, and, on the foundation of what Pearson got from recreant members, he had spelled out this story which is now troubling the State Department. I think if there is any further publicity made on this side, my letter should be published not by me but by Tom Connally, together with his letter in which he asked for mine. But I think the safer course is not to do anything.

APPENDIX II

Letter of Louis Lipsky to Sol Bloom, May 8, 1944

PERSONAL

My dear Sol:

I think I owe it to you (as a friend) to give you my estimate of how matters stand among Zionists and Jews generally with regard to the Palestine Resolution, which now sleeps in Committee. It is very important that you give the conclusions I arrive at your immediate personal attention.

As to your personal connection with the Resolution: At first and more particularly during the hearings, the stand you took was admirable and evoked general Jewish approval. But since the putting away of the Resolution, there has been a growing resentment, especially as people are becoming aware of the fact that the action to defer was tantamount to killing the Resolution. Your own position has deteriorated.

The general impression now being circulated is that while you seemed to favor the Resolution, you were in fact working all the while for its defeat. It is being said that

while you made sure to have everybody believe that you were a great friend of the cause, you actually tried to force an amended resolution to the original one right from the very beginning, although the amended resolution would have practically nullified the original Resolution; and that you hastened a vote in Committee, which you had promised would not take place, because you were afraid that the Republicans would themselves bring the Resolution on the floor of the House. Your voting against the motion to defer in Committee was merely a formal gesture. In fact, you lent yourself throughout those difficult days to the crafty manoeuvres of the forces who were determined to kill the Resolution. Because of these impressions, a number of leading Zionists feel that you have misled them into a major defeat; and this feeling is shared by the rank and file.

I know it as a fact that a public attack on you would have been made at the Madison Square Garden Meeting last month had it not been for the restraining influence of Dr. Silver, who held your critics in check.

Now, Dr. Silver feels very strongly about the situation. He feels that your vote in having a vote in Committee was particularly damaging, coming, as it did, only a few days after he and Dr. Wise had succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory statement from the President, which went a long way toward neutralizing the intervention of the military. But the unexpected vote in Committee, coming a few days after that statement and before we Zionists had a chance to capitalize on it politically in London and in Jerusalem, almost nullified the great value of the President's utterance.

As matters now stand, the President's attitude on Palestine is more uncertain and beclouded than ever before, especially in view of the statement he made to the press a few weeks following the first utterance, when he commented on Palestine in such a way as to endorse the position of the military.

Naturally, the Zionist leadership cannot be expected to take a position of resignation in this situation. It cannot acquiesce in a situation which impairs every advantage we have gained in the past six months. Especially in view of the fact that the Administration is determined to give us merely

gestures instead of action, and that the State Department is consistently playing the game of the British Colonial Office, and, more alarming, that the President himself seems to be unwilling to say anything definite, anything comforting, anything reassuring, on a matter which is so vital to our needs. Looking at the situation objectively, I am personally convinced that there will break out a veritable storm of criticism and indignation against the Administration, which you can readily understand, both you and I would regard as being highly undesirable in the critical months ahead.

The Republicans know what is going on very well. They are preparing to use the issue to the utmost. They can afford to make liberal promises and they are going to make them. Their most likely Presidential candidate has already issued two forthright pro-Zionist statements. There will be others. They will be used extensively among the Jews in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, and elsewhere during the election campaign.

These developments have put Dr. Silver in a very difficult position. The President had won him over almost completely. For the first time in years, Dr. Silver issued a public statement sympathetic to and laudatory of the President. But he is being forced to the conclusion that as matters now stand, the probabilities are that the present Administration will do absolutely nothing to help the Jewish people achieve their just rights in Palestine, except to send what he calls Rosh Hashonah greetings to Jews from time to time; and nothing more. You know that Dr. Silver's voice is listened to by vast sections of our people. He is known to be a non-partisan in politics. In fact, he has never intervened in American political affairs. If he is persuaded definitely that our cause is being sacrificed in Washington, he will not hesitate to speak out on the matter.

I call your attention to the fact that an important conference is to be held in Washington on May 23-24. It is to be attended by the leaders of 300 American Jewish communities, who are engaged in the emergency work of the Zionist movement. Their last meeting was held just before the Palestine Resolution was introduced. They will now have to be given a report of what has happened since and what is

now the attitude of our Government. As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council, Dr. Silver will be called upon to give that report. I am deeply concerned as to what he is going to say and what action may follow, if conditions remain as they are.

In my judgment, it is urgent that you persuade those in authority that some action be taken before the conference on May 23-24. The President gave assurances to Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver that he would issue a statement in his own name after consulting with Mr. Churchill. The President's friends should persuade him to make such a statement—clear and definitive as to the rights of the Jewish people under the Mandate, as to the relation of the American Government toward the promise that was made, as to the Jewish Commonwealth, free immigration, and so forth. When he shall have made such a statement, the green light could then be given to have the Resolution brought out from the Committee to the floor of the House, where it should be voted on. The American people have a right to express themselves on this subject. They are eager to speak and place themselves on record. No one has been taken in by the military argument. Nobody has been persuaded that the intervention of the military was justified in any way. To delay this action until after June would be fatal to all good relations between American Jews and the present Administration of Government.

I submit these impressions knowing that you will take them as coming from a friend—of yourself and of the Roosevelt Administration—and sincerely urge you to give serious thought to the suggestions I have made.

(signed)

Louis Lipsky

APPENDIX III

Letter of Arthur Lourie to Senator Wagner, November 3, 1945

Dear Senator Wagner:

As I indicated on the telephone, Dr. Wise and the members of my Executive Committee felt that the version pro-

posed by the Foreign Relations Sub-Committee was open to serious objection and would be unacceptable.

In an effort to meet some of the views of members of the Sub-Committee, a revised version was drawn up, a copy of which I enclose. I attach, also, some comments on the Sub-Committee's draft and on the suggested revisions.

A small delegation on behalf of the Zionist Emergency Council will be in Washington on Monday morning, and will seek to get into touch with you.

(signed)

Arthur Lourie

Suggested Revised Draft

Therefore be it Resolved that the Senate (The House of Representatives concurring) approves of the interest shown by the President in the solution of these problems and recommends that the United States shall continue to use its good offices with the Mandatory Power to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for the free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum extent of its economic potentialities and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development so that they may reconstitute Palestine the National Home of the Jewish people, as a democratic Commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights.

1. "Approves of the interest shown by the President in the solution of these problems."

No objection is taken to the expression of approval of the President's recent actions provided this is limited to approval of the interest which he is taking in solving the problem. It is felt that a direct endorsement by Congress of the Joint Inquiry Committee which involves, at best, many months of delay before action is taken, would be harmful to the Zionist position.

2. "Good offices with the Mandatory Power"

This is suggested in place of "peaceful offices." The use of the word "peaceful" is objectionable as suggesting that there was some need to make specifically clear that no military intervention is sought. The alternative above proposed, which clearly implies diplomatic efforts, is free from any such objectionable connotation.

3. "Free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum extent of its economic potentialities." The phrase "to the greatest feasible extent" is very vague and dangerous and practically nullifies the provision for free entry. Almost anything can be read into this phrase by way of objections as a ground for drastically limiting Jewish immigration. We would regard its inclusion as injurious and prejudicial. If, therefore, it is insisted that there be some preference to the capacity of the country to absorb additional immigration, it should be made clear that the only criterion on grounds of which immigration might be restricted is the economic criterion. This is in accordance with the undeviating interpretation of the Permanent Mandates Committee throughout the existence of the Mandate. It should be made clear that there is no intention to construe these economic potentialities in any narrow way. For the same reason, it is suggested that after the words "full opportunity for colonization," there be inserted "and development."

4. The concluding clause "so that they may reconstitute Palestine a Jewish Homeland" and "so that Palestine may be established as a Democratic Commonwealth" is altogether unacceptable. Far from advancing the Zionist position, it is definitely a reversal even of the position taken in the 1922 Congressional Resolution as well as of that contained in the Wagner-Taft Resolution. It omits the word "National" which was contained in the Mandate and in the 1922 Resolution. But more than this, it implies the possibility of a Jewish Homeland as a conclave within an Arab state. Accordingly, either the wording contained in the Wagner-Taft Resolution remain unaltered, or as an alternative, it is suggested "so that they may reconstitute Palestine, the National Home of the Jewish people, as a democratic Commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights."

This last clause, is, of course, the most important of all, and we should like to say, in general, however, that the above suggestions represent a great effort to meet the views of certain members of the Committee who do not favor the Wagner-Taft formulation.

APPENDIX IV

Confidential Memorandum from Emanuel Neumann to Senator Wagner, March 14, 1947

In the opinion of many competent observers the failure of the United States Government to make any progress on the Palestine issue stems largely from the habit of treating this issue as an *isolated problem*, wholly apart from the rest of the Anglo-American relations and of Near-Eastern problems. The British Government is naturally aware of this tendency and therefore proceeds on the assumption that British intransigence in the matter of Palestine will have no serious repercussions and will in no wise affect its position vis-a-vis the United States in any of the many issues in which they seek American assistance or support. This, more than anything else, explains British obstinacy and their refusal to comply with the repeated requests of President Truman.

It appears likely that American efforts in the matter of Palestine will remain ineffective and fruitless unless and until the Department of State decides to include this matter as one of its objectives in the give-and-take negotiations which it conducts with Britain and other countries. This is a natural and normal procedure in international relations.

Countless opportunities of this nature have been neglected in the past. To mention but three: important concessions might have been obtained from Arab States, quite amicably, on a quid pro quo basis at the time when these States were trying to get on the band-wagon of the Western Allies, in the last year of the war. Concessions from the British Government might have been obtained on a quid pro quo basis when Britain desired American acquiescence, in the UN and otherwise, in the "independence" of Transjordania. And British agreement to open Palestine for the immigration of displaced Jews of Europe might again have been obtained at the time when Britain was anxious for an American loan to help her in her own rehabilitation. No advantage was taken of these opportunities, or of any similar opportunities in the past.

A new opportunity for such a give-and-take approach has arisen now in view of the effort of the British Government

to get the United States to shoulder foreign commitments in the Near East, hitherto borne by the British Empire. These requests are based on the idea that such American action is necessary to assure international stability in the general as well as in the American interest. Assuming this to be the case, it is nevertheless true that the American action requested would in the first place serve to lighten Britain's burdens while safeguarding Britain's interests. Furthermore, the economic support to be granted by the United States to those countries would, through the trade and currency arrangements existing between those countries and Great Britain, become an important source of dollar exchange for Great Britain and thus directly contribute to the economic rehabilitation of Britain. . . .

In view of this, it seems entirely appropriate that the United States Government link the Palestine question with these current negotiations. This is the more appropriate since the commitments which America is asked to undertake relate to the Near East. As has been pointed out in the press, by Walter Lippman and others, the problems of the Near East are very intimately inter-related, and the American Government should not be content to deal with them piece-meal. It is not reasonable to ask our Government to take a decisive hand in stabilizing the situation in one part of that area while at the same time being compelled to tolerate in another part of the same area a state of affairs which it regards as deeply unsatisfactory. . . .

Should the United States Government raise the Palestine issue in this context—and in view of the new commitments we are expected to make,—it is reasonable to believe that the British Government will prove far more amenable than heretofore.

The recent British gesture in referring the Palestine question to the United Nations does not affect the validity of this argument. It is no more than a gesture for the moment.

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INDEX

Abel, Walter, 35
Acheson, Dean, 153, 179
American Christian Palestine Committee, 107, 129, 164, 169
American Council for Judaism, 7, 15, 39, 44, 100
American Jewish Assembly, 6, 7, 8
American Jewish Committee, 6-12, 14-16, 121, 130, 134, 168, 181
American Jewish Conference, 1943, 8-11, 13, 15, 16, 44, 96, 149
American Jewish Congress, 10, 11
American Jewish Trade Union Committee, 100
American League for a Free Palestine, 102
American Palestine Committee, 27, 28, 32, 99
Americans for Haganah, 168
Anglo-American Committee, 113, 140-7, 152, 200
Anglo-American Convention (1924), 64
Aqaba, 174
Arab Higher Committee, 166, 169
Arab League Council, 150
Aranha, President, 176
Arce, Dr., 179
Arevalo, President, 179
Argentina, xvi, 175, 179
Asquith, Herbert, xviii
Atkinson, Dr. Henry, 99
Atlantic Monthly, 164
Attlee, Clement, 109, 111, 135, 139, 140, 141, 148, 152, 153
Austin, Warren, 166, 184, 190-3, 196, 198-202, 206
Aydelotte, Frank, 141
Azzam, Abdul Rahman Bey, 88
Baghdad, 69
Bailey, Thomas, 118
Balfour, Arthur, xvii-xix
Balfour Declaration, xix, xx, xxii, 4, 5, 26, 55, 56, 96, 115, 127, 143
Baltimore, 99
Barkley, Senator, 108, 109
Baruch, Bernard, 89, 181, 182
Basle Congress (1897), xvi, 3
Basle Congress (1946), 121-4, 159, 162
Beeley, Harold, 143
Beirut, 166
Belt, Dr., 178, 205
Benes, President, 86
Ben Gurion, David, 2, 3, 129
Ben Leon, David, 119
Berle, Adolph, 179
Berlin, Meyer, 44
Bermuda Conference, 45, 46, 70
Bernstein, Herman, 63
Bevin, Ernest, 117, 155, 159, 161
Biltmore Program, xi, 2-6, 11-14, 38-9, 57, 62, 73, 83, 103, 120-2, 124, 153, 160, 162, 207
Bloom, Sol, 39-61 *passim*, 71, 78,

104, 105, 109, 110, 117, 2, 0-2
B'nai Brith, 6, 11, 198, 204
B'nai Brith Monthly, 21
Bolton, Frances, U.S. Rep., 42
Boston, 214
Brandeis, Justice, xviii, xxi, 30,
124
Brewster, Senator, 109
Bridgman, Canon, 143
Buxton, Frank W., 141, 152
Byrnes, James F., 106, 109, 111,
112, 137-9, 152, 155, 157, 159,
166

Cairo, 69
Canada, 169
Cantor, Eddie, 35
Capehart, Senator, 103
Capper, Senator, 103, 108
Catholic World, 184
Celler, Emanuel, 77, 105, 117, 128,
199
Chicago, 55, 214
China, 188, 196
Christian Council on Palestine,
29, 99
Churchill, Winston, 45, 71, 74, 76,
77, 87, 93, 95, 131, 215
Claude, Inis L., Jr., 18
Clay, General, 197
Cleveland, 214
Clifford, Clark, 204, 205
Cohen, Alfred M., 46
Cohen, Benjamin, 109
Cohen, Maxwell, 99
Colliers, 195
Command Paper 1700, 5
Commentary, 195
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
39-41, 43, 50, 60, 61
Compton, Congressman, 39, 104
Congress Weekly, 21, 119, 199
Connally, Senator, 49, 50, 109,
211, 212
Coolidge, Calvin, 63

Cotton, Joseph, 35
Crossman, Richard, 123, 142-4
Crum, Bartley, 141-3, 152, 168,
193
Czechoslovakia, 169, 196

Davis, Howard, 45
Democratic Convention, 1944,
55-9
Dennis, 180
Detroit, 99
Dewey, Thomas E., 82, 155, 156,
187n
Dreyfus Affair, xv

Eddy, William, 89
Eichelberger, Clark, 194, 195
Emergency Committees, 46, 52
Emergency Council of the Zionist
Organization of America, 3, 58,
98, 111-3, 129, 135-6, 207, 215,
216; establishes America at
centre of Zionist movement,
xxii, xxiii; sponsors Biltmore
conference, 3; weaknesses,
1942-3, 29-30; public relations
techniques, 31-3; campaign a-
gainst White Paper, 33-6, 129;
campaign against non-Zionists,
99-100; aims at Congressional
support, 103-4, 108, 118; attacks
Anglo-American Committee,
140, 146, 150; plans political
strategy, 1947, 161-4.
Epstein, Elihu, 204
Ernst, Morris, 71
Evans, Richard, 99
Evelyn, Judith, 35
Exodus, 168

Fabregat, Rodriguez, 169
Federal Council of Churches of
Christ in America, 199
Ferguson, Senator, 109

Feuer, Rabbi Leo, 35
 Figueres, Jose, 178
 Finland, 188
 Firestone Company, 180
 Fisher, Harry, 55
 Forrestal, James V., 151, 157, 187,
 188, 193, 201
 France, xv, 188, 196
 Friedich, Carl, 22

Gaffey, Senator, 109, 114
 Geelan, Rep. James P., 104
 Geneva, 166
 George, Senator, 108
 Gervasi, Frank, 22
 Gildersleeve, Dean Virginia, 109n.
 195
 Gillette, Guy M., 108, 112
 Goldman, Frank, 204
 Goldman, Nahum, 3, 22, 53, 153
 Goldstein, Israel, 10, 15, 22, 25,
 44, 53, 55, 104
 Goldstein, Solomon, 25
 Grady, Henry F., 150
 Granados, Garcia, 169, 179, 185
 Great Britain, see United King-
 dom
 Greece, 163, 175, 188
 Green, William, 27
 Green, Senator, 108, 114
 Grew, Joseph, 126, 127
 Gromyko, Andrei, 178
 Grunther, General, 188
 Guatemala, 169

Hadassah, 25, 123
 Haiti, 175, 179, 184
 Halifax, 79
 Harding, President, 39, 40, 63
 Harlow, Ralph, 99
Harper's Magazine, 195
 Harrison, Earl G., 134, 135
 Hataassai, 196

Hebrew Committee of National
 Liberation, 30, 121
 Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,
 10
 Hecht, Ben, 102
 Heller, James, 25, 44
 Henderson, Loy, 188, 189, 192
 Herzl, Theodor, xv-xvii, xx,
 xviii, 124
 Herzog, Dr. Isaac Halevi, 47
 Hilldring, General, 171, 174
 Hitler, Adolf, 14, 127, 208
 Hoover, Herbert, 63
 Horowitz, David, 142, 177, 178,
 184
 Hoskins, Halford, 69, 74, 76, 77
 Hotel Statler, 211
 Houston, 99
 Hughes, Charles, 63
 Hull, Cordell, 48, 64, 67-9, 71, 73,
 76-7, 79, 81
 Hurewitz, J.C., 73, 92, 93, 156
 Hutcheson, Judge Joseph, 141, 200

Ibn Saud, 48, 77-8, 91, 126-7,
 138-40, 150; warns Roosevelt
 against pro-Zionist policy, 73;
 rejects Philby plan, 74-6; meets
 Roosevelt, 87-90; accuses Tru-
 man of breaking promises to
 Arabs, 157-8.
 Ickes, Harold, 27
 Illinois, 83
Independent Jewish Press Service, 9
 India, 169
 Iran, 149, 169, 188
 Iraq, 105, 147
 Irgun, xi, 102
 Isaacson, Congressman, 199
 Israel, xi, 206, 210
 Italy, 48 188

Jackson, Andrew, 198

Jackson, Attorney-General, 27
Jacobson, Eddie, 182, 197, 198
Jaffa, 173, 175
Javits, Jacob, 167, 199
Jerusalem, 40, 166, 175, 205, 213
Jewish Agency, xx-xxiii, 3, 52, 141,
151, 159, 161, 169, 174, 181,
204; requests control of immi-
gration into Palestine, 4, 129;
establishes offices in Wash-
ington, 29; at San Francisco Con-
ference, 95-8; decides to accept
partition, 120-2, 153, 155, 171;
pressurizes U.N. 1947, 177;
opposes U.N. trusteeship over
Palestine, 197, 199.
Jewish Labour Committee, 6, 8
Jewish National Fund, 30, 32, 68,
101
Jewish Refugees, 18, 19
Jewish Spectator, 21
Johnson, Herschel V., 152, 170-4,
178, 184
Joint Distribution Committee, 10
Jory, Victor, 35
Der Judenstaat, xv

Karen Hayesod, 101, 102
Kelly, Gene, 35
Kennedy, Joseph P., 65
Keyserling, Leon, 26
Kimbball, David P., 107
King, Senator William, 27
Kirk, Ambassador, 81
Klein, Congressman, 199
Koestler, Arthur, 210
Korea, 188
Korff, Baruch, 103, 192

La Follette, Senator, 108
Lake Success, 166, 203, 204
Landis, James M., 87
Lane, Congressman, 103

Langer, Senator, 103
League of Nations, 112, 162
Lehman, Herbert, 152, 168, 186
Le Sourd, Howard M., 99, 107
Levinthal, Judge Louis, 55
Levy, Philip, 26
Liberia, 175, 180, 184
Life, 195
Lippman, Walter, 219
Lipsky, Louis, 44, 52, 53, 212
Lloyd George, David, xvii, xviii.
London, 213
London Conference, 1946, 154
Look, 195
Lourie, Arthur, 112, 215, 216
Lovett, Robert, 183, 191, 201, 202,
205, 206
Lowdermilk, Walter Clay, 22

McClintock, Robert, 200
McCloy, John J., 49, 211
McCormack, Congressman, 103
McDermott, Michael J., 81
McDonald, James G., 141, 142,
152, 155
MacDonald White Paper (1939),
4, 15, 40, 57, 70, 129, 141:
promises discontinuance of
Jewish immigration, 1; makes
Zionists turn to America, xxii,
xxiii, 1, 2; U.S. Government
attitude to, 53, 65-6, 78, 80-1,
131-2.
Maclean, Norman, 22
McMahon, Senator, 109, 152
McNary, Charles, 27
McNutt, Paul V., 27
Madison Square Park, 118, 213
Magnuson, Congressman, 152
Malcolm, James, xviii
Manuel, Frank, 62, 63, 84, 91, 92,
144, 158
Marshall, General George, 50,
108, 166, 167, 169, 170, 185,
191, 195, 197, 205, 206, 212

Marshall, Louis, xx
Martin, Joseph, 110
Massachusetts, 83
Mead, Senator, 103, 109, 117
Michigan, 83
Mizrachi Organization, 25, 121, 123
Monsky, Henry, 6, 7
Morgenstern, Dr. Julian, 13
Morgenthau, Henry, 71, 182
Morrison-Grady Committee, 150-3, 155, 157, 159, 189
Murray, Senator, 109
Myres, Senator, 109, 112

Nathan, Robert, 179, 180, 183
National Conference on Palestine, 49
National Jewish Ledger, 42, 46
National Security Agency, 191
Negev, 175
Netherlands, 169
Neumann, Emanuel, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 66, 93, 114, 116, 122, 163, 167, 218
New Jersey, 83
New Palestine, 5, 10
New Republic, 199
New York, 22, 82, 99, 100, 102, 117, 155, 159, 214
New York Daily Mirror, 28
New York Post, 199
New York Times, 21
Niles, David, 137, 204, 205
Nokrashy Pasha, 128
Nordau, 124

O'Dwyer, William, 168
Ohio, 83
Opinion, 21
Organ for Rehabilitation and Training, 10
Orthodox Jews, xv

Osborn, Sidney P., 107

Palestine Foundation Fund, 30, 32, 68
Parodi, Ambassador, 177
Pearson, Drew, 50, 211
Peel Commission, 120
Pennsylvania, 83, 100
Perkins, Frances, 88
Permanent Mandates Committee, 217
Peru, 169
Philadelphia, 214
Philby, St. John, 74-5
Philippines, 176, 180, 181, 184
Philips, William, 141
Pittsburgh Conference, 5, 6, 7, Poale Zion, 11, 123
Poland, 48
Political Action Committee for Palestine, 103
Potsdam, 129, 130
Proskauer, Judge Joseph, 11-13, 15, 121, 181

Rayburn, Sam, 80
Reader's Digest, 195
Reconstructionist, 21
Republican Convention, 1944, 54-5, 57
Reston, James, 156
Revisionists, 168
Rifkind, Simon, 26
Robinson, Edward A., 35
Romulo, General, 176, 180, 181
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 169, 186
Roosevelt, Franklin D., x, 50, 58, 60-2, 82, 91, 95, 125, 126, 128, 138, 150; basic attitude to Zionism, 92-4; views on Jewish refugee problem, 45, 71-3, 79, 154; attitude to 1939 White Paper, 53, 78, 80, 81; reluctant

to interfere with Britain in Palestine, 64-6; desire to pacify Arabs, 67-8, 70; letter to Ibn Saud 73-4, 77-8, 139; and Philby plan, 74-6; endorses Biltmore Program, 1944, 59, 83-4; meeting with Ibn Saud 85-6, 87-90

Roosevelt, Kermit, 137, 195

Rosenblatt, Will, 56, 82

Rosenman, Judge, 200

Rosenwald, Lessing, 42

Rothenberg, Morris, 7

Rothschild, Lord, xix

Roxas, President, 180

Rusk, Dean, 185

Russia, see Soviet Union

Ryan, Monsignor John F., 27

St. Louis, 99

Saltonstall, Senator, 109

Samuel, Herbert, xvii, xviii

San Francisco Conference, 95

Saudi Arabia, 48 73

Schildkraut, Joseph, 35

Scripps-Howard press, 193, 200

Shertok, Moshe, 123, 174

Shulman, Herman, 44, 155

Shultz, Lilian, 184

Siam, 181

Silver, Abba Hillel, 11-12, 21, 52-4, 58, 60-61, 63, 80-1, 84, 86, 90, 93, 103-4, 133, 154, 162, 172, 194, 215; tactics, 22-4, 31-6, 42-4, 62, 207-8; and Palestine resolution, 1944, 60-1, 212-4; and Palestine resolution, 1945, 111, 116; tries to stop loan to Britain, 117; defeats Jewish Agency moderates, 120-4; rejects Morrison Grady report, 152-3; accepts U.N. partition plan, 171; rejects trusteeship proposals, 194, 199.

Sinai, xv

Smith, Senator, 109, 152

Sokolov, Nahum, xx, 63

Soviet Union, 143, 149, 170, 172, 187, 188

Spellacy, Mayor, 64

Stace, William T., 164

Stalin, Joseph, 86, 93

State Department, see U.S. State Department

Steinberg, Harry, 53

Steinhardt, Ambassador, 56

Stern, David, 114

Stern Gang, xi

Stettinius, Edward R., 49, 58-60, 77, 78, 90, 92, 97, 105, 126, 211

Stimson, Henry L., 47-51, 57, 59, 78, 211

Stone, Elihu, 55

Strauss, Nathan, 100

Sulzberger, A.H., 21, 119

Sweden, 169

Swope, Herbert, Bayard, 182, 183

Sykes, Mark, xviii

Symington, Stuart, 193

Taft, Senator, 27, 39, 109-11, 114, 149

Texas, 100

Thailand, see Siam

The Voice, 39

Tobey, Senator, 109, 112

Tox, Moshe, 178

Toynbee, Arnold, xvii

Tractenberg, Rabbi Joshua, 13, 14

Transjordan, 218

Truman, Harry S., x, 106, 109, 111, 125-6, 136-9, 148-9, 167, 198, 211, 213-6, 218; and Anglo-American Committee, 113-5, 140-1, 145-6; sympathy with Zionists, 1945, 127-135; and Morrison-Grady plan 150-5; promises in 1946 elections, 156, 159, 160; denies breaking commitments to the Arabs, 157-8;

pressurizes countries to support partition, 182-5; shifts from support of partition, 1948, 191, 200-3; and recognition of Israel, 204-6; attitude to Zionist pressure, 154, 182-3, 197.
 Turkey, Sultan of, xvii
 Turkey, xvi, 149, 163

Uganda, xvii
 United Jewish Appeal, 30, 32
 United Kingdom, x, xvii, xviii, 1, 2, 23, 33, 40, 63-6, 70-1, 77-9, 113, 117-8, 121, 127, 129, 131, 135, 140, 143, 150, 151, 153-4, 159, 161-3, 165, 173, 186, 192, 202-3
 United Nations, x, 4, 14, 28, 92, 96, 98, 133, 139, 145, 148, 160, 161-2, 165-9, 172, 174-86, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198-9, 200, 204, 207
 United Nations Charter, 112
 United Nations Security Council, 173, 190, 196-8, 203
 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 165-7, 169, 172, 175
 United States, for U.S. Policy see under Roosevelt, Truman, State Department.
 United States Congress, ix, 5, 16, 26, 37-41, 43, 47, 48, 50, 51, 59, 60, 61-3, 77-8, 80, 85, 103-5, 108-12, 116-7, 167, 181, 208, 212-4.
 United States Palestine Appeal, 101
 U.S. State Department, 41, 64, 74, 77, 81, 92, 96, 108, 128, 137, 141, 148-50, 153, 159, 163, 167, 175, 180, 209, 211-2, 214, 218; opposed to 1944 Congress resolution, 48, 61, 85; apprehensive about Zionism, 62, 67-9, 78-9, 91, 126, 132, 139, 143; warned not to criticize White House, 157; and U.N. partition plan, 175, 184-5, 188-9, 191-3, 200-1; ignored in decision to recognize Israel, 205-6
 Uruguay, 169

Vandenberg, Senator, 27
 Vioux, Antonio, 179
Virginia Quarterly Review, 101
 Voss, Carl Dr., 99

Wagner, Robert F., 25-28, 39, 56, 58, 83, 85, 99, 106-8, 110, 112, 114-5, 129, 130, 133, 146, 149, 152, 155, 163, 164, 181, 215, 218
 Wagner-Taft Resolution, 61, 116, 217
 Walsh, Senator, 103, 110, 111
 Warburg, Felix, xxii
 War Department, 69, 77, 212
 Washington, 21, 22, 70, 118, 140, 150, 180, 194, 197, 205, 214
 Washington Bureau, 46
 Weeks, Edward, 164
 Weiss, Samuel, 78
 Weizmann, Chaim, xvii-xviii, 3, 30, 136, 141, 181-2, 207, 210; focuses on America for support, 2; unsatisfactory trip to U.S., 1940, 66-7; complains about State Department attitude 69-70; and Philby plan, 74-6; and Basle Conference, 1946, 122-4; secures Aqaba for Jewish State, 174; and U.S. trusteeship proposals, 1948, 194, 197-201; obtains U.S. recognition of Israel, 203-4
 Welles, Sumner, 68, 74, 75, 87, 93, 168, 183, 186
 Wheeler, Senator, 109
 White Paper (1939), see Mac-

Donald White Paper
White, William Allen, 27
Wilhelm II, xvii
Wilson, Evan, 143
Wilson, Woodrow, xviii, xix, 41,
56, 62, 63, 127
Winant, John G., 67, 110
Wise, Stephen, 24, 29, 31, 53, 59,
60-1, 66, 80-1, 85-6, 117, 136,
139, 141, 157, 208, 213, 215;
at 1944 Democratic Convention, 54-7; rejects partition, 58;
persuades Roosevelt to confirm
election pledges, 90-91; and
Congress resolution on Palestine, 1945, 104-5, 112; sup-
ports moderates against Silver,
122-4; meeting with Truman
on refugees, 125-8; demands
enforcement of partition re-
solution, 193
World Zionist Organization, xi-
xiii, xvii, xx, xxi, 5, 162; see
also under Jewish Agency

Wright, Walter, 39, 101
Yalta, 88
Young, Senator, 103
Yugoslavia, 169

Zaritsky, Max, 100
Zionist Congresses; First (Basle
1897), xvi, xvii, 3; Sixth, xv;
Fourteenth (Vienna, 1925), xxi;
Twenty-second (Basle, 1946),
121-4, 159, 162
Zionist Organization of America,
x, xvii, 7, 11, 15-16, 33, 34,
42-4, 53, 57, 98, 110, 122-4,
153, 162, 168, 206, 209, 210;
see also under Emergency
Council of the Z.O.A., Silver,
Wise
Zionist Organization Vigilance
Committees 36,